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Abstract 
[Excerpt] President Barack Obama’s Administration has sought to build upon the deepened U.S. 
engagement with India begun by President Bill Clinton in 2000 and expanded upon during much of the 
past decade under President G.W. Bush. This “U.S.-India 3.0” diplomacy was most recently on display in 
July 2011, when the second U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue session saw a large delegation of senior U.S. 
officials visit New Delhi to discuss a broad range of global and bilateral issues. Many analysts view the 
U.S.-India relationship as being among the world’s most important in coming decades and see potentially 
large benefits to be accrued through engagement on many convergent interests. Bilateral initiatives are 
underway in all areas, although independent analysts in both countries worry that the partnership has lost 
momentum in recent years. Outstanding areas of bilateral friction include obstacles to bilateral trade and 
investment, including in the high-technology sector; outsourcing; the status of conflict in Afghanistan; 
climate change; and stalled efforts to initiate civil nuclear cooperation. 
India is the world’s most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative 
government and rule of law. Its left-leaning Congress Party-led ruling national coalition has been in power 
for more than seven years under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an Oxford-trained 
economist. New Delhi’s engagement with regional and other states is extensive and reflects its rising 
geopolitical status. The national economy has been growing rapidly—India’s is projected to be the world’s 
third-largest economy in the foreseeable future—yet poor infrastructure, booming energy demand, and 
restrictive trade and investment practices are seen to hamper full economic potential. Despite the growth 
of a large urban middle-class, India’s remains a largely rural and agriculture-based society, and is home to 
some 500-600 million people living in poverty. This report will be updated periodically. 
Keywords 
United States, India, foreign relations, democracy, strategic issues 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Kronstadt, K. A., Kerr, P. K, Martin, M. F., & Vaughn, B. (2011). India: Domestic issues, strategic dynamics, 
and U.S. relations [Electronic version]. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/861 
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress        
 
 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, 
and U.S. Relations  
K. Alan Kronstadt, Coordinator 
Specialist in South Asian Affairs 
Paul K. Kerr 
Analyst in Nonproliferation 
Michael F. Martin 
Specialist in Asian Affairs 
Bruce Vaughn 
Specialist in Asian Affairs 
September 1, 2011 
Congressional Research Service 
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
RL33529 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 
Summary 
South Asia emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. 
India, the region’s dominant actor with more than 1 billion citizens, is often characterized as a 
nascent great power and “indispensable partner” of the United States, one that many analysts 
view as a potential counterweight to China’s growing clout. Since 2004, Washington and New 
Delhi have been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on shared values and apparently 
convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including 
plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative—first launched in 2005 
and codified in U.S. law in 2008—reversed three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, but has 
not been implemented to date. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense 
framework agreement to expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage 
in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major U.S. arms sales to India 
are underway. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow; 
significant two-way investment also flourishes. The influence of a large, relatively wealthy, and 
increasingly influential Indian-American community is reflected in Congress’s largest country-
specific caucus. More than 100,000 Indian students are attending American universities. 
Further U.S. attention on South Asia focuses on ongoing, historically rooted tensions between 
India and Pakistan. In the interests of regional stability, in particular as a means of facilitating 
U.S.-led efforts to stabilize nearby Afghanistan, the United States strongly endorses an existing, 
but largely moribund India-Pakistan peace initiative, and remains concerned about the potential 
for conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed 
countries. The United States also seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
missiles in South Asia. 
President Barack Obama’s Administration has sought to build upon the deepened U.S. 
engagement with India begun by President Bill Clinton in 2000 and expanded upon during much 
of the past decade under President G.W. Bush. This “U.S.-India 3.0” diplomacy was most recently 
on display in July 2011, when the second U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue session saw a large 
delegation of senior U.S. officials visit New Delhi to discuss a broad range of global and bilateral 
issues. Many analysts view the U.S.-India relationship as being among the world’s most 
important in coming decades and see potentially large benefits to be accrued through engagement 
on many convergent interests. Bilateral initiatives are underway in all areas, although independent 
analysts in both countries worry that the partnership has lost momentum in recent years. 
Outstanding areas of bilateral friction include obstacles to bilateral trade and investment, 
including in the high-technology sector; outsourcing; the status of conflict in Afghanistan; climate 
change; and stalled efforts to initiate civil nuclear cooperation. 
India is the world’s most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative 
government and rule of law. Its left-leaning Congress Party-led ruling national coalition has been 
in power for more than seven years under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an 
Oxford-trained economist. New Delhi’s engagement with regional and other states is extensive 
and reflects its rising geopolitical status. The national economy has been growing rapidly—
India’s is projected to be the world’s third-largest economy in the foreseeable future—yet poor 
infrastructure, booming energy demand, and restrictive trade and investment practices are seen to 
hamper full economic potential. Despite the growth of a large urban middle-class, India’s remains 
a largely rural and agriculture-based society, and is home to some 500-600 million people living 
in poverty. This report will be updated periodically. 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 
Contents 
Overview: U.S.-India Relations....................................................................................................... 1 
Notable Developments in 2011 ................................................................................................. 4 
Early Obama Administration Engagement ................................................................................ 5 
June 2010 Strategic Dialogue .................................................................................................... 6 
President Obama’s November 2010 Visit to India .................................................................... 7 
A Permanent U.N. Security Council Seat for India?........................................................... 8 
Reactions to the President’s Visit ........................................................................................ 8 
July 2011 Strategic Dialogue..................................................................................................... 9 
India’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations................................................................................ 10 
Major Streams of Thought in Indian Foreign Policy............................................................... 12 
Rivalry and Conflict With Pakistan ......................................................................................... 13 
The India-Pakistan Peace Process ..................................................................................... 14 
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks and the LeT ............................................................................. 16 
The Kashmir Dispute ........................................................................................................ 17 
India and the Afghan Insurgency............................................................................................. 19 
Partnership and Reconstruction Assistance....................................................................... 19 
Afghan Reconciliation, Security Concerns, and the U.S. Drawdown............................... 19 
India-China Relations: Asia’s Titanic Rivalry? ....................................................................... 21 
Background and Context................................................................................................... 21 
India-China Commercial Relations................................................................................... 24 
Is There a Chinese “String of Pearls” Strategy in the Indian Ocean? ............................... 24 
Recent Developments........................................................................................................ 25 
India’s Other Regional Foreign Relations ............................................................................... 27 
India-Sri Lanka.................................................................................................................. 27 
India-Bangladesh............................................................................................................... 28 
India-Nepal........................................................................................................................ 30 
India-Burma ...................................................................................................................... 32 
India-ASEAN.................................................................................................................... 33 
India-Iran........................................................................................................................... 34 
India-Russia....................................................................................................................... 36 
India-Japan ........................................................................................................................ 37 
India-Africa ....................................................................................................................... 38 
India’s Domestic Policy Setting..................................................................................................... 38 
National Political System, Elections, and Parties.................................................................... 38 
National System and Elections.......................................................................................... 39 
Major Political Parties....................................................................................................... 40 
Corruption Scandals and Congress Party Woes ................................................................ 43 
India’s Economy...................................................................................................................... 49 
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 49 
Poverty .............................................................................................................................. 50 
Poor Infrastructure............................................................................................................. 51 
Corruption and Economic Freedoms................................................................................. 52 
Inflationary Pressures........................................................................................................ 52 
Foreign Investment............................................................................................................ 53 
Other Economic Issues...................................................................................................... 53 
India’s Energy, Environment, and Climate Change Policies ................................................... 54 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 
Energy Issues..................................................................................................................... 54 
The Environment and Climate Change Issues .................................................................. 55 
Security-Related Issues ........................................................................................................... 58 
The Indian Military ........................................................................................................... 58 
Separatism in the Jammu and Kashmir State .................................................................... 60 
Maoist Rebellion, Other Insurgencies, and Communalism............................................... 67 
Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation..................................................................... 72 
U.S.-India Bilateral Issues ............................................................................................................. 74 
U.S.-India Economic and Trade Relations .............................................................................. 74 
U.S.-India Economic Issues and Engagement......................................................................... 75 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ............................................................................. 76 
Trade in Dual-Use Technology.......................................................................................... 77 
U.S Market Access in India............................................................................................... 77 
India’s Participation in the GSP Program.......................................................................... 77 
Bilateral Investment Treaty ............................................................................................... 78 
U.S. Restrictions on Trade in Services .............................................................................. 78 
U.S. Farm Subsidy Program.............................................................................................. 78 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations ........................................................................................ 78 
Space Cooperation............................................................................................................. 79 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation ..................................................................................... 79 
Background ....................................................................................................................... 79 
Recent Developments........................................................................................................ 81 
U.S.-India Security Cooperation ............................................................................................. 82 
Intelligence and Counterterrorism..................................................................................... 83 
Defense Cooperation and Trade ........................................................................................ 84 
Human Rights Concerns.......................................................................................................... 88 
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 90 
Caste-Based Discrimination.............................................................................................. 91 
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 91 
Female Infanticide and Feticide ........................................................................................ 92 
U.S. Foreign Assistance........................................................................................................... 92 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Major Party Representation in India’s 15th Lok Sabha................................................... 40 
Figure 2. Map of Kashmir.............................................................................................................. 63 
Figure 3. Deaths Related to Kashmiri Separatist Conflict, 1988-2010.......................................... 64 
Figure 4. Map of India ................................................................................................................... 94 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Direct U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2011 ........................................................... 93 
 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 94 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 1 
Overview: U.S.-India Relations 
The United States does not just believe, as some people say, that India is a rising power; we 
believe that India has already risen. India is taking its rightful place in Asia and on the global 
stage. And we see India’s emergence as good for the United States and good for the world.  
-President Barack Obama, Mumbai, India, November 7, 20101 
With the lifting of Cold War geopolitical constraints and the near-simultaneous opening of India’s 
economy in early 1990s, the world’s largest democracy has emerged as an increasingly important 
player on the global stage. India dominates the geography of the now strategically vital South 
Asia region, and its vibrant economy, pluralist society, cultural influence, and growing military 
power have made the country a key focus of U.S. foreign policy attention in the 21st century. This 
attention is to some degree motivated by China’s longer-standing and more rapid rise, with many 
analysts viewing U.S. and Indian geopolitical interests as convergent on many fronts, perhaps 
especially in the area of Asian power balances. President George W. Bush is credited with 
building on the breakthrough visit by President Bill Clinton in 2000, which ended the 
estrangement of the post-1998 Indian nuclear weapons tests. Under President Bush and 
continuing with President Barack Obama the U.S. and Indian governments have been seeking to 
sustain a substantive “strategic partnership,” even as bilateral commercial and people-to-people 
contacts flourish of their own accord. 
The U.S.-India partnership is based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of 
law. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including unprecedented plans for 
civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. The two countries inked a ten-year defense 
framework agreement in 2005 to facilitate expanded bilateral security cooperation. In the new 
century, large-scale combined military exercises have become commonplace, and bilateral 
cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism is increasing. Unprecedented major U.S. arms 
sales to India are underway; more are anticipated. The influence of a geographically dispersed 
and relatively wealthy Indian-American community of some 2.7 million is reflected in Congress’s 
largest country-specific caucus. More than 100,000 Indian students are attending American 
universities. Notably, a number of Indian-Americans now occupy senior positions in the Obama 
Administration, Agency for International Development Administrator Rajiv Shah among them.2 
Further U.S. interest in South Asia focuses on ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan 
rooted largely in competing claims to the Kashmir region and in “cross-border terrorism” in both 
Kashmir and major Indian cities. In the interests of regional stability, in particular as a means of 
forwarding U.S. interests in nearby Afghanistan, the United States strongly endorses an existing, 
but until recently moribund India-Pakistan peace initiative, and remains concerned about the  
                                                                 
1 “Remarks by the President and First Lady in Town Hall With Students in Mumbai, India,” White House release, 
November 7, 2010. 
2 “Desis in DC,” Times of India (Delhi), December 19, 2009. According to India’s Ambassador to the United States, 
America is home to 50,000 Indian-born physicians, and 10,000 Indian-American hotel and motel owners who employ 
nearly 600,000 people; some 40% of American hotel rooms are owned by Indian-Americans. A Newsweek article 
claims that two-thirds of people of Indian descent living in America have a college degree, compared to less than one-
third of the general population, and the average household income is $90,000 for ethnic Indians as compared to 
$50,000 for all U.S. households (Embassy of India, “Ambassador’s Address at the ‘People-to-People’ Conference,” 
October 28, 2010; “India Conquers the World,” Newsweek, July 25, 2011). 
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potential for conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty 
to cause open hostilities between these two 
nuclear-armed countries. The United States also 
seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and missiles in South Asia. 
President Obama desires to continue expanded 
engagement and cooperation with India. His 
May 2010 National Security Strategy noted 
that, “The United States and India are building 
a strategic partnership that is underpinned by 
our shared interests, our shared values as the 
world’s two largest democracies, and close 
connections among our people.”3 Yet there are 
concerns among observers in both countries 
that momentum has waned (by some accounts 
due to U.S. inattention), that outstanding areas 
of friction continue to hinder optimal levels of 
cooperation, and that India’s geostrategic, 
economic, and security circumstances combine 
with New Delhi’s lingering skepticism over 
America’s global and regional role to preclude 
the kind of “special relationship” that many 
boosters of U.S.-India ties envisage. While 
U.S.-India engagement under the Obama 
Administration has not (to date) realized any 
groundbreaking initiatives as was the case 
under the Bush Administration, it may be that 
the apparently growing “dominance of 
ordinariness” in the relationship is a hidden 
strength that demonstrates its maturing into 
diplomatic normalcy.4 
Indeed, there is a pervasive sense in policy 
circles that dramatic new breakthroughs in U.S.-India relations are not on the horizon, and that 
President Obama’s November 2010 travel to India may have brought the two countries to a 
plateau of sorts whereupon routinized, but still meaningful interactions take place in the near 
term. Both national governments have been dealing with serious domestic issues in 2011 (the 
United States with federal budget issues, India with major corruption scandals), as well as with 
more pressing foreign policy concerns.  
                                                                 
3 The document continues: “Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broad-
based relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation, and helps promote 
poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value India’s growing leadership on a wide array 
of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia 
and elsewhere in the world” (see http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf). 
4 Ashley Tellis, “Manmohan Singh Visits Washington: Sustaining U.S.-Indian Cooperation and Differences,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 85, November 2009. See also Ronen Sen, “From Drama to Routine” 
(op-ed), Telegraph (Kolkata), July 28, 2011. 
India in Brief 
Population: 1.17 billion; growth rate: 1.3% (2011 
census, 2011 est.) 
Area: 3,287,590 sq. km. (slightly more than one-third 
the size of the United States) 
Capital: New Delhi 
Head of Government: Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh (Congress Party) 
Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan 72%; Dravidian 25%; 
other 3% 
Languages: 22 official, 13 of which are the primary 
tongue of at least 10 million people; Hindi is the 
primary tongue of about 30%; English widely used 
Religions: Hindu 81%; Muslim 13%; Christian 2%; Sikh 
2%, other 2% (2001 census) 
Life Expectancy at Birth: female 68 years; male 66 
years (2011 est.) 
Literacy: female 48%; male 73% (2001 census) 
Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $3.78 trillion; 
per capita: $3,540; growth rate 8.8% (2010) 
Currency: Rupee (100 = $2.18) 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index): 12% (2010) 
Defense Budget: $38.4 billion (2.5% of GDP; 2010) 
U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $29.5 billion; imports 
from U.S. $19.3 billion (2010) 
Sources: CIA World Factbook; U.S. Department of 
Commerce; Economist Intelligence Unit; International 
Institute for Strategic Studies 
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Given a setting in which the private sectors of both countries are impatient with the pace of 
economic reform in India and with rampant corruption there, some analysts call on the two 
governments to concentrate on limited goals with clear chances for success, such as in defense 
trade and with the development of multilateral and Asian architectures, in both the economic and 
security realms.5 One leading Indian commentator urges American patience and recognition that 
New Delhi views engagement with the United States as its highest foreign policy priority. The 
contention here is that India’s four purported top long-term foreign policy objectives—a stable 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region; exerting influence across the Indian Ocean region; obtaining status 
as a “rule-maker” in the international system; and strengthening “global power” factors such as 
sustained economic growth and military modernization—all require strategic cooperation with the 
United States.6 Yet a more pessimistic view has the bilateral relationship constrained in large part 
by differences over the U.S.-Pakistan alliance and by India’s apparent reluctance to exert power 
in its own region, resulting in years of “a lot of rhetoric but very little substantive movement” in 
U.S.-India ties.7 
The sweeping scope of the bilateral relationship, as well as the perceived lack of focus within it, 
may be found in the various and usually large number of issue-areas listed in joint statements. 
However, in May 2011, the lead U.S. diplomat for the region helpfully summarized U.S.-India 
relations under the rubric of four major “agendas”: 
• an innovation agenda that includes collaboration on energy security, civil nuclear 
cooperation, agriculture, space, climate, and other sciences; 
• a security agenda that includes military-to-military relations, arms sales, and 
nonproliferation; 
• a people-to-people agenda that encourages civic engagement, and open 
governance and democracy initiatives; and 
• a growth agenda focused on increasing bilateral trade and investment by 
removing barriers to both. 8 
                                                                 
5 See S. Amer Latif and Kart Inderfurth, “Six Months After the Obama-Singh Summit,” CSIS U.S.-India Insight, June 
2011. The United States and India have since 2007 participated in an East Asia Dialogue, and the two countries have 
since expanded strategic consultation with June 2011 the launching of a Central Asia Dialogue and the subsequent July 
launch of a West Asia Dialogue. Plans to open consultations on Latin America and the Caribbean are underway. In 
2011, the United States is inviting India to join the upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Hawaii as 
an observer country (India’s membership in APEC is not possible at present). 
6 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Strategic Future,” Foreign Policy (online), November 4, 2010. See also Daniel Twining and 
Richard Fontaine, “The Ties that Bind?: U.S.-Indian Values-Based Cooperation,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011. 
7 Harsh Pant, “The Chasm Between India and the U.S.” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2011. See also Dhruva 
Jaishankar, “U.S.-India Relations: Can India Step Up to the Plate?,” East-West Center Asia Pacific Bulletin 126, 
August 2, 2011. 
8 Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake, “The Current State of U.S.-India Cooperation and Prospects for the Future 
(As Prepared)” (speech transcript), Department of State release, May 13, 2011. President Obama’s November 2010 
state visit to India produced summaries of 16 major issue-areas for bilateral cooperation: (1) Export controls, to include 
U.S. support for India’s membership in major export control regimes; (2) Trade and economic cooperation with a 
shared commitment to open market economics; (3) Partnership for an Evergreen Revolution that will focus on 
enhancing India’s food security through enhanced weather and climate forecasting, and with improved food processing 
and food-to-market links; (4) Counterterrorism cooperation building on a landmark July 2010 initiative; (5) Civil space 
cooperation, including space exploration and earth observation; (6) Clean energy and climate change, to ensure mutual 
energy security and build clean energy economies; (7) Cybersecurity and the promotion of reliable information and 
communication infrastructures; (8) The CEO Forum and implementation of its recommendations; (9) Defense 
cooperation through extensive military-to-military links, joint exercises, defense sales, and a focus on coordinating 
(continued...) 
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Tangible progress is being made in each of these areas despite ongoing U.S. government irritants, 
in particular obstacles to full implementation of civil nuclear cooperation; overly restrictive limits 
on foreign investment; lingering barriers to trade; and insufficient protection of intellectual 
property rights, among others. Even leading American boosters of expanded U.S.-India ties 
insistently call on New Delhi to take more rapid action in these areas.9 
Notable Developments in 2011 
• U.S.-India cooperation in the area of nuclear energy—an initiative launched in 
2005 and approved by Congress in 2008—continues to be delayed by the lack of 
both a liability arrangement and an agreement on monitoring arrangements for 
U.S. nuclear exports to certain Indian entities (see the “U.S.-India Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation” section below). 
• In April, New Delhi announced that it had narrowed the list of competitors for a 
roughly $11 billion contract for 126 new medium multi-role combat aircraft 
(MMRCA) to two finalists, both European vendors. U.S. government officials 
expressed being “deeply disappointed” by news of the “deselection” of U.S.-
based Boeing and Lockheed Martin from consideration, and what seemed a 
choice with major geostrategic implications elicited much debate over its 
meaning (see the “Defense Cooperation and Trade” section below).10 
• Major corruption scandals that broke in New Delhi in late 2010 have snowballed 
into a crisis not only for the sitting Congress Party-led United Progressive 
Alliance national coalition government, but also for India’s political system writ 
large. Summer months have seen the emergence of a massive people’s movement 
protesting the country’s pervasive corruption, a movement lead in particular by 
social activist Anne Hazare (see the “Corruption Scandals and Congress Party 
Woes” section below). 
• U.S. Ambassador to India Tim Roemer tendered his resignation on April 28, 
2011, the same day that New Delhi announced the MMRCA deselection, and 
departed the New Delhi post on June 30. Roemer explained his departure as 
arising for personal, professional, and family reasons. The interim Chief of 
Mission, Peter Burleigh, is a highly competent veteran American diplomat with 
significant regional experience, but observers warn that U.S.-India relations 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
efforts to ensure maritime security; (10) The U.S.-India Economic and Financial Partnership that institutionalizes 
deeper bilateral relations in economic and financial sectors; (11) Education, including academic exchanges, university 
linkages, and the holding of a U.S.-India Education Summit; (12) Nuclear security, including cooperative activities 
with India’s Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership; (13) Deepening U.S-India strategic ties through greater 
consultation on foreign policy issues of mutual concern; (14) Development collaboration in Afghanistan, with a focus 
on agricultural development and women’s empowerment; (15) Securing the air, sea, and space domains that transcend 
national borders; and (16) Open government dialogue based on shared interest in democracy and transparency (see 
“The U.S.-India Partnership: The Fact Sheets,” White House release, November 8, 2010). 
9 See, for example, Richard Armitage and Nicolas Burns, “A To-Do List for Obama in India” (op-ed), Wall Street 
Journal, November 5, 2010. 
10 Department of State release, April 29, 2011. 
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could suffer if the Obama Administration does not move quickly to appoint a new 
permanent Ambassador.11 
• In June, Ranjan Mathai, a career foreign service office and former ambassador to 
France, was appointed to replace Nirupama Rao as Indian foreign secretary 
beginning in August. Rao retired from the Indian Foreign Service and was 
appointed to succeed Meera Shankar as Ambassador to the United States. 
Early Obama Administration Engagement 
Just days into President Obama’s term, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Indian External 
Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna agreed to “further strengthen the excellent bilateral relationship” 
between the United States and India. Soon after, President Obama issued a statement asserting 
that, “Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world’s 
citizens” and that the people of India “should know they have no better friend and partner than 
the people of the United States.” As part of her confirmation hearing to become Secretary of 
State, Clinton told Senators she would work to fulfill President Obama’s commitment to 
“establish a true strategic partnership with India, increase our military cooperation, trade, and 
support democracies around the world.”12 
Despite such top-level assurances from the new U.S. Administration, during 2009 and into 2010, 
many in India became concerned that Washington was not focusing on the bilateral relationship 
with the same vigor as did the Bush Administration, which was viewed in India as having pursued 
both broader and stronger ties in an unprecedented manner. Many concerns arose in New Delhi, 
among them that the Obama Administration was overly focused on U.S. relations with China in 
ways that would reduce India’s influence and visibility; that it was intent on deepening relations 
with India’s main rival, Pakistan, in ways that could be harmful to Indian security and perhaps 
lead to a more interventionist approach to the Kashmir problem; that a new U.S. emphasis on 
nonproliferation and arms control would lead to pressure on India join such multilateral initiatives 
as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; and that the 
Administration might pursue so-called protectionist economic policies that could adversely affect 
bilateral commerce in goods and services.13 
While some of these concerns persist, robust, positive, high-level U.S. attention to relations with 
India has continued. Secretary Clinton was widely seen to have concluded a successful visit to 
India in July 2009, inking several agreements, and also making important symbolic points by 
                                                                 
11 Teresita Schaffer, “Changing of the Guard at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi,” South Asia Hand (online), June 21, 
2011. Amb. Roemer’s statement at http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr042811.html. 
12 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Telephonic Conversation Between EAM and US Secretary of State,” January 
23, 2009; White House statement at http://whitehouse.gov/58_years_of_Indian_democracy; hearing transcript at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. 
13 In a development illustrative of India’s early trepidation, two days after taking office, President Obama announced 
the appointment of former Clinton Administration diplomat Richard Holbrooke to be Special Representative to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Prior to the announcement, there was speculation that the new U.S. President would appoint 
a special envoy to the region with a wider brief, perhaps to include India and even Kashmir. Upon persistent 
questioning, a State Department spokesman insisted that Holbrooke’s mandate was “strictly” limited to dealing with 
“the Pakistan-Afghanistan situation.” By some accounts, the Indian government vigorously (and successfully) lobbied 
the Administration to ensure that neither India nor Kashmir were included in Holbrooke’s official brief (see 
http://state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jan/115448.htm; “India’s Stealth Lobbying Against Holbrooke’s Brief,” Foreign 
Policy (online), January 23, 2009). 
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staying at Mumbai’s Taj Mahal hotel (site of a major Islamist terrorist attack in 2008) and having 
a high-profile meeting with women’s groups.14 
In November 2009, President Obama hosted his inaugural state visit when Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh dined at the White House. Despite the important symbolism, the resulting 
diplomacy was seen by many proponents of closer ties as disappointing (if not an outright failure) 
in its outcome, at least to the extent that no “breakthroughs” in the bilateral relationship were 
announced. Yet from other perspectives there were visible ideational gains: the relationship was 
shown to transcend the preferences of any single leader or government; the two leaders 
demonstrated that their countries’ strategic goals were increasingly well aligned; and plans were 
made to continue taking advantage of complementarities while differences are well managed. 
Perhaps most significantly, the visit itself contributed to ameliorating concerns in India that the 
Obama Administration was insufficiently attuned to India’s potential role as a U.S. partner. 
Still, in the wake of Prime Minister Singh’s U.S. travel, some observers continued voicing 
concerns at the Obama Administration’s perceived “air of ambivalence” toward India, with one 
going so far as to accuse the U.S. Administration of “diplomatic negligence” in its allegedly 
insufficient attention to New Delhi’s key concerns, and for policies that could “put India into its 
subcontinental box” by relegating it to a regional role through the Asia-wide elevation of China.15 
June 2010 Strategic Dialogue 
The United States and India formally reengaged the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under 
President G.W. Bush when a large delegation of high-ranking Indian officials led by External 
Affairs Minister Krishna visited Washington, DC, in June 2010. As leader of the U.S. delegation, 
Secretary Clinton lauded India as “an indispensable partner and a trusted friend.” At a State 
Department reception, President Obama declared his firm belief that “the relationship between 
the United States and India will be a defining partnership in the 21st century.”16 
In anticipation of the Dialogue, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns had 
given a policy speech on “India’s rise and the future of the U.S.-India relationship” in which he 
asserted, “The simple truth that India’s strength and progress on the world stage is deeply in the 
strategic interest of the United States.” Burns acknowledged that progress in the partnership is not 
automatic and would require sustained efforts on both sides, and also that some Indians worry the 
United States sees India through the prism of ties with Pakistan and/or was overly focused on 
China. He sought to ameliorate these concerns by assuring his audience that the United States 
does not view relations in Asia as a zero-sum game and that its relations with Pakistan did not 
come at the expense of India.17 Two days later, the Strategic Dialogue produced a joint statement 
in which the two countries pledged to “deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and 
                                                                 
14 In the resulting U.S.-India Joint Statement, Clinton and Krishna committed their respective countries to enhancing a 
strategic partnership that “seeks to advance solutions to the defining challenges of our time” and to concentrate work in 
11 major issue-areas (see the July 20, 2009, text at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530515048). 
15 Daniel Twining, “Diplomatic Negligence” (op-ed), Weekly Standard, May 10, 2010. 
16 See Secretary Clinton’s and Minister Krishna’s June 3, 2010, remarks to the media at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2010/06/142642.htm. President Obama’s June 3, 2010, remarks at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-us-india-strategic-dialogue-reception. 
17 See the June 1, 2010, speech transcript at http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm. 
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government-to-government linkages … for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the 
promotion of global peace, stability, and prosperity.”18 
President Obama’s November 2010 Visit to India 
As the U.S. President planned his November 2010 visit to India, an array of prickly bilateral 
issues confronted him, including differences over the proper regional roles to be played by China 
and Pakistan; the status of conflict in Afghanistan; international efforts to address Iran’s 
controversial nuclear program; restrictions on high-technology exports to India, outsourcing, and 
sticking points on the conclusion of arrangements for both civil nuclear and defense cooperation, 
among others. Moreover, while Indian officials will present a long list of demands to their 
American interlocutors, they come under fire for paying insufficient attention to American 
interests and concerns, and for not recognizing the sometimes serious costs of appearing 
insensitive to same.  
Upon arriving in the Indian financial hub of Mumbai on November 7, 2010, President Obama laid 
a white rose at a memorial to the victims of the November 2008 terrorist attack and spoke at the 
Taj Mahal Palace hotel, a main target of that attack. While in that city, the President announced 
$10 billion in new trade deals, among them a $7.7 billion contract for Boeing to supply 30 737 
commercial aircraft to India’s SpiceJet airline. The new deals were projected to create some 
50,000 U.S. jobs.19 Many Indian observers were irked by the President’s failure to mention 
Pakistan in his initial remarks, fueling for some a persistent Indian belief that the United States 
remains too devoted to its alliance with Islamabad. When asked about this in a meeting with a 
group of Mumbai college students, President Obama sought to impress upon the audience a belief 
that no country has a bigger stake in Pakistan’s success than does India, commenting, “I think that 
if Pakistan is unstable, that’s bad for India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous, that’s good.”20 
In New Delhi, President Obama’s historic speech to a joint session of the Indian Parliament 
characterized the U.S.-India partnership as serving three broad purposes: (1) promoting prosperity 
on both countries, especially through greater trade and two-way investment, and food security 
and health-related initiatives; (2) enhancing shared security by working together to prevent 
terrorist attacks, and; (3) strengthening democratic governance and human rights. In the context 
of this last issue-area, President Obama chided India for often “shying away” from taking clear 
public stands in the face of gross human rights violations and the suppression of democratic 
movements, as was recently seen to be the case in Burma.21 
                                                                 
18 The Statement further outlined extensive bilateral initiatives in each of ten key areas: (1) advancing global security 
and countering terrorism; (2) disarmament and nonproliferation; (3) trade and economic relations; (4) high technology; 
(5) energy security, clean energy, and climate change; (6) agriculture; (7) education; (8) health; (9) science and 
technology; and (10) development. Secretary Clinton confirmed President Obama’s intention to visit India in 
November 2010 (see the June 3, 2010, document at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142645.htm). 
19 The Administration subsequently touted myriad U.S. export initiatives that were generating jobs across every U.S. 
region and major commercial sector (see “The National Export Initiative” in “The U.S.-India Partnership: The Fact 
Sheets,” White House release, November 8, 2010). 
20 “Remarks by the President and First Lady in Town Hall With Students in Mumbai, India,” White House release, 
November 7, 2010. 
21 “Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, India,” White House release, 
November 8, 2010. 
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While appearing a joint news conference, Prime Minister Singh called the American President “a 
sincere and valued friend” of India, and he welcomed an acceleration of the deepening of bilateral 
ties with an aim of working “as equal partners” in the relationship. For his part, President Obama 
reiterated his view that the U.S.-India relationship will be one of the defining partnerships of the 
21st century, and he reviewed the litany of varied bilateral initiatives both underway and planned. 
Both leaders expressed satisfaction with adjustments in U.S. export control regulations that are 
expected to facilitate greater joint cooperation in high-technology fields.22 
A Permanent U.N. Security Council Seat for India? 
During his address to Indian parliamentarians, President Obama received thunderous applause for 
his endorsement of a permanent Indian seat on the U.N. Security Council as part of elevating that 
country to “its rightful place in the world.”23 This was the most explicit such endorsement to date; 
previously, the U.S. government had endorsed only Japan as a new permanent member of that 
body. There is evidence of U.S. congressional support for a permanent Indian role on the 
Council.24 Although this unprecedented expression of support was widely hailed as a positive 
shift in U.S. policy, some Indian observers noted that the President’s statement was not nearly as 
explicit an endorsement as was received by Japan and that, in the absence of a timeline for 
Security Council reform, it could be taken as little more than a “vague promise.”25 In neighboring 
Pakistan, the endorsement met with expected resistance; Islamabad claimed India is undeserving 
of such status given New Delhi’s “conduct in relations with its neighbors and its continued 
flagrant violations of Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir.”26 
Reactions to the President’s Visit 
President Obama’s India trip was widely considered successful as a diplomatic exercise, although 
reviews of the substantive outcome were somewhat mixed. As External Affairs Minister Krishna 
later reported to his Parliament: “The visit was successful in strengthening mutual understanding 
on regional and global issues, accelerating the momentum of bilateral cooperation, and creating a 
long-term framework to elevate the India-U.S. strategic partnership to a new level.”27 Assistant 
Secretary of State Robert Blake later said the trip “will be remembered as a watershed, when the 
U.S. and India embarked at a new level on concrete initiatives to build a global partnership.”28 
The President’s visit was itself seen by many in India and abroad as reflective of the country’s 
                                                                 
22 “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh in Joint Press Conference in New Delhi, India,” White 
House release, November 8, 2010. 
23 Specifically, the President said, “[I]n the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council 
that includes India as a permanent member” (see the November 8, 2010, speech transcript at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-
india). 
24 “Chairman Kerry Supports India Becoming a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council,” SFRC press release, 
November 8, 2010. In the 111th Congress H.Res. 1729 and H.Res. 1739 both expressed support for India’s becoming a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, although neither bill emerged from committee. 
25 “Off-Mark on India’s UNSC Dream” (editorial), Hindu (Chennai), November 12, 2010.  
26 See the Pakistani Foreign Ministry’s November 8, 2010, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2010/
Nov/PR_279.htm. 
27 Ministry of External Affairs release, November 19, 2010. 
28 “The Current State of U.S.-India Cooperation and Prospects for the Future (As Prepared)” (speech transcript), 
Department of State release, May 13, 2011. 
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rising visibility on the global stage. Even in the absence of major new initiatives, there was a 
sense among some observers that the visit had exceeded expectations, with the U.S. President’s 
“calm demeanor and soaring rhetoric” winning over a previously skeptical Indian audience.29 
Other commentators, however, saw President Obama turning a blind eye toward or 
underestimating the seriousness of India’s ongoing struggles with poverty, government 
bureaucracy, and health and education issues while remaining overly focused on the country’s 
high-technology innovation successes. In these accounts, the New Delhi government’s failure to 
push forward with economic reforms has made foreign investors wary, a problem only 
exacerbated by recent corruption scandals.30 There also continued to be contentions from some 
quarters that India’s polity is skeptical about being subsumed into a U.S. “imperialist agenda,” 
with fears that Indian commercial markets will be opened in ways that do not benefit the 
country’s people and that India will be drawn into a military alliance with the United States.31 
July 2011 Strategic Dialogue 
Another Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi in July 2011. Given the persistence of doubts 
about the robustness of the U.S.-India relationship, there were hopes that Secretary Clinton’s 
attendance could reinvigorate a relationship that many analysts still see as incomplete and in need 
of more specific focus. Clinton traveled with a group of nine other senior U.S. officials, including 
the Director of National Intelligence. Yet even before the final Joint Statement was issued, 
commentators were lowering expectations with the assumption that neither government’s 
circumstances was ripe for new large-scale initiatives.32 
Upon her arrival, Secretary Clinton highlighted three issue areas: (1) trade and investment (“This 
is a good news story, but ... Each of our countries can do more to reduce barriers, open our 
markets, and find new opportunities for economic partnership”); (2) security cooperation 
(especially on counterterrorism and maritime security); and (3) the civil nuclear agreement (“[T]o 
reap the benefits of that investment and to see returns on the political capital that has been spent 
on both sides, we need to resolve remaining issues....”).33 The resulting Joint Statement 
highlighted a bilateral commitment to “broaden and deepen the U.S.-India global strategic 
partnership” in the cause of global stability and prosperity, and to enhance the partnership in 
numerous issue-areas. Among the notable clauses of the Statement were: 
• a reaffirmation of the two countries’ “commitment for consultation, coordination, 
and cooperation on Afghanistan,” to include a reconciliation process there that is 
“Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and inclusive”; 
• a call for Pakistan “to move expeditiously in prosecuting those involved in the 
November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack”; 
                                                                 
29 “Indian Media Sees [sic] Shift in Power in Obama Visit,” Agence France Presse, November 7, 2010; quote from 
Mohan Guruswamy, “Obama Woos, Wows, and Wins India,” Atlantic Council (online), November 24, 2010. 
30 “Obama Overrated India’s Progress, Analysts Say,” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 2011; Sadanand Dhume, 
“Nothing Inevitable About India’s Rise” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2011. 
31 See, for example, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, “Empty Euphoria,” Frontline (Chennai), December 1, 2010. 
32 “Can Clinton Jumpstart India-U.S. Relations?,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2011; Teresita Schaffer, “U.S.-India 
Strategic Dialogue: All-Star Cast, Playing Small Ball,” Brookings Institution, July 19, 2011. 
33 “Remarks at the Opening Session of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue,” State Department transcript, July 19, 2011. 
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• a continued commitment to “full implementation of the U.S.-India civil nuclear 
energy cooperation agreement”; and 
• plans to resume technical-level negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty.34 
In a major policy speech in the southern Indian city of Chennai (formerly Madras) the next day, 
Secretary Clinton laid out the Administration’s vision for future relations, emphasizing India’s 
growing leadership role in the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific and in South and Central Asia. 
On the former, and in what could be seen as a thinly veiled expression of concern about China’s 
rise, she sought India’s close cooperation in seeing formation of a regional architecture that 
adopts “international norms on security, trade, rule of law, human rights, and accountable 
governance.” In this respect she welcomed New Delhi’s “Look East” policy of closer engagement 
with the ASEAN countries. She also took the opportunity to issue an unusually open criticism of 
India’s Burma policy, contending that, “As India takes on a larger role throughout the Asia-
Pacific, it does have increasing responsibilities, including the duty to speak out against violations 
of universal human rights.”35 This last reflects a pervasive view in Washington that New Delhi is 
too hesitant to exercise India’s growing power and influence. 
On South and Central Asia, Secretary Clinton focused on three key issues. First, a reiteration of a 
strong and lasting U.S. commitment to Afghanistan well beyond the planned 2014 withdrawal of 
American combat troops, and a reiteration of “unambiguous redlines” for reconciliation with 
Afghan insurgents (their renunciation of violence, divorce from Al Qaeda, and acceptance of the 
laws and constitution of Afghanistan). She acknowledged New Delhi’s “rightly expressed 
concerns about outside interference in the reconciliation process” and vowed to consult closely 
with India on this shared concern. Second, and related, Clinton stated that lasting peace and 
security in the region will “require a stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan free from violent 
extremism,” and assured listeners that the United States continues to press the Pakistani 
government to seek those ends. Finally, the new “Silk Road” initiative was raised: “an 
international web and network of economic and transit connections” that would facilitate regional 
commerce and prosperity. According to senior U.S. officials speaking later, this regional 
economic integration would be “anchored in the Indian economy.”36 
As with President Obama’s earlier travel to India, the Administration’s second Strategic Dialogue 
session and Secretary Clinton’s public appearances in New Delhi and Chennai were widely hailed 
as successful in moving the bilateral relationship forward. Yet, in another indication that current 
U.S.-India relations have no obvious, specific focus, the read-outs from two major wire services 
highlighted very different issue-areas.37 
India’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations 
The end of Cold War political constraints and the rapid growth of India’s economy has allowed 
New Delhi to more energetically engage global diplomacy. Expanded engagement is evident 
                                                                 
34 “U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement,” U.S. Embassy press release, July 19, 2011. 
35 “Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century,” State Department transcript, July 20, 2011. 
36 Ibid.; author conference call with senior U.S. officials, July 21, 2011. 
37 “US Vows Counterterrorism Support for India,” Associated Press, July 19, 2011; “Clinton Pushes India on Nuclear 
Law, Market Access,” Reuters, July 19, 2011. 
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through the huge increase in the number of bilateral defense arrangements the Indian government 
has made in the past decade, more than tripling from 7 in 2000 to at least 26 today. During the 
latter half of 2010, every major world leader paid a visit to India, including those from all five 
permanent U.N. Security Council members. Much of the international attention on India is due to 
the country’s vast market potential—the retail sector alone is worth an estimated $450 billion. 
Some observers argue that the New Delhi government acts too timidly on the global stage, and 
that the country’s regional and domestic difficulties continue to hinder its ability to exert 
influence in geopolitics. As a rising power, India has appeared unwilling to take the kinds of 
policy stances expected of major global players, in particular those who sit on the U.N. Security 
Council, as India has been in 2011.38 From vague positions on Middle East uprisings to the 
appearance of fence-sitting on issues such as U.S.-led efforts to isolate Iran and Burma, New 
Delhi‘s leaders may be finding it increasingly difficult to avoid taking on the responsibilities 
many in Washington and elsewhere are looking for. One example is New Delhi’s largely hands-
off response to uprisings in the Arab world, with External Affairs Minister Krishna saying India 
would not “jump into the fray” unless invited and would maintain a “very cautious” approach to 
the Libyan conflict.39 In March 2011, India officially opposed NATO’s military action in Libya 
and notably abstained—along with Brazil, China, Russia, and Germany—from voting on U.N. 
Resolution 1973, which approved of such action.40 More recently, Secretary of State Clinton has 
sought greater Indian assistance in pressuring the faltering Syrian regime. 
Human rights activists have joined foreign governments in prodding India to be more proactive 
on key foreign policy issues, even those in India’s own neighborhood such as in Burma and Sri 
Lanka. One such observer has criticized New Delhi for issuing “bland propositions” that “can 
convey indifference to the plight of subjugated people.” She challenges India’s leaders to “stand 
with people or with dictators.”41 
Many analysts view India’s foreign policy establishment—its foreign service, think-tanks, public 
universities, and relevant media—as being too small and/or too poorly developed for India to 
achieve true great power status in the foreseeable future. By one substantive account, without a 
major modernizing and revamping of this establishment, “India’s worldview will be parochial, 
reactive, and increasingly dominated by business rather than by strategic or political concerns.”42 
Thus, even as India’s rising stature commands greater attention in many world capitals, the 
country’s diplomatic influence remains limited—especially in comparison to that of China—and 
the central government continues to concentrate mainly on domestic development and poverty 
alleviation. Indeed, India’s domestic and social indices continue to rank it as a developing 
country, or what one former senior Indian diplomat called a “premature power.”43 Moreover, 
Indian bureaucrats’ prickly and sometimes distrustful attitude toward their American counterparts 
                                                                 
38 In October 2010, India was elected to a nonpermanent UNSC seat, its first appearance in that body in 20 years. 
39 “India Finds Its Seat on the Fence Increasingly Uncomfortable,” Washington Post, February 19, 2011; Krishna 
quoted in “India Will Not Offer Unsolicited Advice to Arab Nations: Krishna,” Hindu (Chennai), February 28, 2011.  
40 One American commentator rued the abstention as being harmful to India’s global moral and political standing, 
saying it would confirm the misgivings of those who doubt the country’s willingness to make difficult choices (Sumit 
Ganguly, “A Pointless Abstention,” Diplomat (Tokyo), March 23, 2011). 
41 Meenakshi Ganguly, “India, Arab Democracy, and Human Rights,” Open Democracy (online), March 8, 2011. 
42 Daniel Markey, “Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software,’” Asia Policy, July 2009. 
43 Shyam Saran, “A Premature Power?” (op-ed), Outlook (Delhi), November 2, 2010. 
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survives long after the Cold War’s end, and is sometimes evident in New Delhi’s vehement 
reactions to what many Americans would consider minor and essentially meaningless slights.44 
Major Streams of Thought in Indian Foreign Policy 
In the assessment of one former U.S. diplomat and longtime South Asia expert, there are two 
major schools of thought in India’s current foreign policy approach: “21st century Nehruvian” and 
“great power advocates.”45 The former is notable for its essential continuation of Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s emphasis on developing world unity and an attendant skepticism regarding U.S. power, 
which, from this view, may require taking action to balance against.46 The latter, energized by 
India’s rapid economic growth and higher visibility on the world stage, concentrates on New 
Delhi’s triangular relations with Washington and Beijing with an eye toward increasing India’s 
relative power, mainly through economic growth and innovation. Yet both schools share several 
important basic characteristics, including a view of India as a more-or-less natural regional 
hegemon; limited attention to global governance issues; a commitment to maintaining India’s 
“strategic autonomy”; and a preference for hedging strategies, be they balancing against a more 
aggressive China by welcoming a continued major U.S. presence in the region, or by working 
with China and Russia to preclude an excessively dominant American presence. 
In an informal but extensive survey of Indian elite opinion about the United States, this same 
expert found broad areas of consensus and concluded that Washington has now supplanted 
Moscow as New Delhi’s most important external partner. As is reflected in opinion surveys of the 
Indian public more broadly, views of the United States, its varied power capabilities, and its 
continued substantive presence as a player in Asia are widely welcomed by Indian decision 
makers. The United States is seen to possess a unique ability to turn innovation into wealth and 
military power, both coveted by aspiring global powers such as India. America’s national will and 
soft power tend to be admired by Indians, and the leading U.S. role in international institutions 
may serve as a model for New Delhi. Moreover—40 years after the Nixon Administration was 
seen to “tilt” toward Pakistan by sending the USS Enterprise carrier task force into the Bay of 
Bengal—American military capabilities and ability to project significant power into the Indian 
Ocean Region are no longer viewed as threatening to most in New Delhi, where there is a widely 
held view of the United States as the only viable hedge against the rise of a potentially adversarial 
or revisionist China.47 
The above-noted schools of thought correspond closely to what two other senior observers 
identify as India’s “traditional nationalist” and “pragmatist” strains of foreign policy visions. 
These analysts see policy makers tending to “split the difference” by mouthing traditional 
nationalist rhetoric while pursuing a largely pragmatic course. While nationalists are inherently 
opposed to any international alliance that would constrict India’s autonomy and tend toward 
legal-moral rather than political arguments, pragmatists are accepting of a balance of power 
approach emphasizing a flexible pursuit of Indian national interests over ideological positioning. 
                                                                 
44 Sumit Ganguly, “Old Friends Yes, But Are We Real Buddies?” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi), November 7, 2010. 
45 Teresita Schaffer, “New Delhi’s New Outlook” (review essay), Survival, December 2010.  
46 The Nehruvian approach is also associated with “strategic restraint,” a tenet that arguably has failed India in its 
dealings with both China and Pakistan, but that continues to endure (Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen Cohen, “Is India 
Ending Its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011). 
47 Teresita Schaffer, “Continued Primacy, Diminished Will: Indian Assessments of U.S. Power,” in Craig Cohen, ed., 
Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011).  
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One result is that pragmatists are less averse to alliance-making and international treaties. Their 
rising influence thus opens greater possibilities for closer and more meaningful U.S.-India ties, 
perhaps especially in the area of nonproliferation (New Delhi’s Iran policy has become a 
bellwether issue of contention between nationalists and pragmatists).48 
Rivalry and Conflict With Pakistan49 
Three full-scale wars—in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1971—and a constant state of military 
preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked more than six decades of bitter 
rivalry between India and its western neighbor, Pakistan. The acrimonious partition of British 
India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have 
been major sources of tension. Both countries have built large defense establishments at 
significant cost to economic and social development, and the bilateral conflict has precluded the 
development of meaningful regional organizations.  
A major factor in U.S. interest in South Asia is ongoing tension between India and Pakistan 
rooted largely in competing territorial claims and in “cross-border terrorism” in both Kashmir and 
major Indian cities. In the interests of regional stability, the United States strongly endorses a 
recently revived India-Pakistan peace initiative, and it remains concerned about the potential for 
India-Pakistan to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries. Senior Indian 
officials continue to press the U.S. government to convince Islamabad to take stronger action 
against anti-India terrorist groups operating inside Pakistan.  
The effects of this bilateral conflict are seen to negatively affect U.S.-led efforts to stabilize 
Afghanistan. Most observers assert that U.S. success in Afghanistan is to a significant degree 
dependent on improved India-Pakistan relations, the logic being that Pakistan will need to feel 
more secure vis-à-vis a perceived existential threat on its eastern front in order to shift its 
attention and military resources more toward the west. Some in Pakistan believe that, by feeding 
their country’s insecurities, the increasingly warm U.S.-India relationship actually foments 
regional instability.  
In 2010, Indian decision makers became discomfited by signs that the United States and its allies 
are preparing to leave Afghanistan in such a way that would provide a central role for Pakistan in 
mediating between Kabul and Taliban elements, perhaps even to include a role for the latter in 
Afghanistan’s governance. Such an outcome would be anathema to Indian leaders, who wish to 
limit Islamabad’s influence in a post-war Afghanistan. During his 2010 confirmation hearing, the 
U.S. military commander in Afghanistan (and current Director of Central Intelligence), Gen. 
David Petraeus, said India “without question” has a legitimate interests in Afghanistan. 
Also in 2010, conflict over water resources emerged as another major exacerbating factor in the 
bilateral relationship. Some in Pakistan accuse India of violating international law, bilateral 
agreements, and ethical principles of peaceful coexistence through the allegedly illicit 
manipulation of water flows into Pakistan. Of particular concern for Indian and Western 
observers has been the fact that some of these complaints are emanating from the leaders of 
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U.S. Relations: A Summary, both by K. Alan Kronstadt. 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 14 
militant Pakistani Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan’s then-foreign minister said 
water was “emerging as a very serious source of [bilateral] tension,” but a senior Indian official 
denied that India is in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty and called Pakistani rhetoric a 
“political gimmick” meant to distract from Islamabad’s own poor water management.50 
The Indian government suspended the bilateral peace process following the late 2008 terrorist 
attack on Mumbai that was traced to a Pakistan-based terrorist group. In early 2011, New Delhi 
chose to reengage dialogue with Islamabad despite the fact that many of the alleged planners of 
that attack have not been brought to justice. A panel of experts of security and terrorism brought 
together by India Today magazine in 2010 outlined ten strategies for India-Pakistan dialogue. 
Each of the top three involved actions to be taken by Pakistan: (1) firmer and more rapid action 
the perpetrators of the 11/08 Mumbai attack; (2) extradition of the fugitives most wanted in India; 
and (3) action against the “terrorist infrastructure” on Pakistani soil. The experts also called for 
establishment of a regular dialogue between the two countries’ intelligence chiefs.51 These remain 
among New Delhi’s key concerns. 
The immense pressures now faced by Islamabad—ongoing and widespread Islamist militancy 
and extremism, the unprecedented embarrassments of bin Laden’s discovery and an attack on a 
naval base in May, and deteriorating relations with the United States foremost among them—may 
have the effect of shifting the focus of Pakistan’s military decision makers away from conflict 
with New Delhi. This may in turn open a window of opportunity for India to pursue improved 
relations with Pakistan.52 
The India-Pakistan Peace Process 
Background 
A bilateral “Composite Dialogue” between New Delhi and Islamabad, initiated in the 1990s and 
officially resumed in 2004, has realized some modest but still meaningful successes, including a 
formal cease-fire along the entire shared frontier, and some unprecedented trade and people-to-
people contacts across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). As per New Delhi’s and Islamabad’s 
intents, the dialogue has been meant to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, 
including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”53 Yet 2008 saw significant 
deterioration in India-Pakistan relations, especially following the large-scale November terrorist 
attack on Mumbai, India, that left some 165 civilians dead (22 of those killed were foreigners, 
including 6 Americans). More broadly, militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen 
Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express 
unhappiness that more substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not 
occurring. Officials in New Delhi continue to declare unacceptable the “terrorist-infrastructure” 
they say remains intact in Pakistani Kashmir.  
                                                                 
50 “Pakistan Steps Up Water Dispute,” Financial Times (London), March 29, 2010; quotes in “India and Pakistan Feud 
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51 Other strategies include (5) halting cross-border infiltrations in Kashmir; (6) settling water disputes; (7) expanding 
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53 See the January 6, 2004, joint statement at http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm. 
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The Obama Administration continues to refrain from taking any direct role in the bilateral 
dispute, and Indian leaders see no need for third-party involvement, in any case. However, to the 
satisfaction of his Indian audience, while in New Delhi in late 2010, President Obama said, 
“We’ll continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe havens within their borders are 
unacceptable, and that terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks must be brought to justice.”54 
Developments in 2010 
Despite its formal suspension of the peace process, New Delhi did continue engaging in high-
level talks with Islamabad in 2010. Pakistani observers variously attributed this Indian 
willingness to an apparent failure of coercive diplomacy, to U.S. pressure, and to new talk of 
reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban, which could leave India in a disadvantageous position 
vis-à-vis Kabul. From the Indian perspective, New Delhi’s leaders were compelled by the desire 
to offer Islamabad tangible benefits for cooperating, and by a perceived need for greater 
flexibility in the case of future terrorists attacks traced to Pakistan. Islamabad welcomed this 
Indian willingness to talk, seeing it as an opportunity to raise “all core issues” and urge India to 
resolve them quickly. New Delhi reiterated that the Composite Dialogue remained in suspension 
and that, while all subjects could be raised at impending meetings, India would focus solely on 
terrorism.  
A series of high-level interactions ensued, but none produced any new agreements or major 
initiatives. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir visited New Delhi in February. Following 
that meeting, India’s then-Foreign Secretary Rao said the time was not yet right for a resumption 
of the Composite Dialogue as requested by Islamabad. Subsequent major military exercises by 
both countries near their shared border (India in February, Pakistan in April) indicated that mutual 
distrust remained serious. In April, senior Indian leaders still ruled out any renewal of substantive 
talks until Pakistan took “credible steps” to bring Mumbai perpetrators to justice. Yet Prime 
Minister Singh did meet with his Pakistani counterpart on the sidelines of a regional summit in 
April 2010 in Thimpu, Bhutan, where the Indian leader expressed a willingness to discuss all 
issues of mutual interest, apparently with the conviction that even a dialogue that produces no 
immediate results is preferable to a diplomatic freeze. More high-level talks were held in 
Islamabad in June when Secretary Rao again met her Pakistani counterpart. The very fact of the 
meeting had many observers optimistic that the bilateral peace process was getting back on track. 
External Affairs Minister Krishna was in Islamabad a month later, but what he called “good and 
constructive” talks produced only an agreement to keep talking. Islamabad called India’s 
“selective” approach to outstanding issues (an oblique reference to Kashmir) a major impediment. 
Despite their strong suspicion of official Pakistani involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attack, 
Indian leaders saw no good option other than continuing the dialogue.55 
Developments in 2011 
Given a lack of progress with its so-called “coercive diplomacy,” the national coalition-leading 
Congress Party announced that it would officially reengage dialogue with Pakistan. The decision 
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met with some political resistance from the opposition.56 A June meeting of foreign secretaries in 
Islamabad appeared unexpectedly positive to many, with the two officials agreeing to expand 
confidence-building measures related to both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as to 
increase trade and travel across the Kashmiri LOC.57 In July, new Pakistani Foreign Minister 
Hina Rabbani Khar was in New Delhi for talks with External Affairs Minister Krishna, who 
reaffirmed India’s intention to reduce the bilateral trust deficit and conveyed New Delhi’s desire 
for “a stable, prosperous Pakistan acting as a bulwark against terrorism, and at peace with itself 
and with its neighbors.” Khar had raised some hackles in New Delhi—and an explicit expression 
of “displeasure” from Krishna—by meeting with Kashmiri separatists before seeing Indian 
government officials.58 Yet the resulting Joint Statement further loosened trade and travel 
restrictions across the LOC, and was widely taken as a successful representation of a peace 
process back on track after a more than two-year hiatus.59 
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks and the LeT60 
The perpetrators of a horrific terrorist attack on India’s business and entertainment capital that 
resulted in 165 innocent deaths were identified as members of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT), a U.S.-designated terrorist group that has received significant past support from 
Pakistani security agencies (the Jamaat-ud-Dawa or JuD, ostensibly a charitable organization, is 
widely considered to be a continuation of the LeT under a new name). The Indian government 
demands that Pakistan take conclusive action to shut down the LeT and bring its terrorist 
leadership to justice. At least one ranking Indian official has openly accused Pakistan’s powerful 
main intelligence agency of overseeing the planning and execution of the attack.61 After being 
granted access to David Headley, an American national of Pakistani descent who pled guilty to 
participating in the planning of the attack, Indian officials claimed to have established an official 
Pakistani role, a claim Islamabad strongly rejected as “baseless.”62 Yet reports continue to finger 
Pakistan’s main intelligence service as being culpable. 
Of particular relevance for India is LeT founder Hafiz Saeed, whom India believes is 
demonstrably culpable, but whom Pakistani officials say they do not possess sufficient evidence 
to formally charge. In September 2009, Pakistani police placed Saeed under house arrest. Only 
weeks later, a court dismissed the two cases brought against him (unrelated to the Mumbai 
attack), but he remained confined to his home. The Islamabad government insisted that it was 
powerless to take further action against Saeed in the absence of more convincing evidence of 
wrongdoing. New Delhi countered that Pakistan was “shielding” the masterminds of the attack. In 
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May 2010, Pakistan’s Supreme Court dismissed a government appeal and upheld a lower court’s 
decision to release Saeed, saying the case presented against him was insufficient. A senior Indian 
official expressed disappointment with the ruling. Many analysts believe Saeed maintains 
substantive control of the organization’s daily operations even as he remains under house arrest. 
In late 2009, Pakistani authorities had brought formal charges against seven men accused of 
planning the Mumbai raid, among them Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a senior LeT figure said to have 
been the operational commander. New Delhi insists that the suspects be extradited to India.63 Yet 
the Islamabad government refuses and has to date pressed no further than preliminary hearings, 
and the start-and-stop nature of the proceedings has only engendered Indian and international 
skepticism about Pakistan’s determination. While in India in July 2011, the Pakistani foreign 
minister asked Indian officials to have “patience, trust, and confidence in the proceedings,” 
saying “Pakistan was not trying to abdicate responsibility.”64 
Osama bin Laden’s May 2011 killing by U.S. commandos in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad 
elicited more insistent Indian demands that Islamabad hand over the Mumbai suspects, but to no 
avail. One senior observer, reflecting a widely-held view, contends that the Pakistani military 
“will do everything to preserve Lashkar as long as it believes there is a threat from India.” 
Analysts warn that another major terrorist attack in India that is traced to Pakistan would likely 
lead to an international crisis. One has offered numerous U.S. policy options for preventing such 
an attack or managing any crisis that results.65 
July 2011 terrorist bombings in Mumbai—most likely the work of indigenous Islamist 
militants—were evidence for many that the city remains highly vulnerable to attack. Well after 
the 2008 attacks, measures had been taking to improve the city’s security, but major initiatives 
such as establishment of a dedicated federal ministry were not taken up, and nearly all of the 
political and police officials involved had avoided termination or even reprimand. 
The Kashmir Dispute66 
Many U.S. officials, as well as the Pakistani government, aver that regional peace is inextricably 
linked to a solution of the Kashmir dispute. New Delhi views separatism in its Jammu and 
Kashmir state to be an internal issue or, at most, a bilateral one with Pakistan. It rejects any third-
party or multilateral engagement. While levels of violence in Kashmir have declined significantly 
from their 1990s peak, the situation remains fragile, and Islamabad insists that what it calls New 
Delhi’s “administrative and half-hearted political measures” will not resolve what is in essence a 
Kashmiri “struggle for the right to self-determination.”67  
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Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. government has continued its long-standing policy of 
keeping distance from the Kashmir dispute and refraining from any mediation role therein. As 
expressed by President Obama in speaking to a joint session of the Indian Parliament, “We will 
continue to welcome dialogue between India and Pakistan, even as we recognize that disputes 
between your two countries can only be resolved by the people of your two countries.”68 The now 
deceased U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, who at 
times used the term “K-word” in discussing Kashmir, said, “We are not going to negotiate or 
mediate on that issue and I’m going to try to keep my record and not even mention it by name.”69 
Officially, India lays claim to the entire former princely state, but in practice New Delhi is 
generally accepting of the status quo wherein it controls two-thirds, including the prized, Muslim-
majority Kashmir Valley, site of the state’s summer capital and largest city, Srinagar (pop. 1.3 
million). Indian policy will not accept any territorial or border shifts, but Prime Minister Singh 
has for many years sought to “make the border irrelevant” and open the LOC to greater trade and 
people-to-people contacts. A rare major opinion survey of 3,700 Kashmiris on both sides of the 
LOC in 2010 found that less than half supported separatist goals. Only in the Muslim-majority 
valley did a large majority (up to 95%) express support for full Kashmiri independence.70 
Indian officials consistently aver that, despite significant decreases in rates of separatist violence, 
the Pakistani threat to Indian Kashmir remains undiminished, with Pakistan accused of providing 
occasional support for militant infiltration across the LOC, as well as of maintaining—or at the 
very least tolerating—militant bases in Pakistani Kashmir. In 2010, India’s defense minister 
claimed there were “conscious, calculated attempts” underway to push more militants into the 
Valley, and the army chief later reiterated his claim that Pakistan was not taking action to 
dismantle the “terror infrastructure” on its side of the LOC. According the Indian Home 
Ministry’s most recent annual report, “[T]here are reports to indicate that the infrastructure for 
training to terrorist elements across-the border continues to remain intact and efforts to infiltrate 
militants into the State continue unabated.”71 
During the summer of 2010, Indian Kashmir experienced its worst separatist-related violence in 
years. The spasm began in June, when a 17-year-old protester was killed by a tear gas canister 
fired by police. By mid-September, more than 100 other mostly young street protesters died in 
clashes with security forces, a curfew was imposed in the Valley, dozens of separatist political 
leaders were arrested, and thousands of Indian police and paramilitary troops were deployed to 
quell the protests. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued a formal condemnation of “the blatant use 
of force by Indian security forces,” called the ongoing violence “unacceptable,” and asked New 
Delhi to “exercise restraint.” The Pakistani Parliament subsequently passed resolutions on the 
issue; New Delhi angrily rejected the attempted interference in “what is purely an internal affair 
of India.” Islamabad was not deterred, however, and further sharp diplomatic exchanges ensued.72 
A feared repeat of such turmoil did not materialize in the summer of 2011 (see also the 
“Separatism in the Jammu and Kashmir State” section below).  
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India and the Afghan Insurgency73 
Partnership and Reconstruction Assistance 
Indian leaders envisage a peaceful Afghanistan that can serve as a hub for regional trade and 
energy flows. India takes an active role in assisting reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, having 
committed a total of some $2 billion to this cause since 2001 (the most recent pledge of $500 
million was made in May), as well as contributing thousands of workers and opening four 
consulates there. It is the leading regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction. New Delhi 
characterizes its relations with Kabul as unique in that Indian humanitarian assistance and 
infrastructure development projects are geographically extensive while also entirely Afghan-led 
in terms of prioritization. India’s wide-reaching assistance program in the country is aimed at 
boosting all sectors of development in all areas of Afghanistan.  
In May 2011, Prime Minister Singh met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, where the 
two leaders announced a new India-Afghanistan “Strategic Partnership” elevating bilateral ties to 
a higher level with regular summit meetings, expanded trade and commercial links, and 
institutionalized dialogues on an array of bilateral issues. New Delhi vows to assist in 
Afghanistan’s emergence “as a land bridge and trade, transportation and energy hub connecting 
Central and South Asia by enabling free and more unfettered transport and transit linkages.” 
Singh pledged another $500 million in bilateral development aid over the next six years.74 
Among Indian assistance to Afghanistan are funding for a new $111 million power station, a $77 
million dam project, construction of Kabul’s new $67 million Parliament building, and 
construction of Afghanistan’s leading children’s hospital. Indian engineers also have completed a 
160-mile-long, $84 million road project linking Afghanistan’s southwestern Nimroz province 
with Iran’s Chabahar port on the Arabian Sea in hopes of providing landlocked Afghanistan with 
an alternative supply route and reducing the country’s dependence on access through Pakistan. 
India provides daily school lunches to 2 million Afghan children. In December 2010, India signed 
agreements to participate in the multi-billion-dollar Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
(TAPI) gas pipeline project, which leaders hope to see completed in 2015 (India’s former 
petroleum minister characterized the project as a new “Silk Route” linking Central and South 
Asia). Thousands of Indian personnel are working on various relief and reconstruction projects 
inside Afghanistan. These workers are guarded by hundreds of Indian police forces which have 
sustained casualties in attacks by insurgents. In the private sector, Indian firms are vying for 
exploration rights in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, where the Hajigak mines contain some 1.8 billion 
tons of high-quality iron ore. 
Afghan Reconciliation, Security Concerns, and the U.S. Drawdown 
New Delhi declares itself “committed to the unity, integrity, and independence of Afghanistan 
underpinned by democracy and cohesive pluralism and free from external interference.” It 
supports efforts toward peace and reintegration with Taliban insurgents, but emphasizes that, to 
be successful and enduring, these should be wholly “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned,” the clear 
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implication being that Islamabad’s substantive involvement is not desired. In May 2011, Prime 
Minister Singh reiterated his government’s wish that an Afghan-led reconciliation process takes 
place “without outside interference or coercion.”75 After a long period of uneasiness with the idea 
of President Karzai negotiating directly with Afghan insurgents, New Delhi’s leadership—in line 
with a similar policy shift by the United States—now fully supports a reconciliation process that 
might include discussions with Taliban elements. Yet hardline Indian analysts foresee 
“catastrophic” implications for India’s security if Pakistan takes a major role in the Afghan 
endgame, and New Delhi continues to worry about Washington’s “toxic dependence” on the 
Pakistani army in pursuing a military victory in Afghanistan.76 
New Delhi’s keen security interests in Afghanistan are longstanding, and Indian investment in 
that country is motivated by a desire to bypass Pakistan when engaging West and Central Asia, 
constrain the spread of Islamist militancy on its western flank, and also dampen the influence of 
both Islamist and Hindutva extremism domestically. Yet Indian efforts to project influence into 
Afghanistan are significantly hindered by geography and ethnicity (where Pakistan enjoys clear 
advantages), Islamabad’s demonstrated willingness to undertake provocative anti-India policies in 
Afghanistan, and, perhaps most importantly, ambivalence among Indian policy makers and 
ordinary citizens alike about the cost-benefit calculation of continuing what may be risky 
investments in an unstable country. Given the June 2011 announcement of an impending U.S. 
drawdown from Afghanistan, New Delhi faces a choice of maintaining/increasing its efforts in 
Afghanistan, risking potentially dangerous reactions from Islamabad, or scaling back its efforts in 
the hope of easing Pakistan’s insecurities. The latter option may facilitate greater stability, but at 
considerable cost to India’s aspirations for regional dominance and global power status.77 
By some accounts, India and Pakistan are fighting a “shadow war” inside Afghanistan with spies 
and proxies, although it is exclusively high-visibility Indian targets that have come under attack 
there. A July 2008 suicide bombing at India’s Kabul Embassy was traced to militants with ties to 
the Pakistani military, and was taken as a stark message to Indian leaders that Taliban militants 
and their allies want New Delhi to withdraw from Afghanistan.78 Prime Minster Singh instead 
responded by pledging $450 million in new Indian aid for Afghan reconstruction.  
Islamabad accuses New Delhi of using an exaggerated number of Indian consulates in 
Afghanistan as bases for malevolent interference in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, specifically 
by materially supporting Baloch separatist militants. The Pakistani government also accuses India 
of interfering in Pakistan’s western tribal regions along the Afghanistan border. When asked about 
such claims in late 2009, Secretary of State Clinton said the U.S. government had seen no 
supporting evidence. Yet senior Pakistani officials remained insistent.79 
In the view of many analysts, Pakistan’s “paranoia” with regard to the perceived threat from India 
leads Pakistani leaders to engage a zero-sum regional competition with New Delhi. In this way, 
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Pakistan’s primary goal with regard to Afghanistan is to prevent any dominant Indian influence 
there.80 Signs of increasing cooperation between the Kabul and Islamabad governments can cause 
trepidation in other regional capitals, especially including New Delhi, for above-noted reasons.  
Some observers viewed a senior U.S. military commander’s 2009 assessment that “increasing 
India’s influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions” as a sign that U.S. 
officials might press India to keep a low or lower profile there, yet the U.S. government has 
continued to welcome and laud India’s role in Afghanistan while at the same time rhetorically 
recognizing Islamabad’s legitimate security interests in having a friendly western neighbor.81 
Obama Administration officials have sought to ease India’s fears by assuring New Delhi that it 
has a legitimate role to play in Afghanistan and that the United States does not view regional 
relationships as a zero-sum game. 
Still, the perception among some observers that the United States is in some way planning to 
abandon Afghanistan elicits great anxiety in New Delhi and fears of a Taliban role in a future 
Kabul government, with the attendant possibility that Afghanistan could again become a haven 
for anti-India militants. Even without this worst-case outcome, a U.S. withdrawal and 
deterioration of security would likely jeopardize India’s role and standing in Afghanistan. New 
Delhi’s leaders may not yet have a coherent plan for this possibility. According to one senior 
analyst, “So far, India’s plans consist largely of hand-wringing and facile hopes.” A presumed 
lack of U.S. consultation with India previous to President Obama’s June 2011 drawdown 
announcement left some in India dubious about a U.S.-India partnership that did not (in their 
view) give sufficient consideration to India’s security concerns about a potential future 
governance role for Afghan Taliban elements. Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables reportedly support 
the notion that New Delhi has been anxious about the implications of a U.S. withdrawal.82 
India-China Relations: Asia’s Titanic Rivalry?83 
Background and Context 
India and China together account for one-third of the world’s population, and are seen to be rising 
21st century powers and potential strategic rivals. As India has sought to expand its strategic 
horizons in recent years—eyeing influence over a vast region from Iran and the Persian Gulf 
states in the west to the Straits of Malacca and Gulf of Thailand and perhaps even the South 
China Sea in the east—it increasingly finds itself bumping into a spreading Chinese presence in 
the same area. New Delhi fears “encirclement” by Beijing, and many analysts view the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR) as a key stage upon which 21st century geopolitical power struggles will 
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play out.84 Some further encourage Washington to leverage its own relationship with the region’s 
leading pluralistic democracy to “set limits on Chinese expansion,” perhaps especially through 
increased joint naval coordination.85 Meanwhile, some strategic thinkers in India worry that the 
United States is on a path of engagement with China that could threaten Indian interests and 
relegate India to a secondary role in Asia.86 
India and China fought a brief but intense border war in 1962 that left China in control of large 
swaths of territory still claimed by India. Today, India accuses China of illegitimately occupying 
nearly 15,000 square miles of Indian territory in Kashmir (the Aksai Chin region), while China 
lays claim to 35,000 square miles in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The 1962 
clash ended a previously friendly relationship between the two leaders of the Cold War 
“nonaligned movement” and left many Indians feeling shocked and betrayed.87 While some 
aspects of India-China relations, including bilateral trade, have warmed measurably in recent 
years, the two countries have yet to reach a final boundary agreement. Adding to New Delhi’s 
sense of insecurity have been suspicions regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons 
capabilities and strategic intentions in South and Southeast Asia. A strategic orientation focused 
on China appears to have affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s own nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missile, and other power projection programs.  
During a landmark 1993 visit to Beijing, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao signed an agreement to 
reduce troops and maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control (LOAC) that divides the two 
countries’ forces at the disputed border. Numerous rounds of border talks and joint working group 
meetings aimed at reaching a final settlement have been held since 1981—13 of these since both 
countries appointed special representatives in 2003—with New Delhi and Beijing agreeing to 
move forward in other issue-areas even as territorial claims remain unresolved.  
Beijing’s military and economic support for Pakistan—support that is widely understood to have 
included nuclear weapons- and missile-related transfers—is a major and ongoing source of 
bilateral friction. Past Chinese support for Pakistan’s Kashmir position, along with more recent 
reports of a Chinese military presence in Aksai Chin, have added to the discomfort of Indian 
leaders. There have been reports of links between Chinese intelligence agencies and insurgent 
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groups in India’s northeast.88 India and China also have competed for trade partners and energy 
resources in other developing regions to feed their rapidly growing economies; India’s relative 
poverty puts New Delhi at a significant disadvantage in such competition.89  
The Chinese are increasingly wary over the growing strategic relationship between the United 
States and India, and Beijing has expressed concern over potential alignments in Asia that could 
result in the “encirclement” of China. Chinese concern in this regard was made evident when 
Beijing protested discussions under the Bush Administration to develop a quadrilateral group of 
like-minded democracies in Asia that would include the United States, Japan, Australia, and 
India. Still, while Indians can at times appear to be obsessed with comparisons to China, the 
Chinese are generally far more complacent, giving the rivalry an appearance of one-sidedness.90  
China is also particularly sensitive to India’s influence in Tibet. India allows the Dalai Lama to 
live in India and has allowed him to visit India’s Arunachal Pradesh state abutting Tibet.91 The 
Indian territory of Ladakh, which is near the Chinese-held, Indian-claimed territory of Aksai 
Chin, is also ethnically Tibetan.92 Nonetheless, India is particularly sensitive to the development 
of U.S.-China relations, especially as they pertain to South Asia. This was evident as India railed 
at a clause in the 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement that called for Washington and Beijing to 
“work together to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in South Asia.”93 
Despite the anxieties elicited by the now simultaneous rise of Asia’s two largest countries, New 
Delhi calls its relationship with Beijing a “priority” and asserts that the two countries have 
“stepped up functional cooperation in all areas, including efforts to build military-to-military trust 
and confidence through bilateral defense interactions” that are “growing.” It also notes ongoing 
bilateral cooperation in areas such as finance, agriculture, water resources, energy, environment, 
tourism, and information technology, along with joint efforts in multilateral fora on global issues 
such as trade negotiations and energy security, which includes “cooperating very closely” on 
climate change issues.94 Both governments have hailed their “strategic and cooperative 
partnership” which, according to New Delhi, has established important confidence-building 
measures and broadened people-to-people contacts.95 
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India-China Commercial Relations 
China has in recent years overtaken the United States as India’s leading trade partner. The value 
of India-China trade surpassed $62 billion in 2010, up an impressive 43% over the previous year. 
China is the single largest source of imports for India, accounting for above $40 billion worth or 
more than 11% of all imports in FY2010/11. China is also the third largest export market for 
Indian goods (behind the United Arab Emirates and United States), accounting for $19.4 billion 
worth or about 7.7% of all exports in FY2010/11.96 Yet the course of the bilateral trade 
relationship may not favor India over the middle- and long-term, given clear signs of both 
qualitative and quantitative imbalances. China now accounts for nearly one-fifth of India’s total 
trade deficit. Roughly half of India’s electronics imports come from China, along with nearly one-
quarter of machinery products imports and about one-sixth of total steel imports. Meanwhile iron 
ore is by far the leading Indian export to China, accounting for nearly half of the total value in 
recent years. India has not yet been able to exploit its advantages in the services sector, and many 
analysts see China trade as an area in which India can at least partially mitigate its badly lagging 
manufacturing sector. 
Numerous large state-owned Chinese companies have operations in India, especially in power 
generation, and machinery and infrastructure construction. The cumulative value of contractual 
Chinese investment projects in India is nearly $30 billion. Indian companies also operate in 
China, notably in the manufacturing, information technology, and banking sectors, but the degree 
is far more modest at less than $1 billion cumulatively.97 
Is There a Chinese “String of Pearls” Strategy in the Indian Ocean? 
There are mounting fears among some in India that China is encroaching upon what New Delhi 
sees as its legitimate sphere of influence in South Asia. This concern focuses especially on 
China’s construction of port facilities in the IOR, which has elicited a debate over Beijing’s future 
intentions and concerns that it may seek to interdict or dominate sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs) there. In 2004, a Washington, DC-based consultancy firm identified China’s 
involvement in developing major new ports in Pakistan (at Gwadar), Sri Lanka (at Hambantota), 
and Bangladesh (at Chittagong) as representing a potential “string of pearls” strategy which some 
strategic analysts and media commentators point to as evidence of Beijing’s aim to encircle India 
with naval bases. In mid-2010, Chinese warships docked for a first-ever visit to Burma’s Thilawa 
port. China’s plans to develop an overland transportation and energy link from the northern 
reaches of the Bay of Bengal through Burma to Yunnan is another aspect of this perceived 
strategy. Port access to the Indian Ocean’s strategically vital SLOCs does appear to be a source of 
considerable rivalry: For example, India desires to see Iran’s Chabahar port grow in importance 
as a transit point into Central Asia that would bypass Pakistan. China, meanwhile, looks to 
Pakistan’s Gwadar port as providing a major future land-line for energy and other supplies to East 
Asia that would reduce Chinese dependence on Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits sea lanes.98 
Some analysts dismiss Indian fears as overwrought and note that China does not have the 
capability to project significant naval power into the IOR. Others take a longer view and see 
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present developments as part of a long term strategic plan that will give the Chinese the necessary 
logistical infrastructure in the IOR to secure its SLOCs to the energy rich Persian Gulf. If 
developed, this infrastructure could give China a strong naval position relative to India in the 
IOR, though this will likely take decades to develop. China only just sent its first aircraft carrier 
out for sea trials in August 2011. The U.S. Department of Defense, in its most recent (August 
2011) assessment of Chinese military capabilities, noted Beijing’s civilian port projects in the 
IOR and their potential to improve China’s peacetime logistical support options, but also 
contended that Beijing’s power projection abilities in the region will remain limited in the 
absence of overseas military bases.99 
China has no naval bases in the IOR at present, and available evidence suggests that Beijing’s 
“string of pearls” strategy is in an embryonic phase. Some analysts encourage stronger U.S.-India 
strategic and military ties with an eye specifically on preventing China from dominating the 
region and its sea lanes.100 Others contend that a (limited) Chinese navy presence in the Indian 
Ocean is not inherently illegitimate or threatening. Some are relatively sanguine that, even if the 
Chinese navy were to establish overtly military posts on the Indian Ocean in the future, India 
would still enjoy considerable geographic and logistical advantages in the case of open conflict. 
Such advantages could be built upon with some fairly facile Indian policies, including reinforcing 
its Andaman and Nicobar Command, which could present a sturdy “barrier” to hostile forces 
entering the Bay of Bengal from the east, and expanding maritime intelligence-sharing with the 
United States.101 A strong Indian naval presence near the entrance to the Strait of Malacca would 
be well positioned to interdict Chinese shipping in the event of conflict. 
Recent Developments 
Tensions between India and China appear to have increased over the past year despite a 30-fold 
jump in the value of their bilateral trade over the past decade. Many commentators are 
speculating that a new “Great Game” is unfolding between Asia’s two largest countries, perhaps 
to be centered on Kashmir, and that the bilateral relationship “has begun to take the form of a true 
geopolitical rivalry.”102 In 2009, India added two full army divisions to those already deployed 
near the disputed border, built at least three new airstrips in the region, and moved two squadrons 
of advanced Sukhoi-30 MKI combat aircraft to a base in the nearby Assam state. The latter 
months of 2009 saw New Delhi and Beijing engage increasingly vituperative diplomatic and 
media barbs, placing U.S. officials in something of a dilemma over how to maintain friendly 
relations with both countries. China’s 2010 decision to issue special visas to Indian citizens from 
Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir reflected Beijing’s official position that residents of 
these states have different status than other Indians, a position that obviously antagonizes India.103  
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Meanwhile, the unresolved border dispute is seen to be a significant obstacle to expanded India-
China economic and trade relations, and some analysts see Beijing’s Kashmir stance becoming 
more adversarial, as was the case in the past, perhaps even more hostile to India than is 
Islamabad’s.104 Indian sources have accused Chinese patrols of “transgressing” the LOAC—an 
average of about ten such incursions per month was reported in 2008—and periodic reports of 
incursions continue. Official Chinese news outlets at times accuse the Indian media of issuing 
“war rhetoric” and “sowing the seeds of enmity” with reports of Chinese “intrusions” across the 
LOAC.105 Earlier in 2011, Indian military officials issued statements that the alleged presence of 
Chinese troops in Pakistan-held Kashmir poses a serious military challenge to India. Beijing 
denies reports of a Chinese military presence in Kashmir.106 
In August 2010, three separate episodes illuminated ongoing frictions. First, New Delhi and 
Beijing exchanged sharp diplomatic words after China refused to issue a visa to the Indian 
general responsible for Indian Kashmir. Later, India reportedly moved to counter the alleged 
deployment of advanced Chinese missiles to the border area with its own plans to place 
intermediate-range Agni II and short-range Prithvi III missiles near the frontier. Finally, two 
Chinese warships paid a first-ever port visit to Burma, exacerbating fears among some that 
Chinese naval power was being wielded too closely to Indian shores.107 In September 2010, 
Prime Minister Singh reportedly warned that China “would like to have a foothold in South 
Asia.” Only days earlier, External Affairs Minister Krishna opined that China had been showing 
“more than the normal interest in the Indian Ocean affairs. So we are closely monitoring the 
Chinese intentions.”108 
While few Indian decision makers are desirous of direct conflict with China, there seems to be an 
upswing in negative views about Beijing’s evolving regional and global role, with misgivings 
perhaps arising along a perspective that New Delhi’s past policies have been too concessionary in 
dealing with a China that may increasingly be perceived as “an erratic, ultra-nationalist state that 
seeks to constrain India.”109 The pessimistic Indian perspective sees Beijing as unworthy of New 
Delhi’s trust and so rejects the Chinese government’s rhetorical commitment to cooperation and 
dispute resolution as bromides veiling more nefarious intent.110 
While there are causes for concern in the India-China relationship, there are also some new areas 
of convergence between the two states, as was made evident when the two governments closely 
coordinated their positions in the lead up to the Copenhagen Conference on climate change. The 
potential for future renewed conflict between India and China warrants a close watch as the 
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correlates of power and strategic architectures evolve in Asia. Yet, while tensions appear to 
mount, neither country is likely to seek open conflict as both have made economic development 
their key national priority. 
From this perspective, increased economic interdependence will act as an inhibitor to conflict, but 
the workings of this dynamic are not so clear. Some analysts also note that the nature and 
imbalance of the dramatically growing trade between India and China is leading to a degree of 
mutual antagonism over the trade relationship. Yet China arguably faces strong disincentives to 
behave aggressively in the IOR given that doing so would be likely to accelerate India’s 
partnership with the United States, and that any open conflict in the region could cause potentially 
major harm to the Chinese economy. The argument is thus that incentives for India and China to 
cooperate are strong.111 In a sign that recent India-China animosity may have crested, Indian 
National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon announced in April 2011 that the two countries 
had agreed to restore suspended defense ties, take steps to enhance their balance of trade, and 
establish a new consultation mechanism to address border disputes.112  
India’s Other Regional Foreign Relations 
India-Sri Lanka113 
India’s relationship with the island nation of Sri Lanka dates back millennia and is marked by 
intimate cultural, religious, and linguistic interaction. For most of the past three decades, relations 
have been dominated by the now-concluded Sri Lankan civil war between Colombo’s 
government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Sri Lanka is divided 
between a largely Sinhalese-Buddhist majority in the south, which dominates the government, 
and a Hindu-Tamil minority in the north and east. The still-unresolved ethnic conflict has 
complicated the relationship between India and Sri Lanka due to the presence in south India of a 
large Tamil minority of more than 60 million (mainly the state of Tamil Nadu). Some strategic 
analysts in India are concerned by increased Chinese activity in Sri Lanka.  
Domestic sentiment and increased flows of refugees led India to intervene in the conflict in 1987 
by sending a large Indian Peace Keeping Force to Sri Lanka to establish order and disarm Tamil 
militants. Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide 
bomber in 1991. India later withdrew its forces after they suffered some 1,000 deaths, and it 
subsequently refrained from direct involvement in the conflict. New Delhi did, however, continue 
to acknowledge Colombo’s right to act against “terrorist forces.” 
The mid-2009 end of combat in Sri Lanka opened the way for newly deepened bilateral relations. 
New Delhi offered an immediate $115 million grant and provided other support to assist in 
dealing with the resulting humanitarian crisis and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of 
internally displaced persons. During a mid-2010 visit to India, Sri Lankan President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa agreed with Prime Minister Singh that the two countries’ “vibrant and multi-faceted 
partnership” warranted agreements on social, legal, and women’s affairs, energy and 
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transportation, as well as a soft loan of $800 million for the reconstruction of a northern railway 
that was destroyed during the war.114 The total value of bilateral trade exceeded $3 billion in 
2010, up some 47% over the previous year. Indian defense ties with Sri Lanka have been revived. 
New Delhi today contends that relations with Colombo are “strong and poised for a quantum 
jump.” 115 
Yet India remains concerned with the situation in Sri Lanka even after the end of open hostilities 
there. Members of India’s Parliament worry that Indian aid intended for displaced Tamils has not 
reached the targeted community. Then-Foreign Secretary Rao traveled to Sri Lanka as Special 
Emissary in 2010 to assess rehabilitation efforts, reportedly conveying to Colombo India’s hope 
that Sri Lanka would initiate a political process to resolve the underlying ethnic issues that fueled 
the previous civil war in addition to resettling and rehabilitating displaced Tamils.116 New Delhi 
continues to emphasize its view that Sri Lanka’s national reconciliation must come through a 
negotiated political settlement of ethnic issues that is “acceptable to all communities within the 
framework of a united Sri Lanka and which is consistent with democracy, pluralism, and respect 
for human rights.” In meetings with Sri Lanka’s President in June 2011, three top Indian officials 
asked that his government move quickly to reach a political settlement with the Tamils.117 
A 2011 report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group acknowledged New Delhi’s 
“active engagement and unprecedented financial assistance” in Sri Lanka, but contends that 
India’s policies have failed to date in facilitating a sustainable peace on the island. The report 
urges the Indian government to work more closely with the United States, European Union, and 
Japan in pressing Colombo to negotiate a political settlement to Sri Lanka’s ethnic disputes, in 
part by lifting blanket emergency rule, re-establishing civil administration in Tamil-majority 
areas, and taking other democratizing and reconciliatory actions. Some independent analysts 
likewise convey a perception that India has done too little to foster democracy, ensure that ethnic 
minority rights are respected, and hedge against growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.118 
India-Bangladesh119 
India shares close historical, cultural, linguistic, social, and economic ties with neighboring 
Bangladesh, a country also born of colonial British India. However, and despite India’s key role 
in the 1971 “liberation” of the former East Pakistan, New Delhi’s past relations with Dhaka have 
been fraught with tensions related mainly to the cross-border infiltration of Islamist and separatist 
militants, and to the tens of millions of illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India. The two countries 
share a heavily-populated, 2,540-mile-long border, the great majority of which New Delhi has 
attempted to seal through fence construction. The two countries’ border forces have in the past 
engaged in sometimes lethal gun battles, and Bangladesh-based terrorists groups have been active 
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inside India.120 Still, New Delhi and Dhaka have cooperated on joint counterterrorism efforts and 
talks on extensive energy cooperation continue. In 2010, India extended a $1 billion line of credit 
to Bangladesh to aid infrastructure development there, and New Delhi offers rice supplies at 
below-market prices. The value of bilateral trade was about $3.5 billion in 2009/2010, up more 
than 12% over the previous fiscal year.121 
India-Bangladesh ties improved markedly after 2008, facilitated by the election that year of 
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose Awami League has historically closer ties to 
India than does the opposition Bangladesh National Party. New Delhi has lauded the restoration 
of multi-party democracy in Dhaka. During her 2010 visit to India, Hasina—accompanied by a 
123-person delegation and 50-member business contingent—agreed with Prime Minster Singh to 
put in place “a comprehensive framework of cooperation for development between the two 
countries,” and signed a number of agreements, including pacts on cultural exchange, security, 
crime prevention, and power supply. India is also allowing increased trade access for Bangladesh 
across Indian territory to Bhutan and Nepal.122  
External Affairs Minister Krishna was in Bangladesh in July 2011 for what he called a “very 
productive” visit marked by the signing of two new trade and commerce agreements, along with 
“significant forward movement” in bilateral power sector cooperation. However, Prime Minister 
Singh made some badly-timed remarks posted on an Indian government website: Just before his 
Krishna arrived in Dhaka, Singh claimed that “at least 25%” of Bangladeshis “swear by Jamaat-e-
Islami [Bangladesh’s largest Islamist political party] and are very anti-Indian.” The comment was 
widely reported in Bangladesh and contributed to straining relations.123 
Prime Minister Singh is scheduled to visit Bangladesh in September 2011. This will be the first 
such travel in 12 years. The visit is expected to develop ties between the two nations and help 
resolve differences over border disputes, trade, and water issues. There reportedly are 162 
disputed enclaves on both sides of the border. The visit will also offer the two leaders the 
opportunity to discuss shared challenges arising from global climate change.124 Some observers 
see India developing east-west connectivity with Bangladesh to facilitate links with both its own 
isolated northeastern states and Southeast Asia, as well as with Bangladesh. A few express 
concern that Bangladesh’s expanding ties with China could facilitate Beijing’s north-south 
connectivity with the Indian Ocean littoral at the expense of India.125  
Cross-border issues and the use of Bangladesh territory by insurgents in India’s northeast remain 
key for New Delhi. A Joint Boundary Working Group established in 2000 met for the fourth time 
in late 2010, but demarcation disputes remain unresolved in numerous sectors.126 Human rights 
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watchdogs have been critical of what they call the “shoot-to-kill” policy of India’s border security 
forces, who reportedly have killed nearly 1,000 people, most of them unarmed Bangladeshis, who 
attempted to cross the border illegally over the past decade. The issue has become a sore point for 
Dhaka; Bangladesh’s foreign minister has urged Indian border security forces to exercise “utmost 
restraint” and was assured by her Indian counterpart that steps were being taken to address the 
problem.127 Prime Minister Hasina has discussed with Prime Minister Singh her government’s 
crackdown on Bangladesh-based Indian separatists, and reportedly made a commitment that she 
would not allow Bangladesh territory to be used for anti-Indian activities.128 Hasina’s government 
reportedly arrested and handed over to India a key leader of the United Liberation Front of Assam 
early in 2010, then later in the year remanded to India 28 leaders of the United Liberation Front 
of Assam (ULFA). Dhaka’s efforts to crack down on Indian separatist militants there apparently 
has led many of those elements to relocate to Burma.129 
Improved ties with Bangladesh can provide India with an opportunity to counter Pakistani and 
Chinese influence there. China has been assisting Bangladesh in developing port facilities in 
Chittagong, and some Indian sources believe Pakistan’s main intelligence agency has used 
Bangladesh to infiltrate operatives and even “terrorists” into India. In October 2010, Bangladesh 
formally sought Chinese assistance to build a deep water sea port in the Bay of Bengal near the 
southeastern island of Sonadia. The Dhaka government hopes that such a port could become a 
key shipping hub for northeast India and China’s Yunnan Province, as well as for Nepal, Bhutan, 
and Burma. Bangladesh is also reportedly in discussion with China and Burma on plans to build a 
highway linking Bangladesh’s Chittagong with Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan Province. 
Such connectivity with China would likely be an issue of concern for India. India’s multi-billion-
dollar transit projects could go far in bringing development to isolated regions of both countries, 
but some in Dhaka worry that India intends to create a “security corridor” across Bangladesh to 
supply counterinsurgency forces in its northeastern states and potentially even defense forces 
facing China in Arunachal Pradesh, which could elicit reprisals from Beijing.130 
India-Nepal131 
India-Nepal relations traditionally have been close and come under the aegis of the 1950 Indo-
Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty, which allows for unrestricted travel and residency across their 
1,150-mile-long shared border. From New Delhi’s view, the Treaty affords Nepali citizens 
“unparalleled advantages in India,” and has “enabled Nepal to overcome many of the 
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disadvantages of being a landlocked country.”132 India remains in close consultation with the 
Nepali government in an effort to support Nepal’s transition to a democratic, peaceful, and 
prosperous state. Prime Minister Singh conveyed his “warmest felicitations” to newly elected 
Nepali Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in August 2011. Bhattarai received his doctorate degree 
from New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University.133 Nepal is the world’s only officially Hindu 
country, and India continues to be its leading trade partner, as well as source of foreign 
investment and tourist arrivals. India has taken a lead role in efforts to train and equip the Nepal 
Army.134 The Madhesh people of Nepal’s Terai region bordering India share the Hindi language, 
as well as many familial ties across the open border. The largely Hindu social and religious 
structure of Nepal makes Nepali culture similar to India’s in many respects. 
The bilateral relationship is driven by two major geopolitical considerations. First, Nepal is 
viewed as a “buffer state” between India and China. As such, India seeks to minimize (or at least 
balance against) Chinese influence there. The substantial Tibetan community in Nepal can at 
times complicate this dynamic. While the Kathmandu government allows Tibetans to live in 
Nepal, it has a policy of not allowing any “anti-China” activity inside Nepal. Nepali authorities 
prevented the election of a Tibetan community government-in-exile in October 2010, a step taken 
by some as a hardening of Kathmandu’s stance toward Tibetan refugees.135 Tibetan protests in 
Nepal in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics had also led to a crackdown by Nepali 
authorities. There is growing evidence of Chinese ties with Nepali Maoists. A high profile bribery 
case alleges that a Maoist leader asked a Chinese official for substantial amounts of money to 
influence Madheshi lawmakers in support of the Maoist’s bid for the prime ministership. Former 
Nepali Prime Minister Prachanda traveled to China at least four times. Current Prime Minister 
Bhattarai, also of the CPN-M, has stated that Nepal needs to be sensitive to the security concerns 
of both India and China. Prachanda was viewed by some as having tilted towards China. India 
reportedly was “deeply uncomfortable with and suspicious of Maoist intentions” under the 
previous Prachanda government. Bhattarai has reportedly offered that “the days of playing India 
and China are over.”136 
The second key Indian geopolitical interest in Nepal is to maintain political stability in 
Kathmandu and keep Nepal from becoming a base of support for insurgents in India. India is 
concerned that a Maoist government in Nepal could lend support to the already significant Maoist 
insurgency in India. Thus far, there have been only limited connections between these groups, but 
it appears that India is concerned the links could grow should the Maoists assert their dominance 
over Nepal. Political stability in Nepal could lead to infrastructure development and the 
establishment of major new projects to tap the country’s estimated 43,000 megawatts of 
hydropower potential that is seen to be technically feasible and economically viable.137 This could 
go far in addressing the growing energy needs of India’s northern states. 
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India-Burma138 
India and Burma share close historical, ethnic, cultural, and religious ties, along with a 1,000-
mile-long border and maritime proximity in the Bay of Bengal. New Delhi continues to pursue 
closer relations with the repressive military regime in neighboring Rangoon for both economic 
and political reasons. India seeks to bolster its energy security by increasing “connectivity” 
between its northeastern states and western Burma. India is also concerned about the maintenance 
of political stability in Burma, fearful that instability could result in a surge of refugees into India 
and a further increase in China’s regional influence. New Delhi may also view good relations 
with Rangoon as a key aspect of its strategy to address ongoing territorial disputes with China and 
Pakistan. In addition, many observers see past and continued cooperation by the Burmese military 
as being vital in New Delhi’s efforts to battle separatist militants in India’s northeast. India was 
Burma’s fourth-largest trading partner in FY2009/10 (after Thailand, China, and Singapore), with 
total trade of a record $1.2 billion, up 27% over the previous fiscal year. India is engaged in more 
than a dozen major projects in Burma, most of them related to improving that country’s 
transportation and communication links.139 
In 2007, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), launched a 
violent crackdown to suppress major pro-democracy street protests led by Buddhist monks. In 
response, the United States imposed new sanctions on Burma and urged other countries to follow 
suit, yet New Delhi continued to favor dialogue and opposed the imposition of new sanctions. 
Moreover, during the protests and immediately afterwards, India moved ahead with plans to assist 
with the construction of a port in northwestern Burma as part of an effort to develop that 
country’s natural gas industry. New Delhi’s approach, justified by Indian leaders as being a 
pragmatic pursuit of their own national interests and as part of their “Look East” policy (see 
below), elicited accusations of Indian complicity in Burmese repression.140 Press reports in late 
2007 indicated that New Delhi was halting arms sales to Rangoon; in fact, India’s supply of 
military equipment to Burma was only “slowed.”141 
Burma again became the focus of international discussions in early 2010, when the SPDC 
released new laws governing parliamentary elections to be held later in the year.142 The laws 
appeared to restrict the participation of Burma’s opposition parties, in particular the National 
League for Democracy and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. While the United States, the European 
Union, and others were quick to criticize the laws, India’s response was comparatively muted. 
New Delhi chose to disassociate itself from a June 2010 U.N. Human Rights Council resolution 
that condemned “ongoing systematic violations of human rights” in Burma. However, as one of 
14 countries in the “Group of Friends on Burma”—a consultative body formed by U.N. 
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Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon—New Delhi did support the Group’s call for free and fair 
elections, and for the release of all political prisoners. 
In mid-2010, SPDC chief Senior General Than Shwe traveled to New Delhi—his second visit in 
six years—and met with Prime Minister Singh to discuss bilateral ties. The leaders reportedly 
discussed matters such as border security, economic relations, and upcoming elections in Burma. 
There were subsequent reports that the Indian military plan would move additional Border 
Security Force troops to guard the border with Burma. Even strident boosters of deepening U.S.-
India relations issued criticisms of New Delhi’s “Machiavellian turn” in welcoming the Burmese 
leader and pursuing greater links with his military regime. Independent analysts also insist that, as 
perhaps the only external power with the ability to tip the balance in favor of Burma’s democratic 
forces, India has an obligation to look beyond its more mercenary interests to take a more 
principled stand.143 
President Obama dismissed Burma’s November 2010 elections as having been neither free nor 
fair. While concurrently visiting New Delhi, the President was openly critical of India’s relative 
silence on the Burmese regime’s suppression of democratic movements and violations of human 
rights, saying democracies with global aspirations have an obligation to condemn such actions. 
Soon after, an unnamed Indian official said New Delhi has “strategic interests” in Burma and that 
its policies are driven by “political compulsions.” Secretary of State Clinton repeated the U.S. 
President’s contention while in Chennai in mid-2011, expressing her hope that New Delhi would 
continue pressing Rangoon to move ahead with democratization and contending that India has 
“the duty to speak out against violations of universal human rights.”144  
Suu Kyi’s November 2010 release from house arrest was officially welcomed by New Delhi with 
the hope that it would begin a process of reconciliation in Burma; Suu Kyi has herself urged India 
to play a more active role in standing up for democracy and “look beyond a commercial kind of 
view” when dealing with Burma.145 In June 2011, External Affairs Minister Krishna paid a three-
day visit to Rangoon, but did not take the opportunity to meet Suu Kyi (a task undertaken by the 
Indian foreign secretary). 
India-ASEAN 
Initiated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991, India’s “Look East” policy coincided with 
the country’s economic liberalization and has for two decades reflected New Delhi’s focused 
efforts to deepen commercial and diplomatic relations with East and Southeast Asia. It also has 
included security cooperation with many of India’s eastern neighbors, likely in response to 
China’s growing regional influence. As the ASEAN countries realized significant economic 
growth, Indian leaders have fairly consistently pursued greater engagement in Southeast Asia. 
Given the Indian foreign secretary’s view that “India is as much a Southeast Asian nation as a 
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South Asian nation,” New Delhi’s policy seeks to “reconnect and reach out in the civilizational 
space we share with our neighbors.”146 
Like the United States, India is designated as an ASEAN “Dialogue Partner.” At the India-
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting in Indonesia in July 2011, there was unanimous agreement that 
engagement should be strengthened in the security and economic fields, to include upgraded 
efforts to combat international terrorism and threats to maritime security, and aspirations to 
finalize a pending Services and Investment Agreement. New Delhi hopes to boost trade with the 
ten ASEAN states to $70 billion by 2012.147 Moreover, India has since 1996 been a member of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in which 27 member states come together to consult on 
matters affecting regional peace and security. New Delhi’s participation further reflects India’s 
growing engagement with the Asia-Pacific region and tracks well with its Look East policy. 
India’s Look East Policy may not be entirely welcome by China. New Delhi is reportedly 
spending $2 billion to set up a military command in the Andaman Islands located to the northwest 
of the Strait of Malacca, through which much of China’s energy and trade flow. In July, an Indian 
Navy vessel based in the Andamans reportedly received a warning from the Chinese navy that it 
was entering Chinese waters as it sailed from Vietnam’s Nha Trang port towards Haiphong. Some 
interpret the presence of Indian naval ships in Vietnam as “possibly the start of an Indian bid for 
influence in the South China Sea.”148 
India-Iran149 
India’s relations with Iran traditionally have been positive and are marked by centuries of 
substantive interactions between the Indus Valley and Persian civilizations. Diplomatic ties were 
formalized in 1950, and New Delhi has maintained high-level engagement with Tehran’s Islamist 
regime after 1979. In 2003, the two countries launched a bilateral “strategic partnership” of their 
own, setting out to deepen economic, energy, science, and education cooperation, as well as work 
together on Afghan reconstruction and counterterrorism.150 Yet, as India has grown closer to the 
United States and other Western countries in the new century, New Delhi’s policy has slowly 
shifted—perhaps most notably when India voted with the United States (and the majority) at key 
International Atomic Energy Agency sessions in 2005 and 2006—leaving most aspects of the 
envisaged India-Iran partnership unrealized. Most recently, New Delhi has moved to more fully 
embrace the international sanctions regime against Tehran, causing new tensions with Iran. In late 
2010, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made repeated mention of the “Kashmir problem,” leading 
some to see an “anti-India tilt” in Iranian policy.151 In a reflection of more constricted bilateral 
commercial relations, the total value of bilateral trade dropped by more than 10% in 
FY2009/2010 after peaking at nearly $15 billion the previous year.152 
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There are U.S. concerns that India will seek greater energy resources from Iran, thus benefitting 
financially a country the United States is seeking to isolate. Indian firms have in recent years 
taken long-term contracts for purchase of Iranian gas and oil. Natural gas purchases could be 
worth many billions of dollars, but thus far differences over pricing and transport have precluded 
sales. Building upon growing energy ties is the proposed construction of a pipeline to deliver 
Iranian natural gas to India through Pakistan (the “IPI” pipeline), but participation in this project 
apparently has been abandoned by New Delhi.153 Still, India has imported an average of about 
400,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil per day in recent years, accounting for about one-seventh of 
India’s total oil imports and making it Iran’s third-largest market in this category.154  
Officially, New Delhi continues to discuss the IPI pipeline project with Tehran, along with long-
term supplies of liquid natural gas (LNG), development of Iran’s South Pars LNG project, the 
development of the Farsi oil and gas blocks, and Iran’s Chabahar port and railway projects.155 
Many in New Delhi see development of Iran’s Chabahar port as providing India with access to 
Central Asian markets bypassing Pakistan. Indian officials have for years been encouraging Iran 
to more quickly develop the port’s facilities, but Chabahar’s current capacity of 2.5 million tons 
per year is only about one-fifth of the target. Tehran’s reluctance to move faster may be linked to 
its concerns about security in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan region, the site of a Sunni Muslim 
insurgency. Plans by India’s state-owned natural gas company to purchase a 40% stake in Iran’s 
South Pars Phase 12 gas project have been delayed by concerns about violating the international 
sanctions regime; banks have been unwilling to fund the investment while global pressure grows 
over Iran’s nuclear program.156 
In its new role as a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council, India has firmed its 
stand on the need to fully implement Iran sanctions. In the final week of 2010, the Reserve Bank 
of India declared that a regional clearinghouse, the Asian Clearing Union, could no longer be 
used to settle energy trade transactions. The Obama Administration praised the decision; 
Washington had long sought the move as a way of making Indian companies’ purchases of 
Iranian oil and gas more difficult, and thus of tightening sanctions targeting Iran. New Delhi may 
have taken the action as a means of bolstering its case for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Tehran 
at first refused to sell outside the previous arrangement, but quickly agreed to ensure continuing 
shipments as officials in both countries scrambled to find a lasting solution. By February, the two 
countries appeared to have found resolution by agreeing to make transactions in euros through an 
Iranian bank with German accounts, but, in May, proliferation-related EU scrutiny of that bank 
jeopardized this new arrangement and Indian payments were again halted. In early summer, Iran’s 
state oil firm threatened Indian refiners with an August supply cutoff if the issue wasn’t resolved, 
but Tehran quickly stated that no cutoff was planned. Still, Iranian exports were reduced, Saudi 
Arabia increased its sales to India to compensate, and the now estimated $4.8 billion impasse may 
yet lead to a full cutoff. 
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The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24) required the President to impose sanctions on foreign 
companies that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy 
sector. The 109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-
293). The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which 
became P.L. 111-195, further tightened sanctions on Iran. To date, no Indian firms have been 
sanctioned under these Acts, although Indian firms potentially involved in the gas pipeline project 
would be sanctionable, as would companies that sell gasoline to Iran. Reliance Industries of 
Mumbai, a major supplier in recent years, has halted such sales.157 
During the period 2004-2006, the United States sanctioned Indian scientists and chemical 
companies for transferring to Iran WMD-related equipment and/or technology (most sanctions 
were chemical-related, but one scientist was alleged to have aided Iran’s nuclear program). New 
Delhi called the moves unjustified. Included in legislation to enable U.S.-India civil nuclear 
cooperation (P.L. 109-401, the “Hyde Act”) was a non-binding assertion that U.S. policy should 
“secure India’s full and active participation” in U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction.158 New Delhi firmly opposes the emergence of any new nuclear 
weapons powers in the region, but also opposes the use of force and even sanctions, favoring 
instead diplomacy to address Iran’s controversial nuclear program.  
The 2003 India-Iran Joint Statement included plans to “explore opportunities for cooperation in 
defense in agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits.”159 While some in Congress 
have expressed concerns about signs of nascent India-Iran defense cooperation, most observers 
view such relations as remaining thin and patchy to date, at most, although some Indian strategic 
analysts call for increasing these as a means of strengthening regional security, as well as to 
maintain New Delhi’s foreign policy independence, especially vis-à-vis the United States.160 
India-Russia161 
Moscow was New Delhi’s main foreign benefactor for the first four decades of Indian 
independence. Today, Russia continues to be “a trusted and reliable strategic partner,” and New 
Delhi views its ties with Moscow as a “key pillar of India’s foreign policy.”162 The Russian 
President was in New Delhi in December 2010 in an effort to sustain close India-Russia relations 
despite New Delhi’s warmer relations with the West. During a follow-on visit to Moscow, 
External Affairs Minister Krishna described the India-Russia friendship as being a “special and 
privileged strategic partnership.” Moscow seeks to continue supplies of nuclear technology and 
expertise, as well as win millions of dollars worth of contracts for the maintenance of India’s 
extensive inventory of Russian-made military hardware. Among the outcomes of the December 
summit was the inking of agreements to deepen cooperation in the nuclear energy, 
pharmaceutical, and information technology sectors. The governments also seek to more than 
double annual bilateral trade to $20 billion by 2015 (trade topped $8.5 billion in 2010, up 15% 
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over the previous year).163 India’s single largest foreign investment is a $1 billion stake in a joint 
oil and gas venture on Russia’s Sakhalin Island.  
Despite some post-Cold War diversification of its defense suppliers, India continues to obtain the 
great bulk of its imported military hardware from Russian firms, which are estimated to have 
been the source of more than 80% of India’s total arms imports for the period 2006-2010.164 
Russia’s status as a main supplier of Indian defense equipment has come under threat in several 
disputes, including over the refitting of an aircraft carrier (which has seen major delays and cost 
overruns), a spat over Russia’s allegedly substandard upgradation of an Indian attack submarine, 
and other irritants. Still, the New Delhi government appears proud to have shifted from a buyer-
seller defense relationship to “more elaborate and advanced cooperation” involving joint design, 
production, and marketing of such weapons systems as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft and 
the Brahmos cruise missile.165 
India-Japan166 
India’s relations with Japan only began to blossom in the current century after being significantly 
undermined by India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests. Today, leaders from both countries 
acknowledge numerous common values and interests. They are engaging a “strategic and global 
partnership” formally launched in 2006, when the Indian foreign minister spoke of Japan as a 
“natural partner in the quest to create an arc of advantage and prosperity” in Asia. He also 
emphasized India’s desire for economic integration in Asia and cooperative efforts to secure vital 
sea lanes, especially in the Indian Ocean. Japan’s support for the latter initiative has included 
plans for unprecedented joint naval exercises. New Delhi and Tokyo also share an interest in 
seeing membership of the U.N. Security Council expanded—both governments aspire to 
permanent seats.  
After years of negotiations, New Delhi and Tokyo finalized a free trade agreement in October 
2010, after differences over Indian tariff rates and Japanese restrictions on the importation of 
generic Indian pharmaceuticals were settled. Bilateral trade was already increasing rapidly: its 
total value in 2010 exceeded $14.5 billion, up by some 46% over 2009. India has also secured a 
$4.5 billion loan from Japan for construction of a 900-mile freight railway between Delhi and 
Mumbai, the largest-ever single-project overseas loan offered by Japan. The Indian government 
hopes that the “Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor” project will attract more than $90 billion in 
foreign investment following completion. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Japan has since 1986 been India’s largest aid donor.167 
U.S., Indian, and Japanese naval vessels held unprecedented combined naval exercises in the Bay 
of Bengal in 2007 (Australian and Singaporean vessels also participated). Officials stressed that 
the exercises—which involved a total of 27 ships and submarines, among them two U.S. aircraft 
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carriers—were not prompted by China’s growing military strength. New Delhi favors greater 
trilateral India-U.S.-Japan cooperation, especially in the areas of trade and energy security, but 
shies from anything that could be construed as a multilateral security alliance. Washington, New 
Delhi, and Tokyo have plans to commence a senior-level trilateral dialogue in 2011. 
India-Africa 
India’s historic engagement with Africa has been considerable and has included ancient trade 
patterns, active support for African liberation movements in the 20th century, and robust 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations on the continent. Indian leaders appear to be 
reviving links to old friends in the developing world with an eye on access to natural resources 
and perhaps also support for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. While speaking to a 
group of African leaders in Ethiopia in May 2011, Prime Minister Singh offered a $5 billion line 
of Indian credit to nations there and pledged his government’s support for African education and 
infrastructure.168 
India’s interests and influence in Africa arguably align well with those of the United States, 
especially given New Delhi’s commitment to secularism, pluralism, and democracy. This stands 
in contrast to China’s role in Africa, which may be considered more mercantile. China’s foreign 
exchange reserves of more than $3 trillion are some ten times greater than India’s, and China has 
been aggressive in using its state-owned development banks to make huge investments in oil, gas, 
and other natural resources in Africa. At $46 billion in 2010, the value of India’s total trade with 
the continent remains less than half of that of China. The United States may thus benefit by 
welcoming and coordinating with India in engagement of African countries, perhaps especially in 
the area of security initiatives.169 
India’s Domestic Policy Setting 
National Political System, Elections, and Parties 
India is the world’s most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative 
government and rule of law. As a nation-state, India contains hundreds of different ethnic groups, 
religious sects, and social castes. U.S. policymakers commonly identify in the Indian political 
system shared core values, and this has facilitated increasingly friendly relations between the U.S. 
and Indian governments. In 2011, the often-cited Freedom House again rated India as “free” in 
the areas of political rights and civil liberties, assigning it a score identical to that of Indonesia.170  
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National System and Elections 
With a robust and working democratic system, India is a federal republic where the bulk of 
executive power rests with the prime minister and his or her cabinet (the Indian president is a 
ceremonial chief of state with limited executive powers). Most of India’s 15 prime ministers have 
come from the country’s Hindi-speaking northern regions and all but two have been upper-caste 
Hindus. The 543-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House) is the locus of national power, with directly 
elected representatives from each of the country’s 28 states and 7 union territories. A smaller 
upper house, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), may review, but not veto, most legislation, and 
has no power over the prime minister or the cabinet. National and state legislators are elected to 
five-year terms. The most recent parliamentary elections were held in the spring of 2009 when the 
incumbent Indian National Congress Party (hereinafter “Congress”)-led coalition won a 
convincing victory, as it had five years earlier. 
National elections in 1999 had secured ruling power for a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led 
coalition government headed by Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee. That outcome decisively ended 
the historic dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi-led Congress Party, which was relegated to sitting in 
opposition at the national level (its members continued to lead many state governments). 
However, a surprise Congress resurgence under party president Sonia Gandhi in the 2004 
elections brought to power a new left-leaning coalition government led by former finance 
minister and Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, a Sikh and India’s first-ever non-
Hindu prime minister. Many analysts attributed Congress’s 2004 resurgence to the resentment of 
rural and poverty-stricken urban voters who felt left out of the “India shining” campaign of a BJP 
more associated with urban, middle-class interests. Others saw in the results a rejection of the 
Hindu nationalism associated with the BJP. 
The Congress Party and its major coalition allies significantly improved their national standing in 
the spring 2009 elections. More than 1,000 parties vied for office and 60% of the country’s 714 
million eligible voters turned out at 838,000 polling stations. Congress Party candidates 
performed strongly both in direct contests against BJP opponents, as well as when contending 
against so-called “Third Front” candidates from a coalition of smaller regional parties that had 
sought to displace the incumbents. The result was a net increase of 61 Lok Sabha seats for 
Congress, bringing its total representation to 206 seats, or 38% of the total. Although the BJP’s 
percentage share of the total vote was similar to that in 2004, it lost 22 more seats, and its second 
consecutive national defeat left it leaderless and in disarray. Meanwhile, the Left Front grouping 
of communist parties (former supporters of the Congress-led coalition) was devastated, losing 35 
of its 60 seats.171 See Figure 1 for major party representation in the current Lok Sabha. 
                                                                 
171 The four most notable coalition allies for Congress—occupying a combined total of less than 10% of Lok Sabha 
seats—are the Trinamool Congress of West Bengal, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of Tamil Nadu, the Nationalist 
Congress Party of Maharashtra, and the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference. 
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Figure 1. Major Party Representation in India’s 15th Lok Sabha 
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Source: Election Commission of India. 
Prime Minister Singh oversees the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) ruling coalition that has 
now marked more than seven years in power, far exceeding the expectations of some early 
observers. Both he and party chief Gandhi have remained fairly popular national figures, although 
both have seen their favorability suffer with major corruption scandals breaking since late 2010. 
Despite some notable successes, the UPA government has remained unpopular by many 
measures, having failed to capitalize on opportunities, and appearing to many as meek and 
indecisive. Singh himself, though still generally admired as an honest and intelligent figure, has 
been unable to succeed in pushing through much of the UPA’s domestic agenda, which focuses on 
development and uplift for India’s hundreds of millions of poor citizens. 
Major Political Parties 
Indian National Congress172 
Congress’s electoral strength had reached a nadir in 1999, when the party won only 110 Lok 
Sabha seats. Observers attributed the poor showing to a number of factors, including the failure of 
Congress to make strong pre-election alliances (as had the BJP) and perceptions that party leader 
Sonia Gandhi lacked the experience to lead the country. Support for the Congress, which 
dominated Indian politics for decades, had been in fairly steady decline following the 1984 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 1991 assassination of her son, Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 
                                                                 
172 See the Indian National Congress at http://www.congress.org.in. 
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Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv’s Italian-born, Catholic widow, refrained from active politics until the late 
1990s. She later made efforts to revitalize the party by phasing out older leaders and attracting 
more women and lower castes—efforts that appear to have paid off in 2004. Today, Congress 
again occupies more parliamentary seats (206) than any other party and, through unprecedented 
alliances with powerful regional parties, it again leads India’s government under the UPA 
coalition. As party chief and UPA chair, Gandhi is seen to wield considerable influence over the 
coalition’s policy making process. Her foreign origins have presented an obstacle and likely were 
a major factor in her surprising 2004 decision to decline the prime ministership. As discussed 
below, her son, Rahul, is widely seen as the most likely heir to Congress leadership. 
Bharatiya Janata Party173 
With the rise of Hindu nationalism, the BJP rapidly increased its parliamentary strength during 
the 1980s. In 1993, the party’s image was tarnished among some, burnished for others, by its 
alleged complicity in serious communal violence in Mumbai and elsewhere. Some hold elements 
of the BJP, as the political arm of extremist Hindu groups, responsible for the incidents (the party 
has advocated “Hindutva,” or an India based on Hindu culture, and views this as key to nation-
building; Hindutva can at times take an anti-Western cast). While leading a national coalition 
from 1998-2004, the BJP worked—with only limited success—to change its image from right-
wing Hindu fundamentalist to conservative and secular, although 2002 communal rioting in 
Gujarat again damaged the party’s credentials as a moderate organization. The BJP-led National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) was overseen by party notable Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, whose 
widespread personal popularity helped to keep the BJP in power. 
Following its upset loss in 2004 and even sounder defeat in 2009, the party has been in some 
disarray. While it continues to lead several important state governments, its national influence has 
eroded in recent years. Party leader Lal Krishna Advani, who had served as Vajpayee’s deputy 
and home minister while the BJP was in power, apparently sought to transcend his Hindu 
nationalist roots by posturing mostly as “governance, security, development” candidate in 2009; 
the party’s loss likely ended his political career.  
At present, the BJP president is Nitin Gadkari, a former Maharashtran official known for his avid 
support of privatization. Although still in some disorder in 2011, there are signs that the BJP has 
made changes necessary to be a formidable challenger in scheduled 2014 polls. These include a 
more effective branding of the party as one focused on development and good governance rather 
than emotive, Hindutva-related issues, and Gadkari’s success at quelling intra-party dissidence 
and, by some accounts, showing superior strategizing and organizing skills as compared to his 
predecessors.174 Yet among the party’s likely candidates for the prime ministership in future 
elections is Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, who has overseen impressive development 
successes in his state, but who is also dogged by controversy over his alleged complicity in lethal 
anti-Muslim rioting there in 2002 (Modi has in the past been denied a U.S. visa under an 
American law barring entry for foreign government officials found to be complicit in severe 
violations of religious freedom).175 
                                                                 
173 See the Bharatiya Janata Party at http://www.bjp.org. 
174 “Race for the Crown,” Times of India (Delhi), December 15, 2010. 
175 Despite his clear political and economic successes in Gujarat—in his ten years as Chief Minister the state has led the 
country on many development indicators—Modi continues to be haunted by the 2002 Ahmadabad riots, a topic he has 
never fully addressed in public. Although he is a safe bet to win a third term in 2012 state elections, his aspirations to 
(continued...) 
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Regional Parties 
The influence of regional and caste-based parties has become an increasingly important variable 
in Indian politics; both the 2004 and 2009 national elections saw such parties receiving about half 
of all votes cast. Never before 2004 had the Congress Party entered into pre-poll alliances at the 
national level, and numerous analysts attributed Congress’s success to precisely this new tack, 
especially thorough arrangements with the Bihar-based Rashtriya Janata Dal and Tamil Nadu’s 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam.176 The newfound power of both large and smaller regional parties, 
alike, is reflected in the UPA’s ministerial appointments, and in the Congress-led coalition’s 
professed attention to rural issues and to relations between state governments and New Delhi. 
Two of India’s three most notable regional parties are based in the densely-populated northern 
state of Uttar Pradesh (UP), home to some 190 million persons. The Samajwadi Party, a largely 
Muslim- and lower caste-based organization, is highly influential there, and holds 23 Lok Sabha 
seats. The rival Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) controls the UP state government; its lower-caste, 
female leader and current Chief Minister Mayawati, is believed to have national political 
aspirations. The BSP occupies 21 Lok Sabha seats. A final regional party of note is the Janata Dal 
(United) (JDU), based out of neighboring Bihar and led by that state’s Chief Minister, Nitish 
Kumar. The JDU holds 20 Lok Sabha seats. 
The Left Front177 
Although the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) seated the third largest number of 
parliamentarians after the 2004 elections (43), its vote bank has been almost wholly limited to 
West Bengal and Kerala. Communist parties (the CPI-M and several smaller allies) have in the 
past been bitter rivals of the Congress in these states, but a mutual commitment to secularism 
motivated their cooperation against the BJP in 2004. This “Left Front” is vocal in its criticisms of 
closer India-U.S. relations, adamantly opposing bilateral civil nuclear cooperation and railing at 
any signs that the United States seeks to make India a “junior partner” in efforts to counter China. 
This made the communists difficult partners for the first UPA government, and they subsequently 
were jettisoned as Congress supporters. In the 2009 national elections, the Left Front competed 
for 130 seats, but won only 20, suffering especially costly losses in their traditional strongholds. 
Many analysts attributed their setbacks to poor governance records in these very states. What may 
be the final blow came when 34 uninterrupted years of communist rule in West Bengal ended 
upon the Congress-allied Trinamool Congress Party’s electoral rout of the communist coalition in 
May 2011 state assembly elections. 
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be the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate face significant obstacles, not least the likelihood that Muslims and liberal-
minded Hindus would represent an anti-Modi bloc at the national level, and the BJP’s key ally in Bihar, Nitish Kumar’s 
Janata Dal (United), could be expected to abandon the alliance in protest (Geeta Anand, “Give Us Your Account, Mr. 
Modi” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011; Karan Shah,” Narendra Modi, Prime Minister?” (op-ed), 
Outlook (Delhi), April 5, 2011). 
176 In 2008, the DMK leader and chief minister of Tamil Nadu, home to tens of million of ethnic Tamils, threatened to 
withdraw his party from the Congress-led coalition—and so bring down the central government—unless India stopped 
“escalating” Sri Lanka’s civil war, in which mostly Tamil civilians were caught in a crossfire. The threat was 
withdrawn days later, but the episode illuminated the fragile nature of a coalition government in New Delhi that can be 
destabilized by narrow regional and/or ethnic interests. 
177 See the Communist Party of India (Marxist) at http://www.cpim.org. 
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Corruption Scandals and Congress Party Woes 
Late 2010 Corruption Stories Break 
Corruption has long been a serious problem in India (see also “India’s Economy” section, below). 
Pervasive, major, and high-level corruption and iniquity is now identified as a central obstacle to 
India’s economic and social development, and is seen as a key cause of a steep decline in foreign 
investment in late 2010 and early 2011. November 2010 witnessed a baring of two major Indian 
scandals that have left the national government largely paralyzed and unable to effectively govern 
to date. The first involves apparent corruption and gross negligence by officials overseeing the 
October 2010 Commonwealth Games hosted by New Delhi; the second relates to the 
government’s sale of broadband licenses at far below market prices, costing the government many 
billions of dollars.  
First, in November 2010, two senior Congress Party figures—the chief organizer of the 
Commonwealth Games and Maharashtra’s Chief Minister—were forced to resign under a cloud 
of corruption allegations. In February 2011, two more senior Commonwealth Games officials 
were arrested on suspicion of corruption, specifically, for conspiring to inflate costs while 
procuring timers and scoring equipment from a Swiss firm at a net loss to the government of 
nearly $24 million. Two months later, federal agents arrested the former chief organizer of the 
games on similar charges. By July, Sports Minister M.S. Gill had resigned his post. 
Yet it is the telecom scandal that has been the most sensational and damaging of the several recent 
corruption stories, especially after an independent auditor estimated that the central government 
had lost some $39 billion by selling the 2G spectrum rights too cheaply. Soon after the 
Commonwealth Games story broke came a spate of revelations about the process by which 
federal Communications and Information Technology Ministry officials had auctioned off parts of 
the 2G spectrum, apparently receiving only $3.6 billion for licenses that should have been worth 
as much as $45 billion. In November 2010, Communications and Information Technology 
Minister A. Raja, a leading Congress Party-allied DMK party figure who personally approved of 
the improper spectrum license sales, resigned under intense pressure and subsequently was 
arrested along with two other ministry officials. Police, acting upon evidence of their collusion 
with private sector figures, arrested a telecom company executive in February 2011. In July, 
another federal cabinet figure and DMK colleague of Raja’s, Textile Minister Dayanidhi Maran, 
quit his post after coming under investigation in the scandal. 
In a further embarrassment for the ruling coalition, the qualifications of a new high-level anti-
corruption official, P.J. Thomas, who had been appointed in September 2010, was questioned by 
the Supreme Court later that year due to his potentially criminal role in an alleged palm oil import 
scam in his home state of Kerala. By the final month of 2010, outrage from opposition parties had 
essentially shut down Parliament for three weeks; the Congress-led coalition was able use its 
majority to pass some spending bills, but most major legislation was blocked.178 The multiple 
scandals have continued to render the Congress-led coalition unable to push through major 
economic reforms that would require the acquiescence of opposition parties. 
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While it has benefitted from the UPA’s woes, the main opposition BJP has not escaped culpability 
in recent corruption scandals. In July 2011, Karnataka’s ombudsman issued a report implicating 
the state’s BJP chief minister, B.S. Yeddyurappa, in a $3.5 billion scandal involving the illegal 
mining of iron ore. Yeddyurappa, accused of receiving a $2 million illicit payment from a mining 
company and selling state land at an inflated price, quickly lost the support of his party and 
resigned. 
In addition to the major incidents of graft and corruptions discussed above, reports of large-scale 
political bribery sparked much outrage in early 2011 when U.S. diplomatic cables released by 
Wikileaks reportedly described an American diplomat’s eyewitness mid-2008 account of being 
shown chests containing about $25 million in cash that a Congress Party aide allegedly said was 
to be used as payoffs to secure Parliament’s endorsement of the controversial U.S.-India civil 
nuclear deal. Although Prime Minster Singh himself denied that his party had paid any bribes or 
broken any laws, and described the account as “unverified and unverifiable,” the episode has led 
to at least two arrests in an ongoing probe and provided further fuel for opposition party attacks 
on the UPA government.179 Moreover, in the current year, new attention also has focused on 
hundreds of billions of dollars in funds illicitly stashed by Indians abroad. In July 2011, India‘s 
Supreme Court requested that the government find and repatriate this so called “black money,” 
adding new pressure on the Congress-led coalition to combat high-level corruption.180 
While Prime Minister Singh is not accused of personal wrongdoing, he has come under fire for an 
allegedly inattentive management style that, for some observers, facilitated an environment in 
which corruption could spread. In the face of mounting pressure to act, Congress President Sonia 
Gandhi acknowledged that problems existed “at all levels” of society, but she squashed rumors of 
any rift between herself and the Prime Minister, expressing full confidence in Singh’s leadership. 
Soon after, Singh himself offered to appear before any investigative body, declaring he had 
nothing to hide about his actions. Yet, as his government continued to be paralyzed by scandals 
and infighting into 2011, speculation about Singh’s status mounted, and in February the Prime 
Minister gave a nationally-televised interview in which he defended his own actions, promised to 
crack down on corruption, and called the related scandals the greatest regret of his term in office. 
Days later, Singh dropped his longstanding resistance and acceded to opposition demands for a 
parliamentary investigation of the telecom scandal in return for an end to their filibuster that had 
paralyzed the legislature for two months.181 
Increasing Public Protest and the Rise of Anna Hazare  
By the spring of 2011, negative emotions sparked by months-long revelations of high-level 
corruption reached the point where mass public mobilization could occur. Two figures were 
notable in initiating this development: In early June, prominent yoga guru Swami Ramdev—his 
television program attracts about 30 million viewers—staged a major anticorruption protest in the 
                                                                 
179 “In India, Leaked Cable About Bribes Sets Off a Furor,” New York Times, March 18, 2011; “No Bribes Paid for 
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180 A comprehensive late 2010 study determined that, from 1948 to 2008, illicit outflows totaled $213 billion. When 
adjusted for accumulated interest, the value is $462 billion (Dev Kar, “Drivers and Dynamics of Illicit Financial Flows 
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Indian capital, and launched his own mass hunger strike to demand government action to recover 
“black money.” That night, after apparently inaccurate reports that the government had acceded to 
Ramdev’s demands, hundreds of police swept through the protesters, using tear gas and batons to 
disperse them; at least 30 people were injured. Government officials explained that Ramdev’s 
permit allowed only for yoga and not a political demonstration; police said that permit was for a 
maximum of 5,000 attendees and some 40,000-60,000 showed up. Critics accused the 
government of using unnecessary force against peaceful protesters.182 Over following days, 
Ramdev’s fast attracted thousands of participants across the country. Public officials were 
discomfited by the exercise of political influence through a perceived “publicity stunt”; other 
observers were alarmed that hardline Hindu nationalists were at times sharing the stage with 
Ramdev. There was thus relief felt across India’s political spectrum when, in mid-June, Ramdev 
called off his fast.183 
Yet a previously unknown figure has assumed far more influence at the national level. Two 
months before the Ramdev-led protest, social activist Anna Hazare, an uneducated 72-year-old 
from an indigent Maharashtran family, had set himself up at a New Delhi tourist sight and vowed 
to “fast unto death” unless the central government moved to toughen its anti-corruption laws, in 
particular by establishing a new “Lokpal” (ombudsman) post to review corruption complaints 
reaching to the highest levels of government. Less than a week later, after many thousands in 
cities across India had taken up his cause, Hazare ended his strike and declared victory upon the 
government’s announcement that it would form a committee to draft Lokpal legislation. 
The composition of that committee—five government officials and five nongovernmental 
activists—quickly became a matter of controversy, with critics questioning why members of civil 
society groups, with no standing as elected representatives of the people, should be involved in a 
process with major political implications. Moreover, the government representatives found 
themselves in serious disagreement with “Team Anna,” as the civil society members and other 
Hazare supporters came to be known. In the end, the government officials produced one version 
(the Lokpal bill) and civil society members produced another (the Jan Lokpal bill). Opinion 
surveys have found huge majorities (80%-90%) of Indians favoring the civil society version. 
Top Congress Party leaders, including Prime Minister Singh, have argued that multiple tactics to 
combat corruption are required, and that no single group could claim to represent the whole of 
civil society. Still, the government has come under fire for failing to open lines of communication 
with alternative civil society groups, leaving an impression that Hazare’s movement speaks for 
the entire nation. Meanwhile, “Team Anna” itself has been criticized for allegedly dividing poorer 
minority communities, and for signs that Hindu nationalists are providing the bulk of its 
organizational muscle.184 
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Status of the “Lokpal” Legislation 
On July 28, 2011, 43 years after the first draft was conceived, India’s federal cabinet approved a 
Lokpal bill that did not include serving prime ministers or the higher judiciary under its 
purview.185 The bill did, however, incorporate some minor provisions of the Jan Lokpal bill and 
had the support of all but one of the Congress Party’s coalition partners. Nevertheless, Hazare 
called the bill “unacceptable,” and the opposition BJP joined him in expressing disappointment 
that the prime minister was excluded from oversight.  
To express his dissatisfaction with the government’s actions, Hazare vowed to begin another fast 
“unto death” in New Delhi on August 16. On that morning, as thousands of supporters began to 
gather at a city park, plain-clothes police arrested Hazare and took him away. At this point, his 
supporters released a pre-recorded videotape in which Hazare, anticipating his own detention, 
announced the start of a “second independence campaign” for India. By jailing Hazare, the 
government looked both inept and undemocratic, and united a wide range of otherwise reluctant 
actors in support of Hazare’s movement. In a further twist, Hazare refused an offer to be released 
until he was given permission to launch a 15-day hunger strike without any restrictions on crowd 
size at the anticipated protest site.186 
In late August, a parliamentary committee began considering the Jan Lokpal bill submitted by 
Hazare and his supporters, thus meeting a central demand of the protestors. Yet Hazare rejected a 
personal plea from the prime minister to end his fast until being guaranteed that certain key 
provisions of the bill would be enacted. On August 27, the 13th day of his latest fast, Hazare 
declared victory when negotiations among government ministers, opposition lawmakers, and civil 
society representatives resulted in an agreement.187 
Congress Party Woes 
Even before major corruption scandals broke in late 2010, the Congress-led UPA was under 
considerable criticism for drift and ineffectiveness. Since that time, the decline of the Congress 
Party’s standing has been precipitous: less than two years after the party won a convincing 2009 
national reelection victory, opinion polls showed a majority of Indians believing the UPA 
coalition had lost its moral authority to rule. Many analysts identify the slow response to 
corruption scandals as having been particularly damaging.188 
In the face of growing public anger, Prime Minister Singh made changes to the federal cabinet in 
January, demoting several ministers who had been tainted by scandal or criticized for 
ineffectiveness. Yet the changes were relatively minor, leaving most commentators unimpressed, 
and the opposition BJP accused the government of lacking enough courage to remove corrupt 
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figures.189 Over the course of recent political upheaval, Singh’s mild, nonpolitical bearing, once 
considered part of his appeal, has for many become a liability, especially as the Indian leader has 
appeared slow-footed in reacting to national outrage over increasing evidence of high-level 
corruption. In June, he publically denied charges that he had become a “lame duck” leader.190 
Poor economic news also continues to leech support for the Congress-led government; in 
February, some 100,000 trade unionists took to the streets of New Delhi to protest high food 
prices and unemployment. In March, the Congress Party nearly lost one of its key coalition 
partners, Tamil Nadu’s Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), which has 18 seats in Parliament 
but was badly beaten in state elections. Some Congress leaders reportedly wanted to end ties with 
the DMK, given that the federal minister at the center of the ongoing telecom scandal, A. Raja, 
was a DMK figure who was seen to taint the overall coalition. In the end, however, Congress 
president Sonia Gandhi chose to maintain a DMK role in the UPA coalition upon condition that it 
concede to Congress’s demand for more Tamil Nadu state assembly seats.191 
Meanwhile, Congress President Gandhi is suffering from an unknown illness, and in early August 
virtually disappeared from India’s political stage, having left the country for surgery at an 
undisclosed U.S. hospital. Moreover, as key Congress figures express support for the future 
leadership role of Sonia Gandhi’s youthful son, parliamentarian Rahul Gandhi, Manmohan 
Singh’s political authority is correspondingly undermined. The 2009 polls may have represented a 
coming out party of sorts for the younger Gandhi, who many expect to be put forward as 
Congress’s prime ministerial candidate in scheduled 2014 elections. Yet this heir-apparent 
remains dogged by questions about his abilities to lead the party, given a mixed record as an 
election strategist, uneasy style in public appearances, and reputation for gaffes.192 
Notable State-Level Developments 
Perhaps India’s best example of effective governance and impressive development is found in 
Gujarat (pop. 60 million), where controversial Chief Minister Narendra Modi has streamlined 
economic processes, removing red tape and curtailing corruption in ways that have made the state 
a key driver of national economic growth. Seeking to overcome the taint of his alleged complicity 
in deadly 2002 anti-Muslim riots, Modi has overseen heavy investment in modern roads and 
power infrastructure, and annual growth of more than 11% in recent years. The state has attracted 
major international investors such as General Motors and Mitsubishi and, with only 5% of the 
country’s population, Gujarat now accounts for more than one-fifth of India’s exports.193 
Another positive example in 2011 has been Bihar (pop. 104 million), one of India’s poorest 
states, where Chief Minister Nitish Kumar has won national attention through his considerable 
success in emphasizing good governance over caste-based politics; he is credited with restoring 
law and order across much of the state, as well as overseeing infrastructure and educational 
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improvements of direct benefit to common citizens projects.194 Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) 
party, in alliance with the main national opposition BJP, won an overwhelming reelection 
majority in November 2010 state elections. 
The examples set in by Chief Ministers Modi and Kumar may have inspired the popular leader of 
India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh (pop. 200 million). Chief Minister Mayawati, who is 
widely believed to maintain national political ambitions and was at the forefront of a nascent 
“Third Front” in 2009, has shifted her own focus much more toward infrastructure projects such 
as road-building and improving the state’s poor energy grid.195 
An ongoing movement to carve a new state out of Andhra Pradesh (pop. 85 million) has caused 
sometimes major public disturbances. The UPA government had first committed to form the new 
state in late 2009, but has since deferred, causing protests. Because the new state would include 
the important high-technology hub of Hyderabad, the movement could have both domestic and 
international economic implications. In March 2011, 100,000 proponents of a new Telangana 
state were detained by police and another 50,000 rallied in defiance of an unofficial curfew. In 
July, a statewide protest strike disrupted business and transportation, and nine Congress party Lok 
Sabha members resigned over their party’s failure to take a stand on the issue.196  
In the key eastern state of West Bengal (pop. 91 million), the group of communist parties that 
had ruled the state for 24 years met with an historic reversal in 2011 state elections, falling from 
235 assembly seats to only 61. The big winner was the Trinamool Congress of Mamata Banerjee, 
a federal cabinet minister in the Congress-led national coalition (her party had in the past allied 
with the BJP). As West Bengal’s new Chief Minister, Banerjee is faced with repairing one of 
India’s poorest states. 
In Tamil Nadu (pop. 72 million), the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a major Congress 
Party ally in the national coalition, was routed and lost power in June state assembly elections, 
winning only 30 seats after having won 160. Their rivals, sometime BJP allies All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), now enjoy an overwhelming majority in that state. 
Finally, Jammu and Kashmir (pop. 13 million) held local Panchayat (village-level) elections 
from April to June, described by the state’s chief minister as the first “real” such poll in 33 years 
(the 2006 round was deferred due to security circumstances and the 2001 round was not 
considered credible by most observers). More than 5 million voters representing more than three-
quarters of the electorate cast votes in the largely peaceful election. New Delhi urges the state 
government to move quickly on a devolution plan that would transfer more power to the more 
than 4,000 newly elected village leaders.197 
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India’s Economy  
Overview 
India has been in the midst of a major and rapid economic expansion, with an economy projected 
to soon be the world’s third largest. Although there is widespread and serious poverty in the 
country, observers believe long-term economic potential is tremendous, and recent strides in the 
technology sector have brought international attention to such new global high-technology 
centers as Bangalore and Hyderabad. However, many analysts and business leaders, along with 
U.S. government officials, point to excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures as a 
hindrance to the realization of India’s full economic potential.198 Although India has made major 
progress in reducing corruption, it is still perceived as a major obstacle for the economy.199 The 
high cost of capital (rooted in large government budget deficits) and an abysmal infrastructure 
also draw negative appraisals as obstacles to growth.200 Ubiquitous comparisons with the progress 
of the Chinese economy show India lagging in rates of growth, foreign investment, poverty 
reduction, and in the removal of trade barriers.201 
It is a testament to the strength of India’s economy that, even in the face of widespread 
corruption, poor infrastructure, political uncertainty, inflationary pressures, and more recently, 
declining rates of foreign investment, it has continued to grow by at least 8% annually in recent 
years. In the absence of such major obstacles, the national economy would most likely enjoy 
double-digit growth, and in many respects government is seen to be an impediment rather than 
facilitator of better performance.202 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India’s nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2010 was $1.538 trillion, making it the 9th largest economy in the world. However, with 
a population of 1.17 billion people, India’s per capita GDP is $1,265, 139th in the world and 
slightly higher than that of Pakistan, but still below that of Bhutan. Although India has had one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world since 2001, relatively high income disparities have 
left much of India’s population in poverty. According to the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), nearly a third of India’s population, and more than 60% of its women, live 
below the national poverty line.203 
                                                                 
198 In 2006, the U.S.-India CEO Forum—composed of ten chief executives from each country representing a cross-
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With Dysfunction,” New York Times, June 8, 2011. 
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India was struck by the secondary effects of the global financial crisis of 2008, but its impact was 
comparatively light. According to the IMF, real GDP growth decreased from 7.3% in 2008 to 
5.7% in 2009. While its financial sectors were largely insulated from the collapse of selected 
financial markets, the ensuing economic slowdown (particularly in Europe and the United States) 
led to a drop in demand for India’s leading exports. In addition, the decline in global liquidity 
placed downward pressure on India’s currency, the rupee. With less access to overseas capital, 
India’s private sector turned to domestic sources, leading to a rise in interest rates. To expedite 
India’s recovery, the Indian government passed a fiscal stimulus package amounting to about 3% 
of GDP in December 2008. 
Consultations have begun for the India’s 12th five-year plan. Deputy Chairman of India’s Planning 
Commission Montek Ahluwalia wrote a May 2011 article summarizing India’s performance 
during the 11th five-year plan and setting out four major challenges for the 12th five-year plan. 
According to Ahluwalia, India had done well in achieving the growth targets of the latest plan, 
but was less successful in efforts to reduce poverty. Although overall poverty rates were lowered, 
India continues to struggle with significant income and wealth inequality across regions, and 
between the urban and rural population. Looking ahead to the 12th five-year plan, Ahluwalia sees 
four major challenges: (1) managing the energy sector; (2) managing the water resources; (3) 
addressing the problems associated with the expected urbanization; and (4) protecting the 
environment during rapid economic growth. He also highlights ongoing issues for India that 
include provision of basic services to the poor, access to education (particularly in rural areas), 
and the rise of “crony capitalism,” wherein government officials and major corporations selfishly 
manipulate markets and government procurement to the detriment of India.204  
India’s economy is showing signs of rebounding from the 2009 slowdown. Real GDP growth in 
FY2010 was 7.4% and in FY2011 was 8.5%. India’s Planning Commission has set a goal of 10% 
annual growth for the nation’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2017). However, the nation faces several 
major obstacles to further economic development, including endemic and stubborn poverty; poor 
infrastructure; corruption and market economy restrictions; inflationary pressures; fluctuating 
rates of foreign investment; and other issues. 
Poverty 
Despite impressive economic growth, India continues to fare poorly in human development 
measures; the U.N.’s 2010 Human Development Index ranked India 119th among 169 countries, 
but lowered India’s composite score by some 30% over the previous year, in large part due to 
increasing inequalities. A “Multidimensional Poverty Index” created by the University of Oxford 
found in 2010 that more than half of the world’s poor people live in South Asia, and that 645 
million—more than half of all Indian citizens—are “poor” by their measure.205 Critics of 
neoliberal economic policies say the growth resulting since post-1991 reforms has been uneven, 
favoring only a fraction of the population, especially those in the services sector, while harming 
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the vital agriculture sector and doing little to alleviate poverty, which continues to affect at least 
one-third of the population.206  
The benefits of India’s recent economic growth has also been geographically mixed. Less 
attention is given to the fact that India’s impressive economic boom has not been country-wide. 
Some states—especially Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Delhi—have enjoyed 
rapid growth, while others—most notably densely-populated Uttar Pradesh—continue to struggle 
with underdevelopment. Such uneven performance becomes stark when malnourishment rates are 
considered: the average caloric intake among India’s poorest states has remained static for more 
than a decade, and more than half of India’s children under the age of five suffer developmental 
problems due to inadequate nutrition. Some analysts contend that static rates of malnutrition 
among India’s children are evidence that economic growth there is benefiting only narrow 
sections of the society. Young females remain particularly vulnerable to malnutrition.207 
Decades of central government social uplift schemes have a poor record of success to date. 
Massive government spending on poverty-reduction programs have met with halting progress, at 
best, most likely because of corruption and poor administration. Despite spending about 2% of its 
GDP on such programs in 2010—a higher percentage than any country in Asia and some three 
times that spent by China—food, health, and job insecurity persist.208 
Poor Infrastructure 
India’s infrastructure is inadequate and inefficient. Analysts continue to identify this poor 
infrastructure as perhaps the most serious impediment to greater economic development, and they 
urge political reforms at the state level so as to better deliver reliable energy and transportation 
services. Indian officials report that only 20% of India’s urban sewage is treated before disposal 
and less than 25% of its 85 largest cities have local bus service. According to a U.S. State 
Department official, India will need to invest $1.25 trillion in energy production, $392 billion in 
transportation infrastructure, and $143 billion in health care by 2030 to support its rapidly 
growing population.209 Poor infrastructure costs India an estimated 2% in annual economic 
growth. Urban areas are especially affected, with the pace of urban development outstripping that 
of population increases; the country spends only $17 per capita on urban infrastructure as 
compared with $116 per capita in China.210 A World Bank study estimated that a lack of toilets 
and poor public hygiene cost India some $54 billion each year though premature deaths, 
treatment for the sick, and lost tourism revenue.211 
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India’s system for generating and distributing electricity poses a particular problem for the 
nation’s economic growth, as undercapacity and poor management lead to frequent brownouts 
and blackouts. In addition, many businesses and households illegally tap into the electrical grid 
for power. Efforts to reform India’s electricity system have been repeatedly thwarted by local 
politicians, who use access to electricity as a means of staying in power. India’s transportation 
infrastructure is also in need of greater investment. The Indian government has been making 
significant investments in the nation’s roads, but much still needs to be done. 
Corruption and Economic Freedoms 
Berlin-based Transparency International placed India 87th out of 178 countries in its 2010 
“corruption perceptions index,” characterizing it as moderately corrupt, with a score of 3.3, 
comparable to China, Greece, and Thailand. India also appears in the lowest cluster of the group’s 
2008 “bribe payer’s index.”212 Evidence of rampant, high-level corruption is another contributor 
to a downturn in India’s economic outlook, leading to what one parliamentarian and former 
businessman called a “psychological crisis of confidence” for the country. By some accounts, 
graft now rivals poor infrastructure as the most acute concern of foreign investors.213 
The Heritage Foundation’s 2011 Index of Economic Freedom—which may overemphasize the 
value of absolute growth and downplay broader quality-of-life measurements—rated India’s 
economy as being “55% free” and ranked it 124th out of 179 countries. The index highlights 
restrictive trade policies, heavy government involvement in the banking and finance sectors, 
rigorous investment caps, demanding regulatory structures, and a high incidence of corruption. 
The Vancouver-based Fraser Institute provides a more positive assessment, while also faulting 
India’s excessive restrictions on capital markets.214 
Inflationary Pressures  
Inflationary pressures in India remain strong, particularly for food, which has a disproportionally 
harmful effect on the poor. India’s wholesale price index for July 2011 was up 9.44% compared to 
a year before.215 The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) raised interest rates in June 2011—the 10th 
such interest rate increase in 16 months—in an effort to reduce inflation. The RBI reportedly 
attributes some of India’s inflation problems to the ongoing government debt crisis in Europe. 
Prime Minister Singh has called inflation a “serious threat” to future economic growth, saying 
that rates above 8% are unsustainable. Food inflation has been a particular concern, with prices 
rising at annual rates of up to 18% in late 2010 and early 2011. Rising food and crude oil prices 
have evoked fears among some that India’s high rates of inflation may be structural rather than 
cyclical, given a national economy characterized by supply constraints, shortages of skilled labor, 
and quickly rising expectations among the populace.216  
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Foreign Investment 
India has become an increasingly lucrative investment destination for international finance in 
recent years. Yet FDI into India dropped by nearly one-third over the entire course of 2010, and 
the country’s Nifty 50 stock index was down 17% in the first month of 2011, falling from record 
highs only two months earlier. Along with infamous bureaucratic hurdles to investment, foreign 
investors are more recently seen to be deterred by India’s corruption scandals and high rates of 
inflation. Despite such hiccups, FDI levels were on the rise again by mid-2011. FDI dropped by 
25% in the fiscal year ending March 2011, but shot up by 300% for the month of June 2011.217 
Also in June, the central government halted efforts to secure land for what would be the country’s 
largest-ever foreign investment project, a long-delayed $12 billion steel plant to be built by a 
South Korean interest. Although the project received final go-ahead in May after a five-year 
delay, protesting farmers’ families have blocked the selected site, halting work “indefinitely.”218 
The tensions between the government’s central aim of further economic development is 
persistently at odds with the country’s still relatively closed and restrictive economy.  
Other Economic Issues 
Employment, monetary policy, and bureaucratic “red tape” are further problem areas for New 
Delhi’s economic decision makers. India continues to be bedeviled by unemployment and 
underemployment. Despite years of comparatively high economic growth, job creation has lagged 
well behind the increases in international trade and GDP. In contrast to neighboring China, India’s 
economic growth has relied on more capital-intensive, low employment sectors (such as 
information technology) and less on labor-intensive manufacturing. In addition, for much of rural 
India, there are few employment alternatives to agriculture.  
Moreover, India’s monetary policy is under pressure from differing directions. After nearly two 
decades of economic reform, India’s financial sector remains a mixture of state and private 
institutions subject to selective strict regulatory control. India’s central bank and chief regulator of 
the nation’s financial system is the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The Indian government and the 
RBI have generally maintained a relatively conservative view on financial regulation, prohibiting 
institutions from taking on excessive risk or allowing overexposure to international capital flows. 
This has been reinforced by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, as well as the global financial crisis 
of 2008. To sustain economic growth, the RBI could lower interest rates, but its concerns about 
inflation would support raising interest rates. In addition, India’s comparatively high interest rates 
(India’s commercial banks’ prime lending rates are between 11% and 14%) have contributed to 
inward capital flows and a strengthening of the rupee. However, under India’s “managed float” 
exchange rate regime, the RBI has attempted to reduce upward pressure on the rupee to maintain 
the competitiveness of India’s exports. As of September 2011, U.S. $1 = 45.85 rupees.  
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Finally, although the days of the infamous “License Raj” are gone, India continues to have a very 
complex bureaucratic system, often involving multiple layers of government and numerous 
agencies with regulatory oversight of the economy. 219  
India’s Energy, Environment, and Climate Change Policies 
Energy Issues 
India’s continued economic growth and security are intimately linked to the supply of energy 
resources. Indeed, Indian leaders insist that energy security is an essential component of the 
country’s development agenda, calling for an integrated national energy policy, diversification of 
energy supplies, greater energy efficiency, and rationalization of pricing mechanisms. The 
country’s relatively poor natural energy resource endowment and poorly functioning energy 
market are widely viewed as major constraints on continued economic growth. The current New 
Delhi government aspires to increase the nation’s electricity generation by five-fold by the year 
2030. The U.S. government has committed to assist India in promoting the development of stable 
and efficient energy markets there; a U.S.-India Energy Dialogue was launched in 2005 to 
provide a forum for bolstering bilateral energy cooperation.220 
India was the world’s fourth largest energy consumer in 2009 (after the United States, China, and 
Japan) and may become third by the middle of this century. Overall power generation in the 
country more than doubled from 1991 to 2005, and the country’s energy demands are expected to 
quadruple by 2035. Estimates suggest that in order to maintain current rates of economic growth 
India will need to expand energy consumption by approximately 4% per year while reducing 
energy intensity.221 As of March 2011, India’s total installed power generation capacity mix was 
54% coal, 22% hydro, 11% renewables (including biomass, waste, wind, and solar), 10% gas, and 
3% nuclear.222  
India is the world’s third most productive coal producer (although most of India’s coal is an 
inefficient low-grade, high-ash variety), but also the world’s fourth-ranked importer. New Delhi is 
beginning to develop coalbed methane despite concerns about carbon emissions and the impact 
on limited water resources. About 70% of India’s oil is imported (at a rate of 2.1 million barrels 
per day in 2009), mostly from the West Asia/Middle East region, making India a leading net 
importer in this category, as well. India’s domestic natural gas supply, while significant, has not 
keep pace with demand, and the country has been a net importer since 2004. Hydropower, 
especially abundant in the country’s northeast and near the border with Nepal, is a booming 
sector. Nuclear power, which Indian government officials and some experts say is a sector in dire 
need of expansion, continues to account for less than 3% of total electricity generation.223 
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Roughly one-fifth of the India’s power is consumed by farmers’ irrigation systems, making the 
farm lobby a powerful obstacle to curtailing subsidies provided by State Electricity Boards, which 
collectively lose billions of dollars annually. Moreover, from one-quarter to one-half of India’s 
electricity is said to disappear though “transmission losses,” i.e., theft. Approximately 44% of 
rural households, representing some 400 million Indians, do not have access to electricity. 
Government plans to increase energy production by 65% in less than a decade will increase 
demand for coal-fired power plants by an estimated 2% per annum to nearly double by 2030.224  
India’s dependence on oil imports presents India with a strategic and economic vulnerability and 
acts as an impetus for developing alternative sources of energy and reducing demand. In the 
absence of alternative energy sources, India’s net oil imports are projected to increase to 90% by 
2030.225 New Delhi’s 11th five-year plan includes a target of increasing energy efficiency by 20% 
by the year 2017.226 New Delhi has set a goal of 20% of its energy coming from renewable 
sources by 2020 and having 15% of its greenhouse gasses taken up by its forests by 2030. India 
hopes to create a new carbon sink by expanding forest cover from 22% of total land area to 33% 
of its land area. A shift to relatively cleaner oil or gas will likely necessitate further dependence 
on foreign sources of energy, most from the Middle East. It is likely that the Government of India 
will continue developing alternative energy sources, such as solar, because there is a perception 
that India’s growth will be jeopardized unless it embraces alternative sources of energy. The 
country’s Solar Mission’s Plan may face major challenges in its goal of increasing solar energy 
production to 20 gigawatts by 2020.227 The extent to which it will be successful in this objective 
and the time frame within which it may do so remain obscure. A market-based mechanism known 
as the Perform, Achieve, and Trade (PAT) scheme was initiated in 2011 to set benchmark 
efficiency standards for 563 power plants, steel mills, and cement plants that collectively account 
for more than half of India’s energy consumption. The scheme includes energy savings 
certificates that can be sold and traded.228 
The Environment and Climate Change Issues 
The carrying capacity of India’s land is under stress. India has 2% of the world’s surface area, 4% 
of the its fresh water, and 17% of its population. Over 70% of Indians depend on farm incomes 
with about 65% of Indian farms dependant on rain fall. Pressure on agricultural production from 
climate change is exacerbated by degraded soils and water shortages. An estimated 45% of Indian 
land is seriously degraded due to erosion, soil acidity, alkalinity and salinity, and water logging. 
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Rain has become more erratic in recent years as ground water is being depleted. One study found 
that the water table in India’s northwest is falling by 1.6 inches per year.229 
Global climate change is anticipated to affect India in a number of ways. Sea level rise from 
global warming would inundate low lying areas. More intense and destructive weather events, 
such as cyclones, are also anticipated. Potential changes to the monsoon rains, which are critical 
for agricultural production in India, could also reduce agricultural output and undermine food 
security for millions in India. Rising temperatures will also likely lead to Himalayan glacial melt 
that would alter the flow of India’s rivers. The Indian Institute for Meteorology has demonstrated 
that global warming will likely cause erratic monsoon behavior in India that would itself lead to 
static or declining food output for India. Agricultural yield in India grew over 3% for the 1980s. 
This has already slowed to a growth rate of 1.5% for the 2001 to 2010 period for rice and wheat. 
The annual increase in demand for food grains in India is projected to be 5% to 6% per annum. 
The Indian Ministry of Agriculture has reportedly asked for funding to develop new varieties of 
wheat and rice that consume 30% to 40% less water than traditional varieties.230  
The Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change issued a National Action Plan on Climate 
Change in 2008 that envisaged a gradual shift to greater reliance on sustainable sources of energy 
with an emphasis on solar power, but India has not made a commitment to binding carbon 
emissions cuts.231 In announcing the National Action Plan, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh 
pointed out that in order to eradicate poverty in India there was a necessity for rapid economic 
growth but added that “I also believe that ecologically sustainable development need not be in 
contradiction to achieving our growth objectives.”232 The Plan has eight key components: (1) 
solar; (2) enhanced energy efficiency; (3) sustainable habitat; (4) water; (5) sustaining the 
Himalayan ecosystem; (6) “Green India”; (7) sustainable agriculture; and (8) strategic knowledge 
on climate change. A report titled “Environment and Energy Sustainability: An Approach for 
India,” published by McKinsey Co. in 2009 has estimated that India could reduce its carbon 
footprint by half by 2030 through significant investment in energy efficiency.233 The Prime 
Minister’s Council on Climate Change announced in 2011 that it approved a National Mission for 
a Green India Initiative with plans for significant investment in India’s forests.234 
Despite the likely negative consequences of climate change and some moves to place new 
emphasis on renewable sources of energy in its energy mix, India has not taken a leadership role 
in addressing climate change on the world stage. As a developing economy that long suffered 
underdevelopment due to its colonial subjugation under the British, India is reluctant to undertake 
measures that it feels will hinder or slow its economic development for a problem it believes was 
largely caused by the West. India notes the fact that, on a per capita basis, its emissions are low. 
Indians emit 1.16 tons of CO2 on a per capita basis as compared to 19.78 for the United States, 
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9.66 for the United Kingdom, and 4.58 for China according to one source.235 While very low at 
present, India’s CO2 emissions are projected to rise significantly to 3-3.5 tons annually by 2030.  
Climate change is an issue that has the possibility to create tensions between India and the West at 
a time when the United States has been seeking a closer relationship with India and will likely 
require adept diplomacy to bring India along in global efforts to address the problem. India shares 
with China the fear that global efforts to contain carbon emissions will hinder its economic 
development. This commonality of interests with China was made evident by their dual 
opposition to European efforts to obtain meaningful binding carbon emissions reductions at the 
December 2009 U.N. Climate Conference in Copenhagen.236 China and India subsequently 
signed the last-minute agreement that emerged from the summit.237 The Copenhagen Accord calls 
for limiting global temperature rise to no more than 2 degrees Celsius beyond preindustrial levels, 
but is not legally binding.238 
The United States and India have begun working together on energy efficiency and carbon 
reduction projects. In November 2009, the U.S. and India announced that they would work 
together to jointly develop clean coal technologies, smart grids, and increased energy 
efficiency.239 Prime Minister Singh and President Obama launched a Clean Energy and Climate 
Change Initiative as part of their reaffirmation of their global strategic partnership.240 The 
November 2009 MoU is to Enhance Cooperation on Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Clean 
Energy and Climate Change.241 
India shares China’s position that the Kyoto Protocol should be extended when it expires in 2012 
to lock in commitments by developed states to cut emissions. While India has pledged reductions 
under the Copenhagen accord it is not subject to binding reductions. Developed states sought to 
shape a successor agreement to Kyoto that would be legally binding and would replace the Kyoto 
Protocol during the October 2010 meeting of 177 governments in Tianjin, China. Many in the 
United States and other developed nations want India and China to accept firm emissions goals 
which they have resisted.242 A key tension in the talks has been the view by developing nations 
that the developed world needs to do more because the bulk of carbon emissions since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution have been caused by developed nations.243 
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Security-Related Issues 
The Indian Military 
Overview and Strategy 
India is in the midst of transforming its military into one with global reach. With more than 1.3 
million active personnel, India’s is the world’s third-largest military (after China and the United 
States).244 New Delhi’s defense budget rose above $38 billion for 2010, a nearly 12% increase 
over the previous year. Another 11.6% boost is proposed for FY2011/12, but this increase would 
be partially mitigated by high rates of inflation.245 The army—more than 1 million strong and 
accounting for about half of the total budget—has traditionally dominated, but the navy and air 
force are becoming more important as India seeks to project its power and protect an Exclusive 
Economic Zone of more than 2 million square kilometers. For 2011, the air force procurement 
budget of $6.8 billion accounts for about half of the service-specific total, with the army receiving 
$4 billion and the navy another $3 billion.246 The late 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks elicited a 
spike in Indian security spending, including plans to enhance the navy’s surveillance capabilities, 
across-the-board strengthening of the National Security Guard (NSG) counterterrorism force, and 
the raising of 29 new Border Security Force battalions (elite NSG commandos now operate from 
four new regional hubs—in Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, and Mumbai—to improve response 
time in emergencies). 
In 2010, Indian defense planners were seen to be focusing much more attention on China, a 
apparent shift from their decades-long Pakistan-specific planning. A much-discussed “Cold Start” 
doctrine, informally aired in 2004, apparently represents an Indian effort to address the escalatory 
problems posed by Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and the perceived inability of the Indian military 
to respond effectively to Pakistani provocations in 2002. It calls for the establishment of smooth 
interservices coordination and forward deployments that would allow for rapid but limited 
retaliatory strikes by “integrated battle groups.” Observers in Islamabad and elsewhere see in the 
doctrine an offensive military strategy with the potential to destabilize the region’s fragile 
strategic balance.247  
Although the Cold Start concept was discussed by India’s Army Chief until 2008, Indian military 
leaders now officially deny that any such doctrine exists. Yet leaked U.S. diplomatic cables 
reportedly confirm at least indirect Indian government endorsement of the doctrine. Moreover, 
these documents may exhibit widespread doubts about Cold Start’s efficacy held in both New 
Delhi and Washington, based in particular on limited Indian government support for the doctrine, 
potentially serious logistical problems with its execution, and worries that it could heighten the 
risk of escalation above the nuclear threshold, among others.248 Moreover, some reports indicate 
                                                                 
244 Additional paramilitary forces number about 1.3 million, with the Home Ministry overseeing most of these, notably 
the State Armed Police (450,000), the Central Reserve Police Force (230,000), the Border Security Force (208,000), the 
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245 The Military Balance 2011 (Institute for International and Strategic Studies, London, 2011); “With an Eye on China, 
India Steps Up Defense Spending,” Reuters, February 28, 2011. 
246 “India Defense Budget,” Jane’s Defense Budgets, May 31, 2011. 
247 See Walter Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,” International Security, Winter 2007/2008. 
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that the doctrine has come under criticism from top American military commanders and 
Administration officials who view it as a source of further India-Pakistan tension and thus as a 
hindrance of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan.249 
Defense Equipment and Procurement250 
The Indian army operates more than 4,100 main battle tanks, the majority of them Russian-built 
T-72s and T-55s, and some 4,000 towed artillery tubes. The navy has grown rapidly in recent 
years, currently operating 23 principal surface combatants (including one aircraft carrier) and 16 
submarines. There also is a significant amphibious capacity: 17 landing ships (including one 
acquired from the United States) can carry 4,000 troops or 88 tanks. The navy has developed an 
indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (INS Arihant) to be armed with nuclear-tipped 
cruise missiles, and it also plans to lease a Russian Akula-class boat in 2011 as part of its “sea-
based strategic deterrence.”251 The air force flies some 655 combat-capable aircraft, the majority 
of them Russian-built MiGs, but also including 122 late-model Su-30 MKIs, as well as French-
built Mirage and Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft. It also possesses modest airborne early warning 
and in-flight refueling capabilities provided by Russian-made platforms. A Strategic Forces 
Command oversees as many as 180 intermediate- and 280 short-range ballistic missiles capable 
of delivering nuclear warheads, and has plans to field a new Agni-IV missile with a range that 
would give it intercontinental capabilities. A three-stage, 5,000-km-range Agni-V is set to be 
tested in late 2011. 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute named India as the world’s largest weapons 
importer—accounting for fully 9% of the world’s total arms imports from 2006 to 2010—a 
designation the country is likely to keep for the foreseeable future.252 Current army programs 
concentrate on tank and missile acquisitions; the navy is pursuing major aircraft carrier and 
submarine programs; and the air force is seeking to procure more than 100 additional advanced, 
Russian-made Su-30 fighters, along with upgradation of its fleet of French-built Mirage ground 
attack aircraft.253  
Russia continues to provide the bulk of India’s imported defense wares. Moscow does not require 
enduse monitoring agreements for most arms sales as does Washington. This has made Russia an 
appealing supplier for India, which in the past has been willing to accept less advanced 
technology in return for both lower costs and fewer doubts about supplier reliability. More 
recently, however, India’s rapid economic growth has provided New Delhi with larger 
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procurement budgets and thus an ability to purchase the most advanced weaponry on the 
market.254 In recent years, Israel has roughly equaled Russia in the value of defense exports to 
India—arms trade with Israel now tops $2 billion annually and, like Russia, Israel does not 
impose political conditions on purchases. Moreover, India and Israel are engaging in new joint 
development projects involving missile technology.  
New Delhi increasingly seeks to shift advanced military imports from finished platforms to co-
production with foreign suppliers. Under a license arrangement with Russia, India’s Hindustan 
Aeronautics Limited is building hundreds of advanced Su-30 MKI ground attack jets. A 2005 deal 
with France provides for technology transfers and Indian construction of six Scorpene submarines 
to be delivered in 2015-2017. In seeking to replace its aging arsenal of MiG-21 fighters, India 
plans to purchase up to 186 new jets (126 for the air force and 60 for the navy) and has signaled a 
desire for technology sharing and co-production in this effort: only 18 of the new air force jets are 
to be manufactured abroad. In addition to the Scorpene submarines, other notable recent 
purchases for the Indian military include 347 of the latest Russian T-90 tanks (with another 1,000 
such tanks to be built in India under a technology-sharing agreement) and upgrades on 600 
existing T-72s; 3 new Russian-built missile frigates; 24 new MiG-29K naval jets for deployment 
on the INS Vitramaditya (formerly the Russian Gorshkov); 42 additional upgraded Su-30s, major 
upgrades on existing MiG and Jaguar aircraft; and 66 jet trainers from Britain. 
Some analysts predict that, in the absence of major policy and organizational adjustments, India’s 
efforts to modernize its armed forces will have little or no impact on the country’s overall 
capacity to address security threats. Among the recommended changes are development of a more 
transparent and efficient procurement process, creation of a new Chief of Defense Staff position 
(to better integrate interservices planning), and the opening of India’s defense research agencies 
to greater oversight.255 Although improvements in the procurement system have been effected, 
transparency and corruption continue to plague the process. 
Separatism in the Jammu and Kashmir State 
Although India suffers from several militant regional separatist movements, the Kashmir issue 
has proven the most lethal and intractable. It also poses the most serious international dilemma, 
given competing territorial claims with Pakistan. Gun battles and bomb blasts in India’s Jammu 
and Kashmir state reportedly killed an average of five or six people every day over the period 
1989-2006.256 Conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty also has brought global attention to a potential 
“flashpoint” for interstate war between nuclear-armed powers. Yet—despite a peaceful uprising in 
the summer of 2008, a resurgence of international attention to the issue following the late 2008 
terrorist attack in Mumbai, and another round of sometimes lethal street demonstrations in mid-
2010—the number of militant incidents in the state has been falling continuously and is now at its 
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lowest point since the violence began. Critics continue to accuse New Delhi of using brutal tactics 
to squash true democracy in the region.257 
India has long blamed Pakistan for supporting “cross-border terrorism” and for fueling a 
separatist rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with arms, training, and militants 
through an “terrorism infrastructure” on the Pakistani side of the LOC. Islamabad, for its part, 
claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls “freedom fighters” who resist 
Indian rule and suffer alleged human rights abuses in the region. New Delhi insists that the 
dispute should not be “internationalized” through involvement by third-party mediators and India 
is widely believed to be content with the territorial status quo.258 Islamabad has sought to bring 
external major power persuasion to bear on India, especially from the United States.  
The longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir is that the issue must be resolved through 
negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people. When asked about Kashmir while in New Delhi in November 2010, President Obama 
described a “longstanding dispute between India and Pakistan” upon which “the United States 
cannot impose a solution.” He did, however, reiterate the U.S. government’s willingness to play a 
role in reducing tensions in whatever way the two parties think appropriate.259 The United 
Nations refrains from playing a role in the Kashmir issue unless both India and Pakistan request 
its engagement. 
Background 
The Kashmir problem is rooted in competing claims to the former princely state, divided since 
1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating India’s Muslim-majority Jammu and 
Kashmir state and Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly known 
as the Northern Areas) (see Figure 2). The dispute relates to the national identities of both 
countries: India has long sought to maintain its secular, multi-religious credentials, in part by 
successfully incorporating a Muslim-majority region, while Pakistan has since independence been 
conceived as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims. India and Pakistan fought full-scale 
wars over Kashmir in 1947-1948 and 1965. Some Kashmiris seek independence from both 
                                                                 
257 London-based Amnesty International released a March 2011 report decrying the Indian government’s detention of 
up to 20,000 people under the 1978 Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA), which allows for years-long 
detentions without trial. Amnesty contends that the PSA violates India’s international human rights legal obligations by 
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interests of regional stability, especially with regard to Afghanistan. At least one senior analyst argues that U.S. policy 
“sabotages” a process in which India’s aspirations for major power status could be used as leverage in finding a 
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concessions domestically acceptable” (Robert Grenier, “Losing Kashmir” (op-ed), Al Jazeera (online), July 14, 2010). 
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countries.260 Spurred by a perception of rigged state elections in 1989, an ongoing separatist war 
between Islamic militants (and their supporters) and Indian security forces in Indian-held 
Kashmir is ongoing and has claimed tens of thousands of lives.261 Soon after the armed 
insurgency began, much of the Kashmir Valley’s indigenous Hindu population fled.262 At least 
8,000 Kashmiris have “disappeared” during the conflict; some of these may occupy the unmarked 
graves discovered in 55 villages over a three-year study.263 
Some separatist groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), continue to 
seek an independent or autonomous Kashmir. Others, including the militant Hizbul Mujahideen 
(HuM), seek union with Pakistan.264 In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat [Freedom] Conference was 
formed as an umbrella organization for groups opposed to Indian rule in Kashmir. The Hurriyat 
membership of more than 20 political and religious groups has included the JKLF (originally a 
leading militant force, now a political group) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the political wing of the 
HuM). The Hurriyat Conference, which states that it is committed to seeking dialogue with the 
Indian government on a broad range of issues, calls for a tripartite conference on Kashmir, 
including Pakistan, India, and representatives of the Kashmiri people. Hurriyat leaders demand 
Kashmiri representation at any talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. The Hurriyat 
formally split in 2003 after a dispute between hardliners allied with Islamabad and moderates 
favoring negotiation with New Delhi. Subsequent efforts to reunify the group failed. In 2005, the 
Congress Party-led government renewed high-level contact with moderate Hurriyat leaders begun 
by the previous BJP-led coalition. Two years later, however, Hurriyat leader and noted Kashmiri 
cleric Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said talks between the Indian government and moderate Kashmiri 
separatists had suffered a “complete breakdown of communication,” and he accused New Delhi 
of lacking the will needed to find a political solution to the problem.265 
 
                                                                 
260 Both Kashmiri separatists and most of the Indian nationalists who insist that the territory is an integral part of India 
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263 “India: Investigate Unmarked Graves in Jammu and Kashmir,” Human Rights Watch release, August 25, 2011. 
264 A 2007 public opinion survey found nearly 90% of the residents of Srinagar, Kashmir’s most populous and Muslim-
majority city, desiring Kashmiri independence from both India and Pakistan. In the largely Hindu city of Jammu, 
however, 95% of respondents said Kashmir should be part of India (see http://www.indianexpress.com/story/
210147.html). A 2008 survey conducted in both India and Pakistan found a majority of respondents expressing an 
openness to a range of possible outcomes for Kashmir, including outright independence. While such an outcome was 
described as “unacceptable” by half of the Indians surveyed, the pollsters concluded that, “If a majority of all 
Kashmiris were to choose independence, a majority of Indians and Pakistanis would find such independence at least 
tolerable” (see http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul08/Kashmir_Jul08_rpt.pdf). 
265 “Kashmiri Separatist Says India Talks Break Down,” Reuters, August 30, 2007. 
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Figure 2. Map of Kashmir 
 
Source: CIA. 
Note: Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 
Levels of violence in Kashmir were high and steady through the mid- and late 1990s, peaked in 
2001, and have been in steady decline since (see Figure 3). The long-term reduction in violence 
has allowed for a rebirth of the scenic region’s major tourist industry. Yet, despite waning rates of 
infiltration and separatist-related violence, the issue continues to rankle leaders in New Delhi and 
remains a serious impediment to progress in the current India-Pakistan peace initiative. Even as 
the normalization of India-Pakistan relations moves forward—and to some extent in reaction to 
their apparent marginalization in the face of this development—separatist militants continue their 
attacks on both civilians and Indian security forces, and many observers in both India and the 
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United States believe that active support for Kashmiri militants remains Pakistani policy. The 
militants, seeing their relevance and goals threatened by movement toward peaceful resolution, 
still lash out with bloody attacks likely meant to derail the process. 
Figure 3. Deaths Related to Kashmiri Separatist Conflict, 1988-2010 
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Source: Adapted by CRS. Data from the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India. 
Mid-2010 Uprising 
A more-or-less spontaneous resurgence of open separatist protest emerged in the summer of 2010. 
In June of that year, large-scale street protests led to violence and the deaths of several protestors 
in clashes with paramilitary police. Within weeks, regular Indian army troops were being 
deployed on the streets of Srinagar to restore and maintain order, yet civil unrest only increased 
and spread to other parts of Indian Kashmir, even as separatist leaders appealed for calm. By 
August, the unrest—comprised mainly of large numbers of youths hurling stones at security 
personnel—was being called a “full-blown separatist uprising”—the most serious challenge to 
central rule in two decades—and evidence grew that the current iteration of unrest represented a 
wider and more spontaneous movement than those in past years. New Delhi imposed an 
indefinite curfew in September, but the central government, along with that of the state’s Chief 
Minister, Omar Abdullah, were seen to be flummoxed by the resilience and depth of resentment 
demonstrated by protestors.266 International human rights groups urged Indian government 
officials to avoid excessive use of force while investigating the deaths of children.267 
                                                                 
266 “India Struggles to Contain Kashmiri Rage,” Financial Times (London), July 15, 2010; “New Delhi Cogitates, 
Kashmir Burns,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2010. Abdullah himself was criticized for being slow to recognize 
the extent of the problem and for appearing detached from his people’s concerns, at considerable cost to his popularity 
(“Kashmir Chief is Target of Mounting Public Frustration,” Time, August 16, 2010). 
267 See, for example, the July 2, 2010, Amnesty International statement at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
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Prime Minister Singh convened an all-parties meeting in September to discuss the crisis with 
opposition parties and announced modest efforts to reduce the presence of security forces and 
facilities in the region even as the Indian military continued to resist amendment or suspension of 
the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) that is named by rights groups as a 
facilitator of abuses in Kashmir and elsewhere. In November, Chief Minister Abdullah ordered 
nearly 1,000 paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force personnel withdrawn from Srinagar as 
part of a peace initiative. Singh later contended the “troubled period” of summer 2010 street 
protests by youths highlighted the need for security forces to develop better nonlethal means of 
response, and he has directed his home ministry to prepare these. Meanwhile, Hurriyat leaders 
have discouraged any repeat of the protests; even hardline separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani 
has come out against stone throwing as a form of resistance, saying it gives security forces “an 
excuse to kill” Kashmiris and that only peaceful resistance will forward his cause.268 Still, 
Srinagar and the surrounding Kashmir Valley have remained unsettled.269 
The Search for a Political Solution 
In October 2010, the UPA government appointed a trio of official and unofficial “mediators,” but 
the team’s composition was widely deemed to be disappointing. During the closing months of the 
year, the three interlocutors—senior journalist Dileep Padgaonkar, social activist Radha Kumar, 
and former information commissioner M.M. Ansari—made multiple trips to the state in an effort 
to find “a political solution for a political problem.”270 Some of their preliminary 
recommendations to Home Minister Chidambaram were made public in December and included 
expediting cases of under-trials, permitting peaceful protests, releasing militants/protestors 
against whom there are no serious charges, training of security forces, identifying jobs for 
young men and women in Central/State Government offices, announcing scholarships for 
Kashmiri students, enhancing monetary assistance to widows and orphans, enhanced efforts 
to trace missing persons, promoting investments in Kashmir, ... increasing monthly 
allowances to Kashmiri Pandits, etc.271 
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ASA20/017/2010/en. Some critics of Indian policy in Kashmir compare it unfavorably to that of Israel in the West 
Bank, arguing that New Delhi should come suffer international opprobrium for its allegedly repressive tactics (see, for 
example, Rob Brown, “Why Isn’t India a Pariah State?” (op-ed), Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2010). 
268 “PM’s Address at the CMs’ Conference on Internal Security,” Prime Minister’s Office release, February 1, 2011; 
“Geelani Rejects Stone Pelting,” Indian Express (Mumbai), July 8, 2011. 
269 November 2010 saw an upsurge in anti-India street protests during the Muslim Eid Al-Adha festival. This unrest 
appears to have been spontaneous and was led by civilian rather than militant groups. Main opposition BJP leaders 
made a show of efforts to hoist the Indian flag in Srinagar on Republic Day in January 2011, but were ordered to desist 
by the state government with backing from the federal home ministry. More than 10,000 Hindu-nationalist protesters 
were physically blocked from entering the state capital and top BJP leaders were detained at the regional airport. 
Commerce in Srinagar was later halted in February 2011 when Gilani supporters protested his temporary detention by 
police investigating illegal money transfers. 
270 “Disappointment With Team to Ease Kashmir Tension,” Financial Times (London), October 13, 2010; “We Aim to 
Evolve a Dialogue Structure: J&K Interlocutors,” Hindu (Chennai), November 29, 2010. 
271 Indian Home Ministry press release, December 7, 2010. After a December visit to Kashmir, an 11-person delegation 
of Indian parliamentarians and civil society members expressed disappointment with what they called the central 
government’s “non-serious” attitude in the face of concrete recommendations, and they emphasized a need to hold the 
state’s security forces accountable for the deaths of more than 100 “innocent people” the previous summer (“J&K 
Needs Immediate, Long-Term Measures,’” Hindu (Chennai), December 6, 2010). 
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A final report is expected in September 2011. While the value of the interlocutor’s efforts to meet 
with a wide spectrum of the state’s population is generally acknowledged, two key weaknesses 
are identified in their approach. First, their interaction has been almost exclusively with 
Kashmiris who accept the state’s status as a part of India; while their mandate officially includes 
dialogue with “separatists,” this has not occurred in practice, and Hurriyat leaders have refused to 
meet with them. Second, these interlocutors have no mandate to interact with another major 
stakeholder: Pakistan. Given these two problems, any progress realized though this tack is likely 
to remain limited.272 
Moreover, cynics contend that those most energetically seeking a “political solution” in Kashmir 
are often themselves the major obstacles to progress. The argument here is that the key 
breakthroughs such as the split among separatists into moderate and militant wings are made 
without the involvement of federal or state officials, and that the government’s unilateral 
reductions in security force levels amount to “appeasement of extremist elements.” From this 
perspective, resolution lies in maintaining pressure on violent, Pakistan-backed separatists, 
including the “stone-pelters” of mid-2010, while empowering moderate Hurriyat figures who are 
willing to disown the “terrorists” who have “hijacked” the movement, in part by having New 
Delhi’s interlocutors meet directly with such figures.273 
Kashmiri separatist leaders have themselves called New Delhi’s efforts “cosmetic” and they 
continue to demand a blanket lifting of AFSPA, the withdrawal of army troops from the Valley, 
and the release of all political prisoners as preconditions for talks with the government. Chief 
Minister Abdullah has chided Hurriyat leaders for resisting talks with New Delhi’s interlocutors 
while showing no hesitation for meeting with the Pakistani High Commissioner and Foreign 
Minister in the Indian capital. Abdullah is among many state politicians who believe dialogue 
with New Delhi is the only way forward for separatist leaders.274 
Some of the separatist demands noted above also appear as suggestions in independent analyses, 
many of which emphasize economic development and political devolution as the best means of 
mitigating Kashmiri discontent. Indeed, economic uplift, perhaps in the form of a large-scale jobs 
program for the region, could be the most effective policy to address the growing numbers of 
disaffected Kashmiri youth.275 In 2011, New Delhi has sought to mollify Kashmiri anger with a 
“charm offensive” of sorts, including new job training programs, the launching of numerous 
cricket and soccer clubs in the Valley, language courses for Indian security forces to speak the 
local tongue, and blanket amnesty for the “stone-pelters” of mid-2010. Yet, while these initiatives 
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and smarter police tactics have kept the Valley calm in mid-2011, in the absence of a substantive 
political settlement, these measures are seen as conflict management only.276 
Maoist Rebellion, Other Insurgencies, and Communalism 
As a vast mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions, India can be difficult to govern. 
Internal instability resulting from diversity is further complicated by colonial legacies such as 
international borders that separate members of the same ethnic groups, creating flashpoints for 
regional dissidence and separatism. In addition to the violent, decades-old Kashmir dispute, 
Maoist rebels continue to operate in numerous states and represent a serious and growing threat to 
internal sovereignty. At the same time, separatist insurgents in remote and underdeveloped 
northeast regions confound New Delhi and create international tensions by operating out of 
neighboring Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal. New Delhi has at times blamed the 
governments of those countries for “sheltering” separatist groups beyond the reach of Indian 
security forces, and New Delhi has launched joint counter-insurgency operations with some of 
these neighbors. India also has suffered outbreaks of serious communal violence between Hindus 
and Muslims, especially in the western Gujarat state.  
More than half of India’s 636 administrative districts are said to suffer from chronic activity by 
insurgent, terrorist, and/or separatist groups. The State Department’s most recent Country Reports 
on Terrorism (released August 2011) found that, although rates of terrorist violence in India 
declined in 2010, “the loss of nearly 1,900 lives (civilian, security forces, and terrorists) still 
made India one of the world’s most terrorism-afflicted countries.”277 
Maoist Rebels 
Increasingly prevalent in India are “Naxalites”—Maoist insurgents ostensibly engaged in violent 
struggle on behalf of landless laborers and tribals. These groups, most active in inland areas of 
east-central India, claim to be battling oppression and exploitation in order to create a classless 
society. Their opponents call them terrorists and extortionists. The rebels get their name from 
Naxalbari, a West Bengal village and site of a militant peasant uprising in 1967. In 2006, Prime 
Minister Singh identified a worsening Maoist insurgency as “the single biggest internal security 
challenge” ever faced by India, saying it threatened India’s democracy and “way of life.”278 At 
least 8,000 hardcore Naxalite fighters now operate in 20 of India’s 28 states, more than one-third 
of the country’s 636 administrative districts, and one-seventh of the country’s 14,000 police 
districts. Related violence has killed more than 5,000 people over the six years, including more 
1,000 deaths in both 2009 and 2010, the great majority of these in the states of West Bengal and 
Chhattisgarh.279 Analysts warn that, by blocking access to raw materials vital to India’s 
manufacturing sector and deterring investors, the Naxalite movement could thwart India’s long-
term economic success. 
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The most notable of India’s Maoist militant outfits are the People’s War Group (PWG), emanating 
from the southern Andhra Pradesh state, and the Maoist Communist Center of West Bengal and 
Bihar. In 2004, the two groups merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Both have 
appeared on the U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Office’s list of “groups of concern” and 
both are designated as terrorist organizations by the New Delhi government. 
In 2005, the Chhattisgarh state government began sponsoring a grassroots anti-Maoist effort. This 
“Salwa Judum” (“Campaign for Peace” or, literally, “collective hunt”) militia—comprised of 
some 5,000 lightly-armed tribals paid about $1 per day—was viewed by some as an effective 
countervailing people’s movement. Others labeled it a vigilante group that engaged in its own 
coercive and violent tactics against innocent tribals, serving only to accentuate the conflict as “a 
cure that is worse than the disease.”280 A 2008 report for India’s Planning Commission contended 
that the Salwa Judum campaign represented “an abdication of the state itself” and should 
immediately cease. New York-based Human Rights Watch later called on the New Delhi and 
Chhattisgarh governments to end all official support for the campaign, including provision of 
weapons, and to launch “serious and independent investigations” of related human rights 
abuses.281 In July 2011, India’s Supreme Court barred Chhattisgarh from arming tribal militias to 
fight the Maoists, calling the renamed Special Police Officers “cannon fodder.”282  
The New Delhi government has sought to undermine the Maoist rebellion in part by boosting 
development spending in affected areas. Yet unsettled debate among national-level political 
leaders between those favoring a militarized counterinsurgency effort versus those calling for a 
development/welfare approach may be hindering New Delhi’s anti-Maoist policies. Naxalite 
activity—including swarming attacks on government facilities and coordinated, multi-state 
economic blockades—is spreading and becoming more audacious in the face of incoherent and 
insufficient Indian government policies to halt it. A shortage of police personnel appears to be a 
key problem; the rebels are able to attack in large enough numbers that most police units, 
oftentimes fighting with inferior weapons, are rendered helpless.283 
Top Indian leaders continue to identify Maoist rebels as the leading domestic security threat and 
some 60,000 paramilitary forces (the Central Reserve Police Force) have been deployed to 
combat them in several affected states.284 In mid-2010, New Delhi announced that it would 
increase its assistance to state governments through the provision of more helicopters, the 
establishment or strengthening of 400 police stations, and the improvement of road connectivity 
in affected areas, among other measures. It also asked the governments of the four most-affected 
states (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and West Bengal) to create a Unified Command for anti-
Naxal operations. However, these efforts do not address the “intellectual appeal” of the Maoists, 
which India’s former national security advisor has identified as a key problem.  
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In February 2011, Prime Minister Singh noted that, while the incidence of Maoist violence had 
been somewhat reduced in 2010, the number of civilian casualties in such violence increased that 
year, and he listed Naxalite activity in six states—Chhattisgarh, Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, 
Orissa, and Maharashtra—as being of serious concern. His government currently seeks to 
implement an “Integrated Action Plan” for 60 districts in affected areas that will allow substantive 
district-level control of resources.285 Maoist militants continue to stage sometimes spectacular 
attacks on both civilian and security targets, indicating that their capabilities are only growing 
(perhaps most notable among these was an April 2010 ambush in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada 
district that killed 75 Indian paramilitary soldiers). According to New Delhi’s Institute for 
Conflict Management, Maoist-related violence in India during the first half of 2011 left an 
average of two people dead every day.286  
Separatism and Insurgency in the Northeast 
Since the time of India’s foundation as an independent nation, numerous militant groups have 
fought for greater ethnic autonomy, tribal rights, or independence in the country’s northeast 
region. Some of the tribal struggles in the small states known as the Seven Sisters are centuries 
old; there are more than 200 ethnic groups in India’s northeast alone. More than 50,000 people 
are estimated to have been killed in such fighting since 1948, including about 20,000 deaths in a 
30-year-old Naga insurgency and another 10,000 deaths in 17 years of fighting in the Assam 
state.287 In the small state of Manipur alone there are said to be more than 20 separatists groups 
fighting the Indian army at a cost of more than 8,000 lives over two decades, and the writ of the 
central government there remains tenuous in many areas.  
As militant groups are seen to benefit from highly profitable criminal activities such as informal 
taxation, kidnapping, and smuggling, many observers conclude that only more effective economic 
development and integration of India’s northeast will allow for the resolution of myriad ethnic 
conflicts there. In a possible indication that such policies are being effective, fatalities linked to 
separatist militancy in the northeast fell dramatically in 2010 as compared with the previous year 
(from 852 to 322), with the historically most-affected states of Manipur and Assam enjoying 
particularly strong improvements in the security situation.288 
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland, and the United National Liberation Front (seeking an 
independent Manipur) are among the approximately 40 northeastern militant groups warring with 
the central government. They reportedly field a total of no more than 20,000 trained cadres. 
ULFA, like other groups, accuses New Delhi of exploiting their state’s resources while doing 
little to forward development and allowing thousands of non-indigenous people (often Hindi-
                                                                 
285 “PM’s Address at the CMs’ Conference on Internal Security,” Prime Minister’s Office release, February 1, 2011. 
286 See data sheets at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal.asp. 
287 Some analysts see links between Chinese intelligence agencies and insurgent groups in India’s northeast, in 
particular those seeking an independent Nagaland. Press reports indicate that Norinco, a large, state-owned Chinese 
weapons manufacturer, has emerged as a key supplier of arms to separatist militants in Nagaland and Manipur (Lyle 
Morris, “Is China Backing Indian Insurgents?,” Diplomat (Tokyo), March 22, 2011; “Gunrunners of Northeast,” India 
Today (Delhi), June 6, 2011). 
288 South Asia Terrorism Portal data at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/
fatalitiesnorteast2006.htm. According to the Home Ministry, the number of separatist “incidents” in the northeast in 
2010 was down by 40% from 2009 (from 1,297 to 773) and the number of related civilian deaths was down by 64% 
(from 264 to 94) (see http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)1011.pdf). 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 70 
speakers from Bihar) to flood the local job markets. In 2005, the U.S. State Department’s 
Counterterrorism Office listed ULFA among its “other groups of concern,” the first time an Indian 
separatist group outside Kashmir was so named.289 In September 2011, the central government 
and ULFA signed a mutual ceasefire agreement pending political settlement of their dispute. 
Communal Tensions and Conflict 
Hindu-Muslim Conflict. Some elements of India’s Hindu majority have at times engaged in 
violent communal conflict with the country’s large Muslim minority of some 150 million, which 
is relatively poor, uneducated, and underrepresented in professions such as law and medicine. In 
1992, a huge mob of Hindu activists in the western city of Ayodhya demolished a 16th-century 
mosque said to have been built at the birth site of the Hindu god Rama. Ensuing communal riots 
left many hundreds dead in cities across India. Mumbai was especially hard hit as the site of 
coordinated 1993 terrorist bombings believed to have been a retaliatory strike by Muslims.290 In 
2002, another group of Hindu activists returning by train to the western state of Gujarat after a 
visit to the Ayodhya site of the now razed Babri Mosque (and a proposed Hindu temple) were 
attacked by a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra; 58 were killed. Up to 2,000 people died in the 
fearsome communal rioting that followed, most of them Muslims. The BJP-led state and national 
governments came under fire for inaction; some observers saw evidence of state government 
complicity in anti-Muslim attacks. In February 2011, a court found 31 Muslims guilty of setting 
fire to the train; another 63 people were acquitted. Of those convicted, 11 were sentenced to death 
and the remaining 20 to life imprisonment. 
The U.S. State Department and human rights groups have been critical of New Delhi’s largely 
ineffectual efforts to bring those responsible for the post-Godhra rioting and murders to justice; 
some of these criticisms were echoed by the Indian Supreme Court in 2003. In 2005, the State 
Department made a controversial decision to deny a U.S. visa to Gujarat Chief Minster Narendra 
Modi under a U.S. law barring entry for foreign government officials found to be complicit in 
severe violations of religious freedom.291 The decision was strongly criticized in India. In 2008, a 
Gujarat state government commission exonerated Modi, claiming to have found “absolutely no 
evidence” that he or his ministers had acted improperly. More than nine years after the Gujarat 
riots, international human rights groups express concerns about obstacles faced by victims 
seeking justice, the continuing internal displacement of thousands of families who lack basic 
necessities, and large numbers of uninvestigated related criminal cases (despite the Indian 
Supreme Court’s 2004 order to reopen nearly 1,600 such cases). In September 2010, the 
Allahabad High Court issued a much-anticipated ruling on the Ayodhya site, determining that 
Hindus and Muslims should share the land. Expected large-scale communal violence did not 
occur. However, in May 2011, India’s Supreme Court suspended the ruling, saying it had opened 
the doors to a flood of unnecessary litigation. 
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Indigenous Islamist Terrorism. Despite New Delhi’s reluctance to openly acknowledge the fact, 
India also has its own indigenous Islamist terrorism threat. The newly emergent “Indian 
Mujahideen” (IM) group, widely believed to be an offshoot or pseudonym of the Students Islamic 
Movement of India (SIMI), has been found complicit in a number of recent bombings, even as 
government leaders continue to name Pakistan as an abettor of such episodes. The New Delhi 
government formally outlawed the IM in 2010; months later, the group claimed responsibility for 
a December bombing in the Hindu holy city of Varanasi that left a child dead and at least 20 
people injured. In July 2011, three synchronized bomb blasts killed 17 people and injured some 
130 more during Mumbai’s evening rush hour. No credible claims of responsibility were received 
and, to date, Indian officials have refrained from naming any specific foreign or domestic groups 
as suspects, but the coordinated bombings appear to have required sophisticated explosives 
training (Pakistan’s two top leaders had immediately condemned the attack). Early indications are 
that the perpetrators were India-based, perhaps from the IM, rather than from a Pakistan-based 
group.292  
Some Indian experts assert that the IM’s top operators, drawn mostly from SIMI’s ranks, receive 
training at camps inside Pakistan.293 Prime Minister Singh acknowledged in 2008 that the 
involvement of “local elements” in terrorist attacks added a “new dimension” to the country’s 
indigenous militancy problem.294 SIMI may be viewed in alignment with the greater international 
jihadi movement, given its endorsement of the goals of Al Qaeda and its links with other 
international terrorist groups such as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harakat-ul-Jihad-
Islami. As India’s Muslim minority continues to suffer from glaring social inequities, it is likely 
that some among its numbers will remain vulnerable to recruitment in SIMI and/or the IM.295 
Indigenous Hindu Terrorism. Even more recent are overt signs that India is home to militant 
Hindu nationalist groups intent on launching domestic terrorist attacks. In September 2008, seven 
people were killed by two bomb blasts in the Maharashtran city of Malegaon, a hotbed of Hindu-
Muslim communal strife. By year’s end, police had arrested nine members of a “Hindu terrorist 
cell” in connection with the bombing, including an active army lieutenant colonel and a Hindu 
nun with links to the main opposition BJP.296 Thus did “Hindu terrorism” become a new and 
highly controversial phrase in India’s national dialogue. Never before in the country’s history had 
the phrase been so widely used, and the development had major and continuing effects on India’s 
national psyche. Many Indian observers warned of the danger of a “militant majoritarianism” 
among Hindu nationalists that threatens to rend the secular fabric of the nation.297  
In late 2010, Hindutva extremist Swami Aseemanand confessed to involvement in a number of 
terrorist attacks previously blamed on Islamist militants, including the 2006 bombing of a Muslim 
cemetery in Malegaon that killed 37 people and the 2007 bombing of the transborder Samjhauta 
Express, a train linking Delhi and Lahore, Pakistan, that killed 68 people, most of them Pakistani 
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civilians. Aseemanand said these and other attacks were to avenge Islamist terrorist attacks on 
Hindu temples. The confessions were an embarrassment for law enforcement agencies that had 
arrested Muslim suspects, and gave credibility to analysts who identify Hindu militancy as a 
threat to India’s security.298 
Hindu-Christian Conflict. In 2008, lethal attacks on Orissa Christians erupted in apparent 
retaliation for the murder of a prominent local Hindu leader. Police blamed the murder on Maoist 
rebels, but Hindu radicals blamed local Christians. Rampaging mobs burned churches and other 
Christian buildings, killing at least 38 people and leaving up to 50,000 more homeless. U.S. 
officials took note of the unrest and urged the Indian government to protect religious freedom 
throughout the country. By some accounts, the Hindu radicals were pursuing a political agenda; 
there was speculation that violent attacks on Orissa’s Christian communities was part of an 
organized political project by Hindu nationalist parties.299 Communal strife continued throughout 
the remainder of the year at a lower level, and state-level officials may have failed to provide 
sufficient security for the Christian minority. For some, the violence provided “a window into 
India’s hidden fragility, its sometimes dangerous political climate, and the fierce historical 
divisions buried in its vast diversity.”300 There continue to be small-scale attacks on and 
harassment of Christians and their places of worship in India (see also the “Religious Freedom” 
section below).301 
Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
India exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 and tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. 
The country has 60-100 nuclear warheads, according to public estimates,302 and continues to 
produce plutonium for weapons.303 New Delhi has stated that it will not engage in a nuclear arms 
race and needs only a “credible minimum deterrent,” but India has never defined what it means 
by such a deterrent. Both the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement and the associated 2008 
Nuclear Suppliers Group decision described below have renewed New Delhi’s access to the 
international uranium market. This access will result in more indigenous Indian uranium available 
for weapons because it will not be consumed by India’s newly safeguarded reactors. 
New Delhi has refused either to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or accept 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all of its nuclear material and 
facilities.304 The NPT states-parties adopted language following the 2010 NPT Review 
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Conference, which ended on May 28, 2010, calling on non-signatories to accede to the treaty as 
“non-nuclear-weapon States ... promptly and without any conditions.” U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1172, adopted after New Delhi’s 1998 nuclear tests, called on India to take a number 
of steps which it has not taken, such as acceding to the NPT, ratifying the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), and refraining from developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.  
Despite this resistance to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements, M.K. 
Narayanan, then-National Security Adviser to Prime Minister Singh, stated in December 2009 
that “India has a long-standing commitment to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear 
disarmament.” Indeed, New Delhi has issued proposals for achieving global nuclear disarmament. 
For example, a 2007 working paper to the Conference on Disarmament called for the 
“[n]egotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, 
stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-
discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.”305 
Moreover, Singh stated during the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit that New Delhi is ready 
to “participate in the negotiation of an internationally verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off 
Treaty.”306 Additionally, India has, despite its refusal to sign the CTBT, committed itself to a 
voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.  
New Delhi also supported the joint statement adopted at the Nuclear Security Summit, which 
contained a pledge to improve nuclear security standards and share best practices with other 
countries.307 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced April 13, 2010, that New Delhi 
had “decided to set up a ‘Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership’ in India.” Describing the 
center as “a state of the art facility based on international participation from the IAEA and other 
interested foreign partners,” Singh stated that it would include a “School” dealing with nuclear 
security. The United States and India signed in November 2010 a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) providing “a general framework for cooperative activities in working with” the center. 
There is no public evidence that India has since conducted nuclear security activities with the 
United States, but the two governments are to hold the first meeting regarding implementation of 
the MOU sometime in 2011, according to a July 19, 2011, joint statement. 
An off-the-record May 2011 gathering of regional and nuclear proliferation experts in 
Washington, DC, found widespread agreement that Pakistan’s current weapons proliferation 
activities are destabilizing, that India’s potential adoption of an altered nuclear doctrine (to 
include a delivery triad and ballistic missile defense) could exacerbate instability, and that the 
U.S. government may in the near future confront new nonproliferation challenges in South Asia 
that could even supplant counterterrorism imperatives. 
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U.S.-India Bilateral Issues 
U.S.-India Economic and Trade Relations 
As one of India’s leading trade and investment partners, the United States strongly supports New 
Delhi’s continuing economic reform policies. A U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum was created in 
2005 to expand bilateral economic engagement and provide a venue for discussing multilateral 
trade issues. According to U.S. trade statistics, U.S. exports to India in 2010 totaled $19.222 
billion and imports from India totaled $29.531 billion, for a bilateral trade deficit of $10.309 
billion.308 With a total trade of $48.753 billion, India was the 12th largest trading partner for the 
United States in 2010.  
The leading U.S. exports to India in 2010 were (in order):  
• Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, 
metals clad with precious metal and articles thereof and imitation jewelry 
(chapter 71)—$4.206 billion;  
• nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances, or parts thereof 
(chapter 84)—$ 2.607 billion; and 
• electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof (chapter 85)—$1.367 
billion.  
The top imports from India were (in order):  
• Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, 
metals clad with precious metal and articles thereof and imitation jewelry 
(chapter 71)—$6.850 billion;  
• pharmaceutical products (chapter 30)—$2.388 billion; and 
• mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation (chapter 27)—$2.324 
billion.  
The cross-trade in items under chapter 71 reflects a strong interrelationship for the industries in 
both nations. India is a major global supplier of precious gems and stones, whereas the United 
States is a major supplier of finished jewelry.309 
In addition to their merchandise trade flows, India and the United States have significant service 
trade relations. In 2009 (latest available figures), U.S. private services exports to India totaled 
$9.940 billion, and imports from India totaled $12.377 billion.310 The leading U.S. service export 
to India was education ($3.155 billion), and the leading service import from India was “business, 
professional, and technical services” ($8.920 billion). 
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Annual inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to India from all countries rose from about $100 
million in FY1990/91 to nearly $3 billion in FY2000/01 and over $19 billion in FY2010/11. The 
stock of U.S. FDI in India as of March 2011 stood at $9.4 billion. According to the Indian 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, about 7.5% of FDI in India since 2000 has come from U.S. 
firms; in recent years, the major U.S.-based companies Microsoft, Dell, Oracle, and IBM have 
made multi-billion-dollar investments in India. Wisconsin-based Harley-Davidson recently 
opened a motorcycle manufacturing plant in India’s northern Haryana state, its second outside the 
United States. Michigan-based Ford Motor Company has plans to expand its operation in India by 
investing $1 billion in a new factory in Gujarat, its second production line in India. In 2011, 
Illinois-based Boeing, which sees no more important a potential customer in the world, projected 
that India will spend some $150 billion on more than 1,300 new passenger airplanes over the next 
two decades. India is also among the fastest growing investors in the United States; the 
Administration reports that investment capital from India grew at an annualized rate of 53% over 
the past decade, reaching about $4.4 billion in 2009. Among the most important investors has 
been India’s Tata Group, which reportedly employs some 19,000 people in the United States.311 
U.S.-India Economic Issues and Engagement 
While bilateral relations are generally good, there are a number of economic and trade issues 
between India and the United States of varying degrees of importance. For the United States, the 
more pressing issues are intellectual property rights protection, trade in dual-use technology, 
access to selective Indian markets, and India’s participation in the U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) program. For India, the key issues are negotiations of a bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT), U.S. restrictions on the trade in services (including the limited supply of H1-B 
visas), high-technology export controls, and the U.S. farm subsidy program.  
Commerce Secretary Locke led a trade mission to New Delhi, Bangalore, and Mumbai in 
February 2011, accompanied by representatives of 24 U.S. companies, many of them seeking to 
strike weapons sales deals or capitalize on the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement. In 
meetings with his Indian counterpart, Locke raised longstanding issues of friction, including 
market access barriers and intellectual property protection. Speaking at a Confederation of Indian 
Industry luncheon, the Secretary went into some detail on these and other issues, asserting that 
seizing the full potential of bilateral cooperation will require India to take further steps to open its 
economy by reducing an array of tariff and nontariff barriers, and lifting restrictions on foreign 
direct investment:  
Ultimately, what America seeks is a level playing field for its companies, where the cost and 
quality of their products determines whether or not they win business. In seeking a level 
playing field, we are merely asking for the same treatment foreign companies and investors 
receive in America.312 
Repeats of this message from the Administration have become both firmer and more common in 
2011. In a major May speech on the future of U.S.-India relations, Assistant Secretary Blake said: 
                                                                 
311 See the Ministry’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion data at http://www.dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/
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[E]conomic impediments make it hard for American exporters to gain access to Indian 
markets, especially in agricultural goods. Restrictions in retail, insurance, defense, and other 
key areas have also limited the expansion of American firms, and the Indian firms with 
whom they seek to partner. To maintain this trajectory [of increased trade], we need to 
methodically address trade and investment barriers and foster market openings that position 
us to capitalize on this continued growth, and allow our private sectors to thrive.313 
The outgoing U.S. Ambassador put it even more bluntly, saying, “India needs to be asking itself: 
Is it delivering on the global partnership? ... There’s no doubt this needs to be a two-way 
street.”314 Commerce Department officials and the White House Chief of Staff have more recently 
admonished New Delhi to move forward with economic reforms. Of particular recent concern to 
Secretary Locke and other U.S. officials is New Delhi’s restrictions on imports of solar power 
technology. The central government plans to disburse some $20 billion in subsidies to power-
plant developers this decade, but is barring importation of foreign-made solar panels, making it 
difficult for U.S. firms to get a share of the market.315 
In June 2011, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner led the U.S. delegation at the second meeting of 
the U.S.-India Financial and Trade Partnership in Washington, DC, where he and his Indian 
counterpart, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, agreed to further expand bilateral trade and 
investment links. While acknowledging that reducing barriers to investment was politically 
challenging for the Indian government, he reiterated the U.S. contention that easing such barriers 
would benefit both national economies and be an important step toward their “integration.”316 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
Inadequate intellectual property rights protection is a long-standing issue between the United 
States and India. India remained on the U.S. Special 301 “Priority Watch List” in 2011 for failing 
to provide an adequate level of IPR protection or enforcement, or market access for persons 
relying on intellectual property protection.317 The report recognized the introduction of a 
Copyright Amendment Bill as an improvement in the regulatory regime, but expressed concerns 
about its compliance with international standards. The United States also acknowledged India’s 
progress on enforcement, but maintained that piracy and counterfeiting, including the 
counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals, remains widespread. India remains critical of U.S. efforts to 
pressure developing nations, including India, to adopt laws and regulations governing 
pharmaceuticals that are overly supportive of the major pharmaceutical companies and could 
potentially deny poorer nations of access to important medicines.  
                                                                 
313 “The Current State of U.S.-India Cooperation and Prospects for the Future (As Prepared)” (speech transcript), 
Department of State release, May 13, 2011. 
314 Amb. Tim Roemer quoted in “U.S. Envoy Prods India on Reforms,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2011. 
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317 The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition of U.S. copyright-based industries, estimated 
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Trade in Dual-Use Technology 
The year 2003 saw the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group 
(HTCG), a forum in which officials can discuss a wide range of issues relevant to creating the 
conditions for more robust bilateral high technology commerce. The 8th HTCG meeting was held 
in New Delhi, India, on July 19, 2011, with discussion focusing on dual-use technology and ways 
to foster greater research and development cooperation. In 2007, India and the United States 
concluded a bilateral 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. While the accord addressed 
many concerns about India’s nuclear program and trade in dual-use technology, there remain 
concerns in the United States about India’s ability to prevent the distribution of potentially 
dangerous technology and equipment to undesirable recipients.  
Since 1998, a number of Indian entities have been subjected to case-by-case licensing 
requirements and appear on the U.S. export control “Entity List” of foreign end users involved in 
weapons proliferation activities. In 2004, as part of NSSP implementation, the United States 
modified some export licensing policies and removed the Indian Space Research Organization 
(ISRO) headquarters from the Entity List. Further adjustments came in 2005 when six more 
subordinate entities were removed. In January 2011, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and 
Security removed several Indian space- and defense-related companies from the Entity List.318 
U.S Market Access in India 
The United States would like greater access to India’s domestic markets, particularly for such 
products and services as agricultural goods, financial services, and retail distribution. India’s 
extensive trade and investment barriers have been criticized by U.S. government officials and 
business leaders as an impediment to its own economic development, as well as to stronger U.S.-
India ties. The U.S. government maintains that India is using sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
regulations to restrict the import of certain U.S. agricultural goods. India denies these claims, 
arguing that the U.S. farm subsidy program unfairly subsidies U.S. agricultural exports and 
greater market access would threaten the livelihood of many of India’s farmers.  
Multi-brand foreign retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target continue to be barred from the Indian 
market due to fears that India’s small shops (there are as many as 12 million of them) would be 
overwhelmed by the competition. The U.S.-India Business Council is among those commercial 
groups contending that liberalization and greater international participation would benefit India 
by creating new and better employment opportunities, and by modernizing the country’s supply 
chain management and distribution.319 
India’s Participation in the GSP Program 
India is designated as a beneficiary developing country (BDC) in the U.S. GSP program since its 
inception in 1974.320 As such, a limited amount of Indian imports of selected goods can enter the 
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United States duty-free. Some in Congress believe that India is too developed to remain a GSP 
beneficiary, while others contend that India should be removed from the GSP program because of 
its stance on various issues related to the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round negotiations. 
India was the third largest GSP beneficiary in 2010, after Angola and Thailand. 
Bilateral Investment Treaty 
India is pressing the United States to carry out negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 
A BIT is frequently seen as the first step in the possible progress towards a free trade agreement 
(FTA). In addition, a BIT between India and the United States might foster greater FDI flows 
between the two nations. Preliminary talks were held in 2009, and there has been only rhetorical 
progress on the issue since. The United States may be missing out on multiple business 
opportunities as India goes forward with comprehensive trade agreements that will lower tariffs 
on imports into India from countries such as Japan and Malaysia. Faster movement toward a 
U.S.-India BIT could improve prospects for American investors, as well as reassure those in Asia 
who question the U.S. commitment to a long-term economic role in the region. During a session 
of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum in Washington, DC, in June 2011, visiting Indian 
Commerce Minister Anand Sharma and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk agreed to “fast-track 
technical negotiations for an early conclusion” of a BIT.321  
U.S. Restrictions on Trade in Services 
India would like to have greater access to U.S. services market, particularly the ability of Indian 
nationals to provide services in the United States. There are two aspects of this issue. First, via its 
various certification programs, the United States restricts the ability of many Indian professionals 
(such as accountants, medical doctors, and lawyers) from providing services in the United States. 
Second, the United States limits the number of people who can work in the country under its H1-
B visa program for certain high-skilled jobs. India would like the United States to increase or 
remove the limit on H1-B visas.  
U.S. Farm Subsidy Program 
India maintains that the U.S. farm subsidy program—worth an estimated $17.7 billion per year—
provides U.S. agricultural exports with an unfair trade advantage. To the Indian government, the 
U.S. program poses a threat to millions of Indian farmers, hence it maintains restrictions on U.S. 
agricultural imports. In addition, India sees the U.S. reluctance to curtail or eliminate its farm 
subsidy program as a major roadblock in making progress in the Doha Round negotiations. 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations322 
In 2006, the World Trade Organization’s “Doha Round” of multilateral trade negotiations were 
suspended due to disagreement among the WTO’s six core group members—which include the 
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United States and India—over methods to reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies, eliminate 
export subsidies, and increase market access for agricultural products. The United States and 
other developed countries seek substantial tariff reductions in the developing world. India, like 
other members of the “G-20” group of developing states, has sought more market access for its 
goods and services in the developed countries, while claiming that developing countries should be 
given additional time to liberalize their own markets. In particular, India resists opening its 
markets to subsidized agricultural products from developed countries, claiming this would be 
detrimental to tens of millions of Indian farmers and lead to further depopulation of the 
countryside. According to Indian officials, the WTO’s narrow focus on economic issues excludes 
political and social variables which are equally sensitive for New Delhi and which constrain the 
options available to the Indian government. They seek greater U.S. understanding of this 
dynamic. The Indian economy could benefit significantly from lowered farm subsidies in 
developed countries and expanded trade in services, but indigenous industries could also be 
harmed if New Delhi were to reduce tariffs that currently protect India’s exporting sectors, 
especially in textiles and garments. 
Space Cooperation 
Bilateral space cooperation may be a particularly productive pursuit now that the U.S. Commerce 
Department has removed obstacles to trade with India’s civil space agencies. The United States 
welcomes India’s robust participation in multilateral fora such as the Committee on Earth 
Observation Satellites and the Group on Earth Observations, and has engaged in preliminary talks 
on human space flight cooperation. Earth observation cooperation benefits agricultural 
productivity through more accurate weather and climate forecasting. Some analysts view bilateral 
space cooperation as a particularly productive pursuit now that the U.S. Commerce Department 
has removed obstacles to trade with India’s civil space agencies. However, India’s space program 
suffered a major setback in late 2010 when the country’s Geo-Synchronous Launch Vehicle 
(GSLV) went out of control 47 seconds after launch and was destroyed along with its 
telecommunications satellite payload. With a 50% success rate, the GSLV may no longer be 
considered a viable option for many commercial satellite launches.323 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation324 
Background 
India’s status as a non-signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) kept it from 
accessing most nuclear technology and fuels on the international market for more than three 
decades. New Delhi’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” spurred the U.S.-led creation of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—an international export control regime for nuclear-related 
trade—and Washington further tightened its own export laws with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242).325 New Delhi has long railed at a “nuclear apartheid” created by an 
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apparent double standard inherent in the NPT, which, they maintain, has allowed certain states to 
deploy nuclear weapons legitimately while other states cannot.326 Senior Indian officials maintain 
the widely held Indian perspective that reaching a civil nuclear deal with the United States was 
crucial to the process of removing constraints placed on India by “an increasingly selective, 
rigorous, and continually expanding regime of technology denial,” claiming that only by “turning 
the nuclear key” would India be able to open the door to global trade in dual use and other 
sophisticated technologies, including nuclear technologies.327 
Differences over nuclear policy bedeviled U.S.-India ties for decades and—given New Delhi’s 
lingering resentments—presented a serious psychological obstacle to more expansive bilateral 
relations. In a major policy shift, a July 2005 U.S.-India Joint Statement notably asserted that “as 
a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and 
advantages as other such states,” and President Bush vowed to work on achieving “full civilian 
nuclear energy cooperation with India.” 328 As a reversal of three decades of U.S. nonproliferation 
policy, such proposed cooperation stirred controversy and required changes in both U.S. law and 
in NSG guidelines. India reciprocally agreed to take its own steps, including identifying and 
separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner and placing the former 
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. 
After extensive and difficult negotiations, U.S. legislation allowing the United States to conclude 
a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India became law in December 2006 (P.L. 109-
401). President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law in October 
2008. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India’s External Affairs Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee signed the agreement later that month and it entered into force in December 2008. 
Following an intense U.S. lobbying effort, the NSG decided in September 2008 to exempt India 
from some of its export requirements—a decision that enabled the government to conclude 
nuclear cooperation agreements with several countries.329  
In the realm of geopolitics, much of the Bush Administration’s argument for moving forward with 
the U.S.-India nuclear initiative appeared rooted in an anticipation/expectation that New Delhi 
would in coming years and decades make policy choices that are more congruent with U.S. 
regional and global interests (a desire for such congruence is, in fact, written into the enabling 
legislation, P.L. 109-401). Proponents have suggested that this U.S. “gesture” would have 
significant and lasting psychological and symbolic effects in addition to the material ones, and 
that Indian leaders require such a gesture in order to feel confident in the United States as a 
reliable partner on the world stage. Skeptics aver that the potential strategic benefits of the 
nuclear initiative have been over-sold. Indeed, centuries of Indian anti-colonial sentiments and 
oftentimes prickly, independent foreign policy choices are unlikely to be set aside in the short run, 
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326 Under the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
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meaning that the anticipated geopolitical benefits of civil nuclear cooperation with India remain 
largely speculative and at least somewhat dependent upon unknowable global political 
developments. It is worth noting that, although proponents of the nuclear agreement argued that it 
would bring New Delhi into the “nonproliferation mainstream,” India has not made any 
significant changes to its nuclear-weapons policies. 
Recent Developments 
U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India. Washington and New Delhi 
announced March 29, 2010, that they had concluded an agreement on a reprocessing facility in 
India; the two countries signed the agreement July 30, 2010. The arrangement, which the 
Administration had submitted to Congress on May 11, 2010, would not have taken effect if 
Congress had adopted a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 days of continuous session; 
Congress did not adopt such a resolution. New Delhi had reportedly insisted that India and the 
United States conclude the arrangement before New Delhi would sign contracts with U.S. nuclear 
firms. Despite the subsequent arrangement, U.S. firms may be reluctant to engage in nuclear trade 
with India if the government does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for 
nuclear reactor operators and suppliers.330  
India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which 
has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that 
India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, which both houses of India’s parliament adopted 
in August 2010, is not consistent with the CSC, citing the provisions which make reactor 
suppliers, in addition to operators, liable for damages caused by a reactor accident.331 U.S. 
officials have argued that India’s law should be consistent with the Convention. Assistant 
Secretary of State Robert Blake stated in a June 9, 2010, interview with India Abroad that the 
U.S. interest is to “ensure that the bill that ultimately is enacted is compliant” with the CSC. 
Although Under Secretary of State William Burns described New Delhi’s signing of the CSC as a 
“very positive step” during an October 27 press briefing, he also indicated that India will need to 
take additional steps in order to resolve U.S. concerns regarding India’s liability policies. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated during a July 19, 2011, press conference that the 
United States wants India to ratify the CSC by the end of 2011, as well as adopt a liability 
regulatory regime that “fully conforms with the international requirements” under the CSC. 
India’s then-Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao stated in a July 29, 2011, interview that India 
would ratify the CSC “before the end of the year.” She also explained that “the rules and 
regulations concerning the civil nuclear liability bill ... are in the process of being framed and in 
this process we are consulting with both the domestic companies and the foreign companies 
concerned.”332 
Washington and New Delhi are also discussing necessary monitoring arrangements for U.S. 
nuclear exports. Section 104 (d)(5) of the Hyde Act requires the President to “ensure that all 
appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, 
equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or re-exported to India,” including a “detailed 
system of reporting and accounting for technology transfers, including any retransfers in India, 
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authorized by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act.”333 
India has provided retransfer assurances covering several state-owned entities, but has not yet 
provided them for private entities.334 
U.S.-India Security Cooperation 
Defense cooperation between the United States and India remains in relatively early stages of 
development (unlike U.S.-Pakistan military ties, which date back to the 1950s). Since late 2001, 
and despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement with Pakistan, U.S.-India security cooperation has 
flourished; U.S. diplomats rate military cooperation among the most important aspects of 
transformed bilateral relations. The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group (DPG)—moribund after 
India’s 1998 nuclear tests and ensuing U.S. sanctions—was revived in 2001 and meets annually. 
At the most recent session, in Washington, DC, in March 2011, senior U.S. State Department and 
Pentagon officials and their Indian counterparts reaffirmed the importance of and expressed 
satisfaction with ongoing bilateral defense cooperation, especially in the areas of joint military 
exercises and arms sales. The DPG operates four subgroups—a Military Cooperation Group, a 
Joint Technology Group, a Senior Technology Security Group, and a Defense Procurement and 
Production Group—which meet throughout the year.335 
In June 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense pact outlining planned 
collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increasing 
opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, expanded collaboration related to 
missile defense, and establishment of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group. The 
agreement may be the most ambitious such security pact ever engaged by New Delhi. A Maritime 
Security Cooperation Agreement, inked in 2006, commits both countries to “comprehensive 
cooperation” in protecting the free flow of commerce and addressing a wide array of threats to 
maritime security, including piracy and the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and 
related materials. 
The United States views defense cooperation with India in the context of “common principles and 
shared national interests” such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and 
maintaining regional stability. Senior officials in the Obama Administration’s Pentagon have 
assured New Delhi that the United States is “fully committed to strengthening ties through the 
enhancement of our defense relationship.”336 In a report accompanying the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (S. 1253, S.Rept. 112-26), the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, in expressing its belief that a deepened strategic partnership with India will be 
“critical” to the promotion of core mutual national interests in the 21st century, would direct the 
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Secretary of Defense to report to Congress a detailed plan to enhance U.S.-India security 
cooperation.337 
Many analysts view increased U.S.-India security ties as providing an alleged “hedge” against or 
“counterbalance” to growing Chinese influence in Asia, though both Washington and New Delhi 
repeatedly downplay such probable motives. Still, while a congruence of U.S. and Indian national 
security objectives is unlikely in the foreseeable future, convergences are identified in areas such 
as shared values, the emergence of a new balance-of-power arrangement in the region, and on 
distinct challenges such as WMD proliferation, Islamist extremism, and energy security. There 
remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian strategic planners 
are divergent on several key issues, perhaps especially on the role of Pakistan and policies toward 
the ongoing Afghan insurgency, as well as on India’s relations with Iran and repressive 
governments in places such as Burma and Sudan.  
Intelligence and Counterterrorism 
One facet of the emerging “strategic partnership” between the United States and India is greatly 
increased intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation. In 2000, the two governments 
established a U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism to coordinate bilateral efforts 
in this realm. In 2002, India and the United States launched the Indo-U.S. Cyber Security Forum 
to safeguard critical infrastructures from cyber attack. The 2005 “New Framework for the U.S.-
India Defense Relationship” listed “defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism” as one 
of four key shared security interests, and it called for a bolstering of mutual defense capabilities 
required for such a goal.338 A bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative was formally 
launched in July 2010.339 
Counterterrorism cooperation is described by the Administration as a pillar of the bilateral 
relationship. Programs include exchanges of law enforcement best practices, reciprocal visits of 
senior-level officials, joint military training exercises, and joint approaches in relevant 
international fora. The FBI’s Quantico laboratory has hosted visits by senior Indian forensics 
experts and the agency regularly shares best-practices with senior Indian law enforcement 
officials. The State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program has conducted scores of 
training courses for more than 1,600 Indian law enforcement officials.340 
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CIA and FBI personnel have worked in India to investigate terrorist attacks, including a major 
2006 bombing in Mumbai, as well as the 2008 attack on the same city (FBI forensics experts 
provided testimony to the Indian court trying the sole surviving gunmen in the latter attack). In 
June 2010, the Indian government was granted access to David Headley, an American national 
who has confessed to participating in planning the November 2008 Mumbai assault. Then-U.S. 
Ambassador to India Tim Roemer identified the development as “historic in the nature of security 
cooperation” and expressed optimism about multiple U.S.-India partnerships in this area, 
including cooperation on launching a National Counterterrorism Center in India modeled on that 
in the United States.341 Yet lingering and significant distrust of the United States—and its close 
relationship with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services—became evident after it was 
learned that U.S. officials had received prior warnings about LeT intentions to attack Mumbai 
from Coleman’s former wives. U.S. officials deny that any useful intelligence information had 
been withheld from India, but some observers remained skeptical.342 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano was in New Delhi and Mumbai in May 2011, 
where she meet with Indian officials and representatives of private industry to promote 
counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation. Under the rubric of the bilateral Strategic 
Dialogue, a U.S.-India Homeland Security dialogue was established, with Indian Home Minister 
Chidambaram as co-chair, wherein agency-to-agency engagements are being fostered on a wide 
array of law enforcement issues, including counternarcotics counterfeit currency, illicit financing 
and transnational crime, infrastructure security, transportation and trade, coastal security, and 
large-city policing.343 
Defense Cooperation and Trade 
Combined Military Exercises 
Since early 2002, the United States and India have held a series of unprecedented and 
increasingly substantive combined exercises involving all military services. Such military-to-
military relations have been key aspect of U.S.-India relations in recent years—India now 
conducts more exercises and personnel exchanges with the United States than with any other 
country.344 These include “Cope India” air exercises,345 joint Special Forces training,346 and major 
annual “Malabar” joint naval exercises are held off the Indian coast.347 U.S. and Indian officials 
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sponsored by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Indian Home Ministry. Senior law enforcement officials 
from both countries, including 39 Indian police executives from 29 state and federal agencies across India, met to 
discuss such topics as crisis response, forensics, and megacity policing (U.S. Embassy press release, April 25, 2011). 
341 See the Ambassador’s June 10, 2010, statement at http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr061110.html. 
342 “U.S. Didn’t Warn India Despite ‘Information & Concerns,’” Hindu (Chennai), October 20, 2010. 
343 U.S. Embassy press release, May 24, 2011; Indian External Affairs Ministry release, May 27, 2011. 
344 See “Defense Cooperation” in “The U.S.-India Partnership: The Fact Sheets,” White House release, November 8, 
2010. 
345 In 2004, mock air combat saw Indian pilots in late-model Russian-built fighters hold off American pilots flying 
older F-15Cs, and Indian successes were repeated versus U.S. F-16s in 2005. 
346 U.S. and Indian special forces soldiers have held at least seven “Vajra Prahar” joint exercises, and hundreds of U.S. 
Special Forces soldiers have attended India’s Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School. 
347 In 2008, the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, the nuclear submarine USS Springfield, and five other major 
American naval vessels joined Indian navy ships in the Arabian Sea. Unlike in previous years, the 2008 Malabar 
(continued...) 
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tout ongoing joint maneuvers as improving interoperability and as evidence of an overall 
deepening of the bilateral defense relationship. Countries such as China and Pakistan are acutely 
interested in the progress of such relations, seeing them as the potential seeds of a more formal 
defense alliance. 
Defense Trade 
Along with increasing military-to-military ties, the issue of U.S. arms sales to India has taken a 
higher profile. New Delhi is undertaking a major military modernization program, potentially 
spending $100 billion over the next decade to update its mostly Soviet-era arsenal. U.S. weapons 
makers are eager to gain a slice of this lucrative pie, and American security companies also see in 
India a potentially also huge new market for sophisticated equipment such as surveillance and 
detection systems. Some analysts suggest that increased defense trade could be a means of 
reviving what are perceived as stagnating U.S.-India relations.348 Yet many Indians continue to be 
wary of closer defense ties with the United States and are concerned that these could lead to 
future strings, such as conditionality and/or cutoffs, and perhaps constrain New Delhi’s foreign 
policy freedom. In an unusually open expression of frustration with the United States in this 
realm, India’s Army Chief in May 2010 informed his Defense Ministry that the U.S. Foreign 
Military Sales program had proven troublesome for India.349 Nevertheless, the value of new and 
unprecedented major defense sales to India has continued to grow, with the United States now 
offering to sell India some of its most sophisticated military hardware.350 
The first-ever major U.S. arms sale to India came in 2002, when the Pentagon negotiated delivery 
of 12 counter-battery radar sets (or “Firefinder” radars) worth a total of $190 million. In 2006, 
Congress authorized and New Delhi approved the $44 million purchase of the USS Trenton, a 
decommissioned American amphibious transport dock. The ship, which became the second-
largest in the Indian navy when it was commissioned as the INS Jalashwa in 2007, set sail for 
India carrying six surplus Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters purchased for another $39 
million. The Security Cooperation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-266) authorized the President to transfer 
to India two Osprey-class coastal minehunter ships as Excess Defense Articles. In 2008, 
Washington and New Delhi finalized a deal to send to India six C-130J Hercules military 
transport aircraft (along with related equipment, training, and services). The deal, which 
represented the largest-ever U.S. defense sale to India to date, is worth nearly $1 billion to the 
manufacturer, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin (the C-130Js, configured to support Indian 
special operations requirements, were delivered in December 2010). In 2009, New Delhi signed a 
$2.1 billion deal to purchase eight P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft from Illinois-based Boeing. 
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exercises were bilateral and did not include warships from any third country. During the previous exercise, India hosted 
a total of 27 warships from five countries—including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Singapore—for 
maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal. It was the first time such exercises were conducted off India’s east coast. 
348 Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen Cohen, “Arms Sales for India: How Military Trade Could Energize U.S.-India 
Relations,” Foreign Affairs, March 2011. 
349 “Army Chief Warns Against Govt-to-Govt Deals With US,” Times of India (Delhi), May 25, 2010. 
350 For example, in a June 2011 report (S.Rept. 112-26), the Senate Armed Services Committee raised the idea of 
potential future sales to India of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, as well as a potential U.S.-India co-development 
partnership on other weapons systems, perhaps to include the anticipated program to replace the U.S. Air Force’s T-38 
trainer jet. 
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These aircraft, slated for delivery in 2013, also provide anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and 
their sale set a new record as the largest-ever U.S. arms transfer to India. 
In 2010, the Pentagon notified Congress of a potential sale to India of ten C-17 Globemaster III 
military transport aircraft (with training equipment, spare parts, and other support). Yet another 
new record sale was realized when, in June 2011, New Delhi formally approved the $4.1 billion 
purchase, the largest-ever Indian defense contract with a U.S. company. Washington welcomed 
the sale as both advancing the U.S.-India partnership and in sustaining some 23,000 American 
jobs in 44 states.351 Other potential upcoming sales include 
• 22 Boeing AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, along with accompanying General 
Electric engines, and radars, missiles, training, and other support that could be 
worth an estimated $1.4 billion; 
• 145 lightweight 155mm M777 towed howitzers with laser targeting systems 
(worth $647 million); and 
• 26 Harpoon anti-ship missiles for $200 million and 32 Mk-54 torpedoes for $86 
million—both weapons intended for use on the Indian Navy’s newly-purchased 
P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft. 
Yet by far the most lucrative hoped-for sale would have served India’s quest for 126 new 
medium, multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) in a deal that could be worth some $11 billion. 
Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and Boeing’s F/A-18 were competing with aircraft built in Russia, 
France, Sweden, and by a European consortium. Hopes of an American firm landing the MMCA 
deal received a boost in 2009 when General Electric won in its bid to provide India with 99 jet 
engines for its Tejas light combat aircraft for some $800 million, but in 2011 New Delhi 
announced that it would not look to American firms for this larger sale (see below). 
Outstanding Defense Cooperation Agreements 
Some Indian officials express concern that the United States is a “fickle” partner that may not 
always be relied upon to provide the reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought 
by New Delhi, and that may act intrusively. This has contributed to New Delhi’s years-long 
political resistance to sign several defense cooperation accords, including the Communications 
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMoA), the Basic Exchange and 
Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA), and the Logistics Support 
Agreement (LSA).352 U.S. law requires that certain sensitive defense technologies can only be 
transferred to recipient countries that have signed the CISMoA and/or the BECA. All three 
outstanding accords have been opposed by some influential Indian politicians for their “intrusive” 
nature, and the issue was not taken up at the July 2011 Strategic Dialogue talks.353  
                                                                 
351 U.S. Embassy press release, June 7, 2011. 
352 The CISMoA requires purchasers of U.S. defense equipment to ensure that equipment supplied to India is 
compatible with other American systems. The BECA provides for mutual logistical support and enables exchanges of 
communications and related equipment. The LSA permits armed forces of both countries to enjoy reciprocal use of 
facilities for maintenance, servicing, communications, refueling, and medical care. New Delhi is wary of LSA 
provisions, which some there believe could lead to India’s being caught up in U.S. regional military operations (“US 
and India Urged to Complete Defense Cooperation Deals,” Jane’s Defence Industry, June 2, 2010). 
353 “India Averse to Inking Military Pacts With U.S.,” Hindu (Chennai). June 23, 2011; “CISMOA, LSA Not on Table 
of Indo-US Strategic Dialogue,” Press Trust of India, July 15, 2011. 
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New Delhi did in 2009 sign on to an End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) after two years of 
protracted negotiations, but only after receiving the concession that the time and location of 
equipment verification would be determined by Indian officials. Then-Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates, on a visit to New Delhi in 2010, stated that not getting the outstanding agreements 
signed “is an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.”354 Despite U.S. 
claims that India’s military capabilities are hampered by lack of access to U.S. equipment and 
technologies, senior Indian military officers have reported to their government that the absence of 
these agreements makes no substantial difference in their operational abilities.355 
MMRCA “Deselection” 
By the turn of the new century, New Delhi began to address the need to replace their air force’s 
large and aging fleet of Russian-built MiG-21 combat aircraft, which were crashing regularly and 
became known to some Indian pilots as “flying coffins.”356 Refurbishment was deemed 
impractical, and no indigenously-built replacement could be online for up to two decades so, in 
2004, the government issued formal Requests For Information (RFIs) on potentially purchasing 
126 new aircraft from one of four vendors: Lockheed Martin (F-16IN), France’s Dassault 
(Rafale), Sweden’s Saab (Gripen JAS-39), and Russia’s Mikoyan (MiG-35). Soon after, Boeing 
(F/A-18E/F) and a European consortium (Eurofighter Typhoon) joined in the bidding.357 
In April 2011, seven years after the first RFIs were issued, New Delhi announced that it had 
narrowed the list of competitors to two finalists: the French Rafale and the Eurofighter. The 
government described the decision as having been wholly rooted in technical assessments of the 
contending aircraft. These assessments determined that the Rafale and the Typhoon were best 
suited to the needs of their air forces. Assistant Secretary of State Blake expressed Washington’s 
obvious disappointment, while also stressing that the United States will remain committed to the 
bilateral defense partnership—he contended that India had “shown confidence in American 
products” such as C-130J, C-17, and P-8 military aircraft—as well as to the greater strategic 
partnership. Blake later said that choosing one of the American-made platforms would have 
“provided a ladder to even higher levels of U.S.-India technology transfers” and it was “a source 
of puzzlement” that the Indian Air Force deselected them.358 New Delhi’s decision elicited much 
criticism both from U.S.-based analysts as well as some Indian strategic thinkers, and sparked 
some debate over the “real” reasons for what seemed a major geostrategic choice. 
Some commentators considered the Indian decision short-sighted and potentially damaging to the 
greater U.S.-India partnership. From this perspective, political and geostrategic considerations 
were given short-shrift or even ignored in New Delhi’s apparently narrow focus on purely 
                                                                 
354 “Gates Uses India Visit to Push for Defense Technology Accords,” Bloomberg.com, January 19, 2010. 
355 “Absence of Military Pacts With U.S. Will Not Impact Capability: IAF Chief,” Hindu (Chennai), October 16, 2010. 
356 In mid-2011, India’s defense minister formally announced that all MiG-21s would be phased out by 2017, 53 years 
after their first induction into service. During that time, India’s air force inducted 946 of the aircraft, 476 of which have 
been lost to accidents (“India to Phase Out Mig-21s by 2017,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 10, 2011). 
357 Lockheed’s pitch reportedly included offering a “super-cruise” version of the F-16 that saves large amounts of fuel 
by achieving supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners. Boeing, for its part, sought to establish multiple joint 
ventures that could better position the company to become India’s preferred aerospace and defense partner (“US 
Contenders Enhance Their MRCA Offerings to India,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 30, 2008; “Boeing Keen to 
Develop India’s Aerospace Industry,” Reuters, July 16, 2008).  
358 Department of State release, April 29, 2011; “The Current State of U.S.-India Cooperation and Prospects for the 
Future (As Prepared)” (speech transcript), Department of State release, May 13, 2011. 
India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations  
 
Congressional Research Service 88 
technical variables. The decision may not have been the great surprise that was perceived by 
some in Washington: Indian skepticism about U.S. reliability as an arms supplier is longstanding, 
and Washington’s close defense relationship with Islamabad over the past decade has added to 
New Delhi’s doubts.359 
Indeed, many analysts sought to explain the decision by pointing to Indian concerns about U.S. 
reliability and Indian annoyance with U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan, with some also viewing the 
Europeans as being more willing than the Americans to transfer technologies desired by India. 
Supply reliability may have played a central role in what may have been a largely political 
decision.360 A few even suspected that deselecting the U.S.-built planes was an indirect statement 
that New Delhi did not seek full alignment with the United States. When viewed in light of 
serious obstacles to implementing bilateral civil nuclear commerce, and New Delhi’s UNSC 
abstention on Libya and tepid support for Burmese democratization, the MMRCA decision was 
for some observers a (troubling) signal that Indian decision makers are uncomfortable with 
developing closer ties with the United States.361  
Others rejected these arguments as unreasonable, given that most major powers seek to diversify 
their strategic relationships, the United States among them. For these commentators, the 
overarching relationship was not diminished by this one development and does best when a 
transactional approach is avoided.362 The judgment here is that there was no “strategic rebuff” of 
the United States, and Indian doubts about American reliability in arms trade is much diminished 
in recent years (U.S. firms have won numerous other Indian defense contracts). In the words of 
one close observer, “[T]he current threats to the burgeoning defense partnership derive less from 
abortive military sales and more from a lack of vision, focus, and determination to create the 
strategic affiliation that serves common interests.”363 Moreover, it does appear that the Indian 
procurement process worked exactly as it was supposed to—divorced from political 
considerations—and that corruption scandals in New Delhi and the ruling coalition’s recent 
travails made strategic factors even more unlikely to have played a role.364 
Human Rights Concerns 
Many of India’s more than 1 billion citizens suffer from oftentimes serious human rights abuses. 
Some analysts are concerned that, as Washington pursues a new “strategic partnership” with New 
Delhi, U.S. government attention to such abuses has waned. In a notable shift, the State 
                                                                 
359 Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables reportedly showed that senior U.S. officials had for some time been aware that, given 
these circumstances, major arms sales such as that for the MMRCA could prove difficult to secure (“U.S. Long Feared 
India Arms-Sale Snag, Cable Shows,” Reuters, April 29, 2011). 
360 See, for example, “A Way Forward in U.S.-India Defense Cooperation,” National Bureau of Asian Research, July 
2011; Praveen Swami, “Why the Critics of India’s Combat Jet Deal Are Wrong” (op-ed), Hindu (Chennai), May 2, 
2011. 
361 See, for example, Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The US-India Strategic Partnership and the MMRCA Deal,” Institute for 
Defense Studies and Analysis (New Delhi), May 6, 2011; Sumit Ganguly, “Not Squaring Up With Washington” (op-
ed) Asian Age (Mumbai), June 15, 2011; Christophe Jaffrelot, “India Keeps Abstaining, But Abstention Cannot Be a 
Policy,” Caravan (New Delhi), August 2011. 
362 S. Amer Latif and Karl Inderfurth, “U.S., India: Take a Long View of Relations” (op-ed), Defense News, May 2, 
2011. 
363 Ashley Tellis, “Decoding India’s MMRCA Decision,” Force (Noida), June 2011. 
364 Ashley Tellis, “Decoding India’s MMRCA Decision,” Force (Noida), June 2011; author interviews with Indian 
diplomats, June 30, 2011, and August 25, 2011. 
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Department’s most recent Country Report on Human Rights Practices (released April 2011) does 
not include what had been regular overarching statements in previous reports about the Indian 
government’s general respect for the rights of its citizens, nor does its introductory section make 
note of Indian government efforts or improvements in certain areas. Instead, the report moves 
quickly to a listing of India’s “major human rights problems,” including 
reported extrajudicial killings of persons in custody, killings of protesters, and torture and 
rape by police and other security forces. Investigations into individual abuses and legal 
punishment for perpetrators occurred, but for many abuses, a lack of accountability due to 
weak law enforcement, a lack of trained police, and an overburdened court system created an 
atmosphere of impunity; lengthy court backlogs prolong the latter. Poor prison conditions 
and lengthy detentions were significant problems. Unlike in previous years (2008 and 2009), 
there were no instances of officials using antiterrorism legislation to justify excessive use of 
force; however, indiscriminate use of force by Border Security Forces was a problem. 
Corruption existed at all levels of government and police. There were reports of delays in 
obtaining legal redress for past attacks against minorities. The law in some states restricted 
religious conversion, but there were no reports of convictions under these restrictions. 
Violence associated with caste bias occurred. Domestic violence, child marriage, bonded 
labor, dowry-related deaths, honor crimes, and female feticide remained serious problems. 
Separatist insurgents and terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeastern States, and the 
Naxalite belt committed numerous serious abuses, including killing armed forces personnel, 
police, government officials, and civilians. Insurgents engaged in widespread torture, rape, 
beheadings, kidnapping, and extortion. The number of incidents, however, declined 
compared with the previous year.365 
International human rights groups echo many of these findings. According to the 2011 World 
Report of Human Rights Watch,  
Authorities made little progress [in 2010] in reforming the police; improving healthcare, 
education, and food security for millions still struggling for subsistence; ending 
discrimination against Dalits (“untouchables”), tribal groups, and religious minorities; and 
protecting the rights of women and children.366  
Constraints on religious freedom are another matter of concern; India’s Muslim and Christian 
minorities continue to face sometimes violent persecution. Moreover, rampant caste-based 
discrimination is identified as a major societal problem, as are female infanticide and feticide. 
“Honor killings” of couples accused of violating Hindu marriage traditions may be on the rise.367 
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has in the past claimed 
that India’s human right abuses “are generated by a traditionally hierarchical social structure, 
deeply rooted tensions among the country’s many ethnic and religious communities, violent 
secessionist movements and the authorities’ attempts to repress them, and deficient police 
methods and training.”368  
                                                                 
365 See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160058.pdf. 
366 See http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/india. See also the 2010 Amnesty International report at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/india/report-2010. 
367 “In India, Castes, Honor, and Killings Intertwine,” New York Times, July 9, 2010. 
368 U.S. Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2002-2003. 
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Government treatment of actual or suspected militants and terrorists can be severe and potentially 
unlawful. India’s 1958 Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives security forces wide 
leeway to act with impunity in conflict zones, has been called a facilitator of grave human rights 
abuses in several Indian states. Visits by representatives of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross in 2002-2004 reportedly revealed evidence of widespread torture by security forces in 
Kashmir. Such evidence was presented to U.S. officials, according to press reports about leaked 
diplomatic cables. A senior Indian police official in Kashmir called the allegations “baseless 
propaganda.” A 2010 report by the Delhi-based Asian Center for Human Rights found that the 
incidence of torture and prison custody deaths in India is on the rise, and it chastised the current 
New Delhi government for failing to address these problems through legislative changes. After 
examining India’s nonconflict areas, Human Rights Watch issued a 2011 report detailing what it 
calls India’s “numerous, serious human rights violations” in the treatment of terrorism suspects 
detained following attacks, saying the “abuses are both unlawful under Indian and international 
law and counterproductive in the fight against terrorism.”369  
Indian authorities have brought and threatened to bring sedition charges against prominent social 
activists. According to watchdog groups, India’s colonial-era sedition law has been used to 
intimidate peaceful political dissenters in cases involving activists such as Dr. Binayak Sen and 
Arundhati Roy. Human Rights Watch repeatedly has called for the law’s repeal. Sen, who spent in 
a total of 28 months in what he described as horrific prison conditions, later accused the 
government of using the sedition laws “to silence voices of dissent.”370 
Religious Freedom 
An officially secular nation, India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with periodic 
lapses), which is protected under its constitution. The population includes a Hindu majority of 
82% as well as a large Muslim minority of some 150 million (14%). Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, 
Jains, and others total less than 4%. Although freedom of religion is protected by the Indian 
government, human rights groups have noted that India’s religious tolerance is susceptible to 
attack by religious extremists. In its annual report on international religious freedom released in 
November 2010, the State Department contended that the New Delhi government  
generally respected, provided incentives for, and intervened to protect religious freedom; 
however, some state and local governments imposed limits on this freedom. There was no 
change in the status of respect for religious freedom by the government during the reporting 
period. The national government, led by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), continued 
to implement an inclusive and secular platform that included respect for the right to religious 
freedom. Despite the national government’s rejection of Hindutva (Hindu nationalism), a 
few state and local governments continued to be influenced by Hindutva.... The law 
generally provided remedy for violations of religious freedom, however, due to a lack of 
                                                                 
369 “Wikileaks: India ‘Tortured’ Kashmir Prisoners,” BBC News, December 17, 2010; Asian Center for Human Rights, 
“Torture in India 2010,” April 2010; “The ‘Anti-Nationals’: Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Terrorism Suspects in 
India,” Human Rights Watch, February 2011. 
370 In December 2010, Sen was sentenced to life imprisonment under the sedition law for criticizing the Chhattisgarh 
government’s anti-Maoist policies. Roy was threatened with sedition charges following an October 2010 speech in 
which she voiced support for (nonviolent) Kashmiri separatism (see Human Rights Watch, “India: Repeal Sedition 
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sufficient trained police and corruption, the law was not always enforced rigorously or 
effectively in some cases pertaining to religiously oriented violence.371 
A May 2011 report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that 
“India’s progress in protecting and promoting religious freedom during the past year continued to 
be mixed” and that “justice for victims of communal violence ... remains slow and often 
ineffective.” While noting the Indian government’s creation of some structures to address past 
problems of communal violence, and recognizing positive steps taken by the central and state 
governments to improve religious freedom, the Commission again placed India on a “Watch List” 
of countries where it believes violations of religious freedom require very close attention. It urged 
the U.S. government to encourage and assist New Delhi in being more vigorous and effective in 
efforts to better protect religious freedom in India, including those aimed at halting violent attacks 
on religious minorities, undertaking more timely investigations and prosecutions of those alleged 
to have perpetrated such violence, among others.372 
Caste-Based Discrimination 
The millennia-old Hindu caste system reflects Indian occupational and socially defined 
hierarchies. Sanskrit sources refer to four social categories: priests (Brahmin), warriors 
(Kshatriya), traders (Vayisha) and farmers (Shudra). Tribals and lower castes were long known as 
“untouchables”—a term now officially banned but still widely used—or Dalits.373 Although these 
categories are understood throughout India, they describe reality only in the most general terms. 
National-level legislation exists to protect India’s lower castes, yet, according to the U.S. State 
Department, “The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act lists 
offenses against disadvantaged persons and prescribes stiff penalties for offenders; however, this 
act had only a modest effect in curbing abuse and there were very few convictions.”374 In the 110th 
Congress, H.Con.Res. 139, expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should 
address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India, was passed by the full House, but was not 
considered by the Senate. 
Human Trafficking 
The State Department’s latest annual report on trafficking in persons (issued June 2011) again 
said, “India is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children subjected 
to forced labor and sex trafficking.... The Government of India does not fully comply with the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to 
do so.” Moreover, in noting the Indian Home Ministry’s more focused efforts and the 
government’s ratification a relevant U.N. Protocol in May, India’s designation as a “Tier 2 Watch 
List” country, which it had held since 2004, was upgraded to “Tier 2,” the second highest of four 
designations. Still, State criticized law enforcement efforts against bonded labor as remaining 
“inadequate,” and said the complicity of public officials in human trafficking “remained a serious 
problem” and “impeded progress.375 
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Female Infanticide and Feticide 
Given traditional societal discrimination against females, uneven female-to-male ratios are a 
matter of growing concern for India. The incidence of female infanticide and gender-selective 
abortions is identified as a serious human rights problem in India. The diffusion of enabling 
medical technology and the existence of unethical doctors have made sex-selective abortions 
more common there. Prime Minister Singh has called female feticide a “national shame” and said 
the government has a responsibility to curtail the widespread practice. The country’s 2001 census 
found only 927 girls aged 0-6 for every 1,000 boys nationwide. Wealthier states, such as Delhi, 
Punjab, and Gujarat, have the lowest ratios (Punjab’s was the lowest at 798).376 A 2006 study 
published in the British medical journal Lancet estimated that up to 10 million Indian females are 
“missing” due to sex-selective abortions and infanticide over the past two decades, and that some 
500,000 girls are being “lost” annually.377 In subsequent years, the incidence of such practices 
only appears to be increasing.378 The most recent U.S. State Department Country Report on 
Human Rights for India (released April 2011), identified Punjab and Haryana as states in which 
female feticide was an especially “serious problem,” and noted reports of relatives “forcing” 
women to engage in female feticide.379 A June 2011 survey of gender experts ranked India as the 
world’s fourth most dangerous country for women, citing high rates of female feticide, 
infanticide, and human trafficking (neighboring Pakistan was ranked third).380 
U.S. Foreign Assistance 
A total of more than $15.9 billion in direct U.S. aid went to India from 1947 through 2010, nearly 
all of it in the form of economic grants and loans, more than half as food aid. In 2007, in response 
to several years of rapid Indian economic expansion and New Delhi’s new status as a donor 
government, the State Department announced a 35% reduction in assistance programs for India. 
The bulk of the cuts came from development assistance and food aid programs. Another smaller 
decrease came in 2008 “in recognition of the continuing growth of the Indian economy and the 
ability of the government to fund more” development programs. Under the Obama 
Administration, however, increases in Global Health and Child Survival funds, along with some 
added Development Assistance, have reverted aid amounts to their previous levels.381 Table 1 
shows U.S. foreign assistance categories and figures for FY2001-FY2012. 
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), India has the world’s 
largest concentration of people living in poverty (more than 700 million earning less than $2 per 
                                                                 
376 “Indian Prime Minister Denounces Abortion of Females,” New York Times, April 29, 2008; census data at 
http://www.censusindia.net/t_00_004.html. 
377 Cited in “India Loses 10m Female Births,” BBC News, Jan. 9, 2006. Another study found that sex-selective 
abortions of females “increased substantially” in India from 1990-2005, especially for pregnancies after a first-born 
girl. The incidence was “much greater” for mothers with ten or more years of education and in wealthier as compared 
to poorer households (Prabhat Jha, et al., “Trends in Selective Abortions of Girls in India,” Lancet (London), May 
2011). 
378 “Sex-Selective Abortions on the Rise in India Among Couples Without Boys,” Washington Post, May 24, 2011. 
379 See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160058.pdf. 
380 “The World’s Most Dangerous Countries for Women,” Reuters, June 15, 2011. 
381 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/2008/104699.htm. In 2011, New Delhi’s plans to establish its own aid 
agency have many observers questioning the need for further foreign assistance to India (see “Aid 2.0,” Economist 
(London), August 13, 2011). 
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day). USAID and economic-related State Department programs in India, budgeted nearly $120 
million in FY2010, concentrate on five areas: economic growth; health; disaster management; 
energy and environment; and opportunity and equity.382  
The United States has provided about $175 million in military assistance to India since 1947, 
more than 90% of this distributed from 1962-1966. In recent years, modest security-related 
assistance has emphasized export control enhancements, counterterrorism and counternarcotics 
programs, and military training. 
 
Table 1. Direct U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2011 
(in millions of dollars) 
Program 
or 
Account 
FY2001-
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 
FY2011 
(est.) 
FY2012 
(req.) 
CSH/GHCS 214.7 52.8 53.4 66.0 76.0 87.2 87.4 105.0 
DA 139.9 19.7 15.7 16.6 11.0 31.3 26.5 31.0 
ESF 52.3 5.0 4.9 — — — — — 
IMET 5.4 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 
NADR 7.7 2.7 1.1 1.7 1.7 3.2 5.2 5.2 
PEPFAR 47.0 29.6 29.9 29.8 30.5 27.0 30.0 30.0 
Subtotal 467.0 111.1 106.5 115.4 120.6 150.0 150.5 172.6 
Food Aid* 107.3 30.7 31.0 13.5 13.5 3.7 4.0 4.0 
Total 574.3 141.8 137.5 128.9 134.1 153.7 154.5 176.6 
Sources: U.S. Departments of State and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development. FY2011 figures 
are estimates; FY2012 amounts are requested. Columns may not add up due to rounding. 
Abbreviations: 
CSH: Child Survival and Health (Global Health and Child Survival, or GHCS, from FY2010) 
DA:  Development Assistance 
ESF:  Economic Support Fund 
IMET:  International Military Education and Training 
NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (mainly export control assistance, but 
includes anti-terrorism assistance for FY2007) 
PEPFAR: President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
* P.L. 480 Title II (grants), Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus donations), and 
Food for Progress. Food aid totals do not include freight costs. 
 
                                                                 
382 See http://www.usaid.gov/in/about_usaid/overview.htm. 
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Figure 4. Map of India 
 
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (11/2010) 
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